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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
DPHIL IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES 
EU REGIONAL POLICY IN GREECE: STATE CAPACITY AND THE 
DOMESTIC IMPACT OF EUROPE 
SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to analyse the implementation of the European Union’s 
Regional Policy (EURP) in Greece and to clarify and explain the contextual factors that 
resulted in the ineffective deployment of the policy. It adopts a comparative political 
economy approach and employs largely qualitative methods in order to collect empirical 
material. It develops a conceptual framework based on the theories of state and 
administrative capacity on the one hand and Europeanisation and implementation on the 
other. Empirically, the aim is to substantiate the difficulties that the country faced in the 
implementation of the EURP.  Moreover, the aim is to explain these difficulties with 
reference to the patterns of interaction developed within the institutional network that was 
created as part of the EURP as well as the domestic authorities that supported the 
implementation of the policy.   
 
The Greek state has suffered from a series of weaknesses that impacted upon its internal 
administrative as well as its interactive capacities in the field of developmental policy. The 
recent Europeanisation of the country’s polity has partially addressed these issues. 
Nonetheless, the fieldwork research on the implementation of the EURP reveals that these 
difficulties persisted and impacted upon the patterns of the implementation of the policy. 
Significant delays, implementation difficulties and reorganisations of the programmes were 
the main characteristics of all the programming periods. Furthermore, the introduction of 
the institutional network that would manage and monitor the implementation of the 
programmes has become embedded in the previously existing patterns of state-society 
interaction.  
 
The thesis has two main original contributions. The first consists of the empirical findings 
and particularly the detailed analysis of the patterns of implementation of the third 
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Community Support Framework (CSF). Moreover, it offers the first detailed study of the 
separate administrative network that was established in the third CSF and attempts to depict 
its impact upon the patterns of institutional interactions that were established in previous 
programming periods. Secondly, the conceptual framework that it develops in order to 
account for the patterns of implementation of the EURP in Greece has not been employed 
for similar purposes. It postulates that it is important to account for the mediating influence 
that domestic political and administrative institutional arrangements play in the 
implementation of the EURP.  
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Chapter 1. Objectives and Structure of the Research 
 
1.1. Introduction  
Greece has been among the main beneficiaries of the European Union Regional Policy 
(EURP) funding provided through the Structural and the Cohesion Funds. There is 
sufficient evidence, however, indicating that the policy was not employed effectively in the 
country. This resulted in the policy having a limited impact both in the policy areas in 
which it intervened and in terms of the spillovers that it endowed to the broader 
institutional and administrative structures of the country. This is corroborated by the long 
term macroeconomic situation of the country and the persistence of a series of structural 
weaknesses of the domestic political economy. In particular, the objective of the 
achievement of catch-up by Greece with the richest EU member states has only been 
partially achieved. Despite the more than average rates of national economic growth 
achieved during the last fifteen years- the country enjoyed an average growth rate of around 
4% in this period,1 around 2% more than the EU average- the overall situation regarding the 
structural weaknesses of the Greek political economy –low competitiveness, high structural 
unemployment, acute socioeconomic disparities- remains largely unchanged. Furthermore, 
since the 2004 and 2007 waves of enlargement, eight out of thirteen Greek regions belong 
to the group of 70 regions with a GDP per capita less than 75% of the EU average. 
Secondly, the interregional disparities inside the country, best described as the country’s 
‘regional problem’ established in the post World War II years, have not been addressed.  
 
The ‘regional problem’ mainly consists of an overconcentration of economic activity and 
population in and around the two major cities, the capital Athens and the second largest city 
Thessaloniki. Specifically, the capital continues to enjoy the sheer majority of economic 
activity as it produces around 50% of the national GDP. Moreover, in the period 2000-2006 
the gap between the rates of socioeconomic development between Athens and the rest of 
the country became even wider with the GDP of the region of Attiki growing at around 5% 
and the GDP of all the other regions of the country taken together at 3%.2 Therefore, the 
                                                 
1
 Pelagidis, 2010; CEC, 2010.  
2
 CEC, 2010, p. 58.  
  
 
2 
significant problems that one encounters in the study of the economic geography of Greece 
do not seem to have been solved by the EURP. Moreover, the structural problems of the 
Greek political economy remain more or less unchanged. Thus, the research question is 
why the EURP was not employed more effectively so as to contribute in altering these 
dynamics. The answer provided in the thesis is that it is the limited internal and interactive 
capacities of the Greek state that offer the conceptual framework through which the limited 
impact of Europeanisation that was filtered domestically through the EURP needs to be 
corroborated empirically. 
 
The remainder of the chapter introduces the theoretical and empirical aims of the thesis. It 
establishes the rationale that I develop in the remaining chapters in order to answer the 
questions that provided the initial incentive for instigating the research. Why did a 
developmental policy, initiated at the supranational level, fail to affect the endogenous 
capabilities of the Greek political economy? What was the role of the state in providing the 
institutional infrastructure required for the successful implementation of the relevant 
programmes? More specifically, what was the role played by the authorities involved in the 
implementation of the projects of regional socioeconomic development in the country? 
Furthermore, at the societal level, what were the elements that contributed to the lack of 
collective responses to the challenges offered? Finally, what role did Europeanisation play 
in the whole process? Did the external forces of participating in the EU – and specifically 
the adoption of the regulatory framework governing the activities of the EURP – play a part 
in the creation of spillovers that would affect the domestic political and socioeconomic 
institutional configurations? These were some of the fundamental questions that motivated 
the research leading to the thesis. 
 
1.2. Previous works on the effects of the EURP and the Greek political economy  
Several works have been written about the relationship between the EURP and the recipient 
countries. Similarly, many studies have attempted to explain the configurations of the 
Greek political economy. As far as the former are concerned they tend to be divided into 
two camps. Firstly, there are those that address the issues involved in a purely economistic 
way, focusing on the actual impact that the policy has had on the economies of the 
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countries that receive this type of funding. They mainly come from regional 
science/economics, mainstream economics and the new economic geography and they 
employ sophisticated econometric techniques in order to provide a quantitative assessment 
of the changes involved. They isolate the effects that other contextual factors might have 
and attempt to measure the effects of changes on GDP rates, unemployment and/or 
productivity that came as a result of the EURP either in specific countries or the EU as a 
whole. Depending on their initial assumptions, they conclude either that the EURP 
contributes positively in that it decreases the interregional disparities inside the EU3 or that 
it does so negatively as it promotes dependency of the poor member states on the EU 
handouts.4  
 
On the other hand, there are those studies that emanate from a political science perspective 
and address the interactions that exist between the actors or the institutions at the three 
territorial levels – international, national and regional/local. They tend to be of a qualitative 
nature and focus on processes rather than on clearly identifiable outputs. They are either 
comparative in their research orientation, dealing with these issues on the level of 
individual countries or groups of countries5, or they attempt to explain the changing 
constellations in the relationship between the EU and the member states.6 In both cases, 
they tend to frame their questions conceptually in accordance with the terms provided by 
the literatures on implementation, Europeanisation and multi-level governance, whilst in 
some cases these literatures are employed interchangeably.  The general aim is the 
identification of the ‘added value’7 that the EURP has in administrative, institutional or 
other policy terms either at the supranational or the national and sub-national levels.  
 
                                                 
3
 Rodriguez-Pose and Frattesi, 2004; Leonardi, 2005; Molle, 2006; Martin and Tyler, 2006; Puigcerver-
Penalver, 2007; Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007. 
4
 Boldrin and Cannova, 2001; Puga, 2002; Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis, 2002; Funck and Pizzati, 2003; 
Cappelen et al., 2003; Sapir et al., 2004; Tarschys, 2003; Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger 2005. 
5
 Borzel, 2002; Gualini, 2003; Paraskevopoulos, 2001, 2005; Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi, 2004; Andreou, 
2006; Milio, 2007; Baun and Marek, 2008; Bache, 2008. 
6
 Marks, 1992, 1993; Hooghe and Keating, 1994; Ansell, et al., 1997; Hooghe, 1996; Bache, 1998; Ansell, 
2000; Sutcliffe, 2000; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bailey and De Propris, 2002; Thielemann, 2002; Leonardi, 
1995, 2005;  Blom-Hansen, 2005; Bachtler and Mendez, 2007. 
7
 Bachtler and Taylor, 2003; Mairate, 2006; OIR, 2007; Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007. 
  
 
4 
The studies that examine the configurations of the Greek political economy also tend to be 
divided into two categories. On the one side are those studies that discuss the Greek 
political economy in isolation from the institutional variables that affect its performance.8 
They tend to examine issues of competitiveness and seem to be particularly preoccupied 
with the excessive public deficits of the national economy. Quantitative data are presented 
in a way to confirm their theories. They are usually pessimistic about the prospects of the 
Greek economy and identify the bloated public finances, the resulting reduced 
competitiveness in terms of wage levels and the limited flexibility of the labour markets as 
contributing factors. They usually conclude that a restrictive macroeconomic policy that 
would reduce the public debts and keep the wages at competitive levels is needed if the 
economy is to grow. To those studies we can add a branch of literature that again employs 
mainly econometric variables in order to elucidate the specifics of the national political 
economy. Nevertheless, contrary to previous approaches, the results that are drawn are 
closer to a post-Keynesian perspective and seem to be more favourable to governmental 
intervention as a way of achieving macroeconomic stability.9    
 
On the other side there are those studies that are more inclined to discuss the prospects of 
the Greek political economy as a whole or the progress of certain sectors of the economy 
with reference to political and/or social contextual factors. They can be seen as coming 
from the public policy literature or other sub-disciplines of political science,10 with some 
older contributions coming from the perspectives offered by the Sociology of Development 
and Economic History.11 In relation to those, one needs to make explicit references to the 
studies that emanate from the comparative political economy and answer the empirical 
questions that they pose by using either structural conceptual frameworks12 or rational 
choice ones.13 What these perspectives seem to share is an understanding of the Greek 
political economy as embedded in a series of institutional configurations which have 
                                                 
8
 Alogoskoufis, 1995; Pirounakis, 1997; Lolos, 1998; Christodoulakis and Kalyvitis, 2001; Bank of Greece, 
various reports; Moschovis and Servera, 2009. 
9
 Pelagidis, 2001, 2010; Katseli and Magoula, 2005; Kollias, 2005. 
10
 Parts of Voulgaris, 2001; Paraskevopoulos, 2001; Christoforou, 2003; Sotiropoulos, 2004; Featherstone, 
2003a, 2005; Matsagganis, 2006; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008.  
11
 Freris, 1986; Mouzelis, 1978, 1987; Tsoukalas, 1983, 1987; Psalidopoulos, 1990.  
12
 Tsakalotos, 1998; 2008; Pagoulatos, 2003; Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002; Giannitsis, 2008; Antoniades, 
2010; Pagoulatos, 2011; Featherstone, 2011.  
13
 Kazakos, 2001; Pelagidis, 2005. 
  
 
5 
largely been determined from past experiences and may be applicable to a modern context. 
The focus is usually on structural determinants of the national political economy and there 
is less preoccupation with issues of competitiveness in a strictly neo-liberal sense. Rather 
the development of social welfare, developmental and/or redistributive mechanisms gain 
more attention. The state intervention is not necessarily associated with ineffectiveness and 
the policy implication is not always the reduction of the public deficits through –amongst 
others – less participation by the government in economic activities. Nevertheless, the 
quality of the different methods of governmental intervention and the socioeconomic ‘mix’ 
in which this takes place are normally put forward as more plausible explanations for the 
configurations of the Greek political economy. These different strands of literature often 
tend to develop in isolation from each other, thereby ignoring the contributions that can be 
made by a cross fertilisation of different perspectives.  
 
1.3. General Aims and Objectives 
The purpose of the thesis is to analyse the implementation of the Structural and the 
Cohesion Funds in Greece during the period 2000-200814 and to clarify and explain the 
contextual factors that resulted in the ineffective deployment of the policy and the limited 
spillovers that were made on the domestic political, economic and social systems. As 
mentioned above, it aims to do so by adopting a comparative political economy 
perspective, which to the best of my knowledge is not an approach that has been taken in 
the study of the EURP in the member states before. No previous study has aimed to 
examine the EURP in one of the main recipient countries from the perspective of the 
theories that explicitly examine state capacities in relation to socioeconomic development 
and the relationships of these domestic factors with the external stimuli of Europeanisation. 
Thus, although some studies have recently turned their research focus on issues of 
administrative and /or absorption capacity,15 they attempt to isolate issues of administrative 
capacity from the wider political economy and social context in which the EURP 
intervention takes place. The thesis aims at improving the conceptualisations of these 
                                                 
14
 The Community Initiatives (CI) and the Innovative actions are the two other sources of finance for the 
recipient countries of the EURP. For analytical purposes they are not included in the analysis that follows in 
the thesis.  
15
 For example Milio, 2007.  
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studies through the concurrent examination of the domestic political and socioeconomic 
context in which the funds are implemented and their interaction with the external forces of 
Europeanisation as they develop through the regulatory framework that governs the 
activities of the EURP. This conceptual framework and the empirical analysis that 
accompanies it can be used in order to complement the results of studies that examine the 
domestic impact –political and socioeconomic- of the structural funds in the recipient 
countries by assigning more importance to institutional issues that affect the 
implementation and outcomes of the policy.    
 
Likewise, even though some studies have examined the implementation of the EURP in 
Greece,16 no previous study has focused so extensively on the period under examination, 
that of the third Community Support Framework (CSF) which lasted between 2000 and 
2008. Moreover, the empirical analysis that follows is detailed and in depth and addresses 
the processes involved in a systematic way as it covers all aspects of socioeconomic 
interactions. The period of the third CSF is even more important for the EURP in Greece as 
it was the first operating period for the administrative network that was set up with the 
exclusive aim to manage the structural funds. This network -Management and 
Implementation Systems (MIS)17- was created in the late 1990’s and aimed at combating 
one of the long lasting structural problems of the Greek political economy; the 
ineffectiveness of the domestic public administration. Thus, one of the contributions of the 
thesis is to examine the extent in which the MIS altered these problems and the quality of 
spillovers that were created for the country. This research can complement the research 
interest on the impact that the introduction of the MIS has had for the countries that entered 
the EU in 2004 and 2007 and the original Cohesion countries.  
 
Finally, another indirect contribution is that together with the examination of the stimuli of 
Europeanisation, the empirical aims of the thesis are substantiated through the concept of 
state-society ‘embeddedness.’ There has been an extensive literature –discussed in the 
remaining of the chapter- dealing with the broader aspects of the Greek political economy 
                                                 
16
 Paraskevopoulos, 2001; Petrakos and Psycharis, 2004; Andreou, 2006. 
17
 EPRC, 2009.  
  
 
7 
and/or specific policy or social welfare areas and their evolution over time. Usually, the 
conclusions reached by these studies are that the domestic political and social developments 
have left an ineffective state and/or an immature civil society that do not allow the effective 
fruition of developmental, redistributive or social policy measures. Although the thesis 
accepts the broader propositions of these results, it attempts to complement them through 
the examination of both the spheres of state and society in conjunction. It does so through 
the incorporation of the concept of ‘embeddedness’ which aims at avoiding simplistic 
distinctions between government action and the socioeconomic environment in which it 
takes place. Thus, the aim is to elaborate a research orientation that accepts that the Greek 
state and the civil society are inexorably interlinked and any changes to one sphere are 
likely to lead to changes to the other as well. Hence, any administrative or state reforms 
need to take into account the social ‘mix’ in which they are to be implemented. Similarly, 
any calls for bottom up ‘cultural’ changes towards a more autonomous civil society need to 
take into account the state policies both in terms of their content and their implementation 
prospects.    
 
More precisely, the thesis aims to explain the ineffective deployment of the EURP in 
Greece by utilising the perspectives offered by two branches of literature. Firstly, I employ 
those that examine internal and interactive state capacities as they developed as part of the 
comparative political economy literature and secondly those that come from the broader 
area of the EU studies. As far as the former are concerned, I refer to the insights offered by 
the theories of the ‘developmental state’18, whose main objective is the account of the 
socioeconomic development achieved by different economies. In this context, 
socioeconomic development is explained with reference to the qualitative characteristics of 
the interaction between the state and the surrounding socioeconomic environment. 
Therefore, the discussion is twofold, aiming on the one hand to explain the internal 
elements of the domestic governmental intervention in the economy; and simultaneously, to 
consider the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’19 which has been developed in order to 
account for the interaction that the state achieves with the socioeconomic interests that 
                                                 
18
 Evans, 1995. 
19
 ibid. 
  
 
8 
surround it. Nonetheless, the two spheres – the state activity and the surrounding 
socioeconomic environment – are not each examined in isolation. Instead, the internal and 
the interactive capacities of the state are employed in conjunction with each other in order 
to discuss the reasons for the success or failure of a developmental programme.  
 
The second branch of literature that is utilised in the thesis is one that discusses the 
domestic impact that the participation in the EU has on the member states. The traditional 
discussions about the dynamics of EU integration attempted to elucidate the nature of the 
unique experiment of a supranational pooling of sovereignty. The theories of 
Europeanisation and implementation, however, take the process of EU integration as a 
given and attempt to explain the impact that it has on the participating member states. 
Therefore, they see the EU as a given polity similar to some extent to the national ones 
albeit with specific characteristics which make its analysis sensitive to sectoral dynamics.20 
This is to say, this literature does not aim at providing broad range theories about the 
interaction between the supranational and the national levels in the EU. Instead, it attempts 
to discuss these dynamics in specific sectoral and policy areas, utilising the perspectives 
offered from comparative politics.21  
 
The conceptual framework that emerges from a synthesis of these two sets of literature 
aims at explaining the dynamics of the implementation of the programmes financed through 
the EURP in Greece. The EURP is the second most important policy of the EU in financial 
terms. It aims at reducing the economic imbalances between the participating countries of 
the EU and represents the most significant interventionist mechanism for the 
accomplishment of greater economic and social cohesion. Nevertheless, when it comes to 
its administration it retains certain characteristics which make its study interesting for 
anyone who wishes to examine the interaction between the member states and the 
supranational executive and legislative authorities. In particular, even though the 
Commission co-decides the design of the policy, the implementation is almost exclusively 
the prerogative of the recipient governments. Thus, the pre-existing administrative 
                                                 
20
 Ladrech, 2010. 
21
 Hix, 2005.  
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infrastructures of the latter become important intervening explanatory concepts in 
illuminating the patterns of the implementation.   
 
The policy reaches the recipient states through the Community Support Frameworks 
(CSFs), which form the agreement between the Commission and the country. They are the 
plans of regional and sectoral economic development, which encompass the four guiding 
principles of the Structural Funds; those of the concentration of resources, programming, 
partnership and additionality. In Greece, the third CSF was initiated in 2000 and was 
intended to finish at the end of 2006. However, after successive delays and extensions the 
programme finished instead at the end of 2009. It followed three other rounds of 
coordinated programs of economic and regional development that started in 1989 with the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) and continued with the first two rounds of 
CSFs.  
 
1.4. The Case of Greece 
Greece was not part of the industrial revolution that was initiated in most countries of 
Europe from the end of the 18th century until the end of the 19th century.22 Furthermore, 
because it was part of the Ottoman Empire from the mid 15thcentury until 1821, it did not 
participate in any of the cultural developments that took place in what is broadly – and 
maybe simplistically – defined today as the period of the Enlightenment.23 Greece’s 
inability to participate in either of these historical developments created a structure that has 
effectively determined the constellations of the relationship between the state and the 
surrounding economy and society ever since. 
 
Moreover, in order to compensate for the lack of an industrial base, successive Greek 
governments have either actively employed the state as a vehicle for economic and social 
modernisation or expanded its activity in the economy for many years.24 The manner in 
which this took place, however, has been intricately linked to the above mentioned 
idiosyncratic historical configurations. Therefore, although the deployment of the state as a 
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vehicle for economic and social modernisation has been a preferred strategy advanced by 
many other economic latecomers,25 in this case the continuity of previous organisational 
arrangements – both political and social – resulted in the limited success of the strategy.   
 
In relation to the more recent history of the country, Pagoulatos26 offers a convincing 
outline of the development of the country’s political economy. He identifies four successive 
and overlapping stages starting with that of economic development in the immediate post 
World War II period. After the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 the process of socio-political 
democratisation started, followed by that of Europeanisation after the accession to the EC 
in 1981. Finally, the participation in the common currency has signalled the integration of 
the country’s politico-economic system in a globalised environment. The adoption of the 
euro has been accompanied by the achievement of significant rates of economic growth that 
have consistently been above the EU-15 average. Therefore, as far as the last 15 years are 
concerned, the macroeconomic picture that emerges for the country is one of monetary 
stability achieved through the adoption of the Maastricht criteria and considerable fiscal 
expansion aided not only by the Olympic Games but also by the EU Cohesion assistance. 
Nevertheless, the country largely retains its pre-industrial character, with the primary sector 
registering very high levels of employment. Other elements that seem to confirm this 
picture are amongst others widespread tax evasion, high levels of family owned small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and high rates of self employment.27 Also, the rates of 
unemployment are particularly high – around 10%, the second highest in the EU-1528 – and 
the competitiveness of the economy is particularly low.29  
 
Furthermore, the lack of synchronicity between economic development and 
democratisation has  impacted on the lack of welfare and redistributive mechanisms in the 
country. The bottom-up demands for equality that came from the middle classes in the 
European countries did not materialise to the same extent in Greece. One area where this 
difference is most profound is the regional disparities between different localities in the 
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country. The excessive economic growth of the immediate post World War II period was 
largely the result of massive movements of migration from rural and undeveloped areas 
mainly to Athens and secondarily to the second largest city, Thessaloniki. This situation 
remained unchanged throughout the period of economic growth of the last 10 years and if 
anything it has deteriorated since at the same period the population and economic activity 
around the area of Athens has increased even more.30  
 
The internal economic imbalances between the regions of the country only serve to 
exacerbate the disadvantages that accrue because of its geographical marginalisation. The 
country is clearly located on the periphery of the European market and outside the well 
known banana shaped economic agglomeration. Moreover, until 2007 and the accession of 
Bulgaria, it did not enjoy any common borders with its EU counterparts. This makes the 
development of economic relations more difficult, whilst the precarious security situation 
with Turkey has only compounded the country’s economic problems.  
 
The regional imbalances inside the country as well as the disadvantaged position of Greece 
in relation with the EU were recognized by the Commission when it designed the EURP. 
The whole country was awarded Objective One status, which means that its levels of GDP 
have been persistently lower than 75% of the EU average. It has remained in this position 
throughout the first round of IMPs and the three CSFs that followed. The situation only 
changed in the fourth programming period – which officially started in 2007 – when some 
regions were awarded phasing-out status, which means that they will cease receiving 
Convergence –the replacement of the Objective One classification of NUTS II regions- 
funding after 2015. Nevertheless, this has been the result of the ‘statistical effect’ that came 
about as a result of the enlargement rather than the achievement of significant growth rates 
by the Greek regions.31 
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1.5. Key Issues, Concepts and Research Methods  
The thesis aims to examine the patterns of implementation of the EURP in one of the 
original four Cohesion countries.32 It does so by employing a conceptual framework that is 
sensitive to the relationships between the state and the surrounding socioeconomic 
environment on the one hand and the interaction of the domestic political and 
administrative system with the EU on the other. The internal and external characteristics of 
the mode of coordination that is provided by the state in the field of the developmental 
policy are discussed with reference to Evans’33 concepts of ‘developmental state’ and 
‘embedded autonomy’. Evans distinguishes between three possible ideal types that provide 
institutional responses in a developmental policy; these are the ‘developmental’, 
‘predatory’ and ‘intermediate’ states.34 In the case of the developmental response the state 
can be credited as initiating and sustaining a successful programme of socioeconomic 
transformation. Conversely, in the case of the predatory response the state can be seen as 
responsible not only for the lack of such transformation but also for the deterioration of the 
economic prospects of the area where the programme is implemented. The intermediate 
cases describe the most common responses where elements of both the above responses are 
combined to provide cases where a state might act developmentally in one area but fail in 
another.  
 
More specifically, the argument that is put forward is that the ambition of a state to act in a 
developmental manner is one thing; the capacity that it possesses in order to play such a 
role is another. This capacity depends on two main complementary but also overlapping 
issues, the internal administrative capacities and the external or interactive ones. The 
internal capacities depend on the existence or lack of a strong and coherent bureaucracy 
that is sufficiently resourced and trained but also adequately insulated by the broader 
political workings of the polity in which it functions. The ideal type of bureaucratic 
rationality that Weber postulated is the most accurate description of this situation, 
according to which the individual departments of the executive are able to coordinate their 
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actions in order to pursue a wider developmental objective. Their function is also supported 
by a strong judicial system that is able to impose the rule of law.  
 
The interactive capacities that allow a state to act in a developmental manner are less 
straightforward. The concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ is put forward in order to describe a 
situation in which the internal characteristics of the state are successfully embedded in the 
wider socioeconomic environment but also equally autonomous from it. The wider 
socioeconomic environment in this case refers to actors representing both the civil society 
and the sectors of the industry that are involved in the process of a developmental 
programme. The state is able to coordinate its actions with the actions of these actors but 
also allows them sufficient scope for autonomous action. This situation is also described by 
the concept of ‘Governed Interdependence’35 through which the state and the society are 
able to constantly negotiate the particular aspects of a developmental programme.  
Finally, the concept of ‘state-society synergy’36 aims at further improving the 
conceptualisation of this process. This is dependent on the existence of sufficient 
complementarity but also on embeddedness in the interaction between state and society. 
Complementarity involves clearly delineated roles between state, civil society and industry 
actors in the process and embeddedness the ability to cross the public-private divide and 
form institutionalised and mutually reinforcing relationships. The extent to which ‘state-
society synergies’ can be formed depends on the existence of adequate levels of civil 
society and social capital that is available in the area where the intervention takes place. 
Although these terms usually describe different albeit overlapping phenomena, they are 
more or less used interchangeably in the thesis in order to describe the intermediate levels 
of public sphere between the state and the individual.37  
 
Social capital has emerged as a prominent explanatory concept in the literature that 
explains public policy outcomes and/or institutional processes. It describes: 
 features of social organisation such as trust, norms and networks that can improve 
the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.38   
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The assumption is that a civic culture where social actors engage in meaningful interactions 
based on trust and reciprocity can improve the outcomes of a public policy programme or 
institutional performance by solving collective action problems. More details about the 
ways in which the terms social capital and civil society are employed in the thesis are 
provided in chapter 2. What is important to clarify at this point is that the aim of the thesis 
is not to provide a straightforward relationship between the research question posed and the 
levels of social capital in Greece. Instead, the two concepts discussed here are integrated in 
an institutionalist perspective and are examined concurrently with state action. The 
conceptual aim is to capture the bottom-up characteristics that influence the outcome of the 
EURP as they interact and/or complement bureaucratic activities.   
 
The main qualitative element that does not allow for the creation of adequate levels of 
social capital is the existence and reproduction of modes of interaction that are 
particularilistic and aim at capturing goods that are supposed to be public for private use. 
One of them is the combined notion of clientelism and patronage39 which together provide 
crucial explanatory concepts in this thesis. The terms describe methods of exchange 
between holders of public office and the public, in which the former employ the privileges 
that accrue from their position in order to gain spoils from the latter. Anthropological 
studies have adequately described the sort of interactions described by the concepts 
particularly with reference to Greece.40 What is interesting for the aims of the thesis is that 
despite the modernising reforms of Greece the clientelistic system of interchange has 
survived albeit in a different form. After the democratisation of the 1970s and 1980s it 
became a method of political incorporation and was thus transformed into ‘bureaucratic 
clientelism’.41  
 
The main force that has provided the stimuli for these modernising reforms is the 
Europeanisation of the country’s polity that has taken place during the last fifteen years. 
After a period of reluctant acceptance of even the basic obligations stemming from the 
participation in the then EC, the Greek attitude towards the EU changed substantially 
                                                 
39
 Piattoni, 2001. 
40
 Campbell, 1964. 
41
 Lyrintzis, 1984. 
  
 
15 
during the 1990s. This has informed or was informed by the change in the political attitude 
of the Greek core executive vis-à-vis the process of European integration, with acceptance 
of the need for further political integration becoming the default position of the two main 
parties that have been in government.42 Nonetheless, this process does not seem to have 
trickled down in the administrative and broader institutional systems of the country and to 
have been applied empirically. The patterns of domestic compliance with EU norms and 
regulations as well as the extent in which the country has acceded to the convergence 
criteria stipulated by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) indicate that the Europeanising 
influences were significant albeit epiphenomenal.  
 
The concepts of Europeanisation of the administrative system in particular and the 
implementation of the public policies are employed in order to provide theoretical backing 
for this point. These two concepts attempt to conceptualise the process through which the 
participation in the EU impacts upon specific aspects of the domestic polity of the member 
states. In this case the focus is on the responses of the administrative authorities involved in 
the implementation of the EURP in Greece.  During the third CSF, the implementation of 
the policy required the creation of new administrative structures – or the reinforcement of 
existing ones – that would manage the relevant programmes. The introduction of these 
administrative structures impacted directly on the process of state-society interaction, since 
the regulations that governed the operation of the programmes entailed specific and detailed 
rules about the involvement of both the private sector and representatives of civil society. 
The main result that is drawn in the thesis is that despite the creation of these new 
structures, the patterns of state-society interaction as they had been established in Greece 
changed very little.  
 
1.6. Research Design  
In order to provide a complete answer to the questions addressed in the thesis I employ an 
approach that falls broadly within the broader sub-discipline of comparative political 
economy and draws heavily on neo-institutionalism as a research approach.43 I ‘embed’ the 
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policy actions of the EURP in the context of state-society interactions and attempt to 
establish the administrative procedures that were followed and can provide adequate 
answers to the research question that I pose. In addition, I utilise the perspectives provided 
by the comparative inquiry of political systems as my overall procedural approach.44 There 
are different types of comparisons that can be used depending on the questions asked and 
the ideological commitments of the researcher.45  One can compare variables in a purely 
mechanistic way and seek for application of the results in a broader framework. This would 
imply the collection of large amounts of mainly quantitative information. Alternatively, one 
can employ narrower definitions of comparison by only examining specific qualitative 
variables in a small number of cases. The present study tends to follow the rules of 
investigation provided by the latter tradition, stressing the importance of historically and 
culturally embedded processes in the explanation of social phenomena.   
 
The distinctive element of comparative political economy is that it treats the markets and all 
other constitutive elements of capitalist relations as embedded in pre-existing cultural and 
institutional arrangements.46 In doing so it follows a tradition of scholarship mainly 
inspired by Polanyi47 and the institutionalist approaches in economics mostly established on 
the Continent.  In this context, the nation-state is considered the most appropriate unit of 
analysis and the forces of internationalisation have a much smaller impact than is usually 
assumed in explanations that adopt an outlook more focused on global processes and 
outcomes.48 To be sure, each scholar of comparative political economy tends to emphasise 
different areas of distinctiveness of the nation-states.49 Some discuss the organisational 
differences that impact upon the inter- and intra-firm relationships,50 whilst others are 
mainly concerned with the role of intervening institutions such as the process of wage-
bargaining in the policy-making process.51 The state’s role in the national markets is 
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indispensable in most accounts of comparative political economy.52 However, some treat 
the state as an autonomous actor with significant scope for independent action.53 This is the 
approach followed by the thesis.  
 
In order to acquire evidence to justify the assumptions made by the conceptual framework 
that emerges from the conceptual framework described above, I employ a mixture of 
primarily qualitative and secondarily quantitative techniques. Firstly, a series of semi-
structured interviews was conducted with employees of the administrative network created 
with the explicit aim to support the implementation of the third CSF in Greece. The 
interviewees were current and former employees of the Managing Authorities (MAs) from 
both sectoral and regional Operational Programmes (OPs). Also, interviews were conducted 
with employees of the central authority of the MA of the Ministry of the Economy –CSF 
MA- as well as with employees in other organisations of the same implementing network-
for example the Paying Authority (PA). The aim was to acquire an accurate sample of 
employees from the national, regional and sectoral levels.  
 
The choice of the interviewees was made in accordance with the snowball method of 
purposeful sampling. Essentially, I would contact specific individuals in each organisation 
and identify one who was willing to act as an initial interviewee and a gate-keeper to the 
employees of this organisation. Following this initial interview I would prompt them to 
recommend one or two other individuals that they thought would be appropriate for my 
research. I would then proceed to interviewing these employees and I would stop following 
this procedure at the point where I would recognise that the answers that I would receive 
were similar. At this point I would move to another organisation and follow similar patterns 
of purposeful sampling. I followed a similar approach with the European Commission 
employees involved in the process of the design and the implementation of the Structural 
Funds in Greece.54  
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Admittedly, conducting this short of fieldwork research in Greece proved to be a 
challenging experience and there were salient differences in the acceptance of the 
employees in Greece to provide an interview when compared with their Commission 
counterparts. Many of the difficulties that I identify in the thesis as the prime explanations 
in order to answer the research questions that I pose reflected on the process of trying to 
contact and organise interviews with employees. To be sure, it is easy for a researcher to be 
biased and seek for explanations that confirm their theories when conducting empirical 
research.  Thus, the fieldwork research can become a process of self fulfilling prophecy in 
which one simply reinforces the assumptions that they have constructed before engaging in 
the process of collecting data. I tried to avoid falling into this trap although the series of 
practical problems that I encountered meant that sometimes this required significant effort.  
 
In particular, given that I was based in Brighton, after three futile attempts to conclude the 
fieldwork in a logical time–in the summers of 2004 and 2005 and the spring of 2007- I 
decided that I would be able to proceed in acquiring an accurate sample of interviewees 
only by allowing for a substantial amount of time in the process. Therefore, I stayed in 
Athens four months of the summer of 2008 in order to allow sufficient time to conduct the 
interviews. This enabled me to allow for the last minute cancelations of the appointments 
with the interviewees –or even the no-shows at the mutually agreed specified time and/or 
the cancellation of the appointment after hours of me waiting- that were the main practical 
difficulties that I encountered. This was of course compounded by the very low response 
rate that the questionnaires that I would send as a precursor to the interview had received.  
 
Furthermore, even when an interview was agreed I could not help but noticing that the 
interviewees were very reluctant to answer truthfully to the questions posed. Instead, they 
would only touch superficially to the questions asked and seemed to resort to describing 
official procedures with which I was already familiar. A general sense of defensiveness was 
also identified when specifically asked about any problems that they thought were 
encountered in the implementation of the programmes and some of the interviewees 
seemed keen to present an artificial image of efficiency in the programmes in which they 
were involved. In a few cases this attitude was practically translated to covert hostility 
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towards the interviewer with some interviewees seemingly thinking that the aim of the 
semi-structured interviews was to unearth specific ‘scandals’ that blighted the 
implementation of the projects which of course was not my intention.  
 
True, the defensive attitude of some of the interviewees and their reluctance to offer their 
time in order to conduct a semi-structured interview are understandable given the nature of 
the discussions that relate with the management of public funds in Greece. As will be 
shown in chapter 3 one of the endemic characteristics of the relationship between the Greek 
state and the surrounding socioeconomic environment is mistrust when it comes to the 
everyday activities of the country’s bureaucracy. In particular, people seem inclined to 
adopt generalisations about ‘corrupt’ and ‘incompetent’ public servants hence it makes 
sense that the latter are defensive when it comes to openly talking about issues of managing 
public funds. This of course reflects the low levels of social trust that are endemic in the 
Greek society in general which are also discussed in chapter 3. Furthermore, there is an 
implicit agreement in the coverage of issues relating with the civil service by the Greek 
media that most of the activities that it performs are inherently corrupt. Nonetheless, this 
eagerness to hold political and administrative actors to account for the deployment of 
public money is seldom -if ever- accompanied by serious investigative journalistic research 
that would substantiate these allegations. To be sure, as will be shown in chapter 3 
corruption is indeed a significant problem especially at the local level but it is seldom -if 
ever- a strictly top down affair. There is considerable bottom up demand for bypassing 
official administrative procedures for the promotion of clientelistic interests and as will be 
shown in chapter 5 some of the media outlets themselves are active participants in this 
process. Therefore, given this social context, it is understandable that certain potential 
interviewees would become defensive when asked about instances of mismanagement since 
they may have been scared of being implicated in dubious practices.  
Another issue that is discussed in chapter 3 and might have also affected the process of 
generating qualitative information through the semi-structured interviews is that of the 
political interference of the governing party in the workings of the country’s bureaucracy as 
well as that of the general politicisation of the country’s civil service. This process is 
practically translated into frequent changes of personnel at both the upper and the lower 
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echelons of the civil service or even the ‘freezing’ of certain civil servants every time there 
is a change of government if they are considered to belong to the political party that was 
previously in government. This situation was made clear to the interviewer during the 
fieldwork conducted in the Regional OP for Western Macedonia.  
 
For the reasons outlined above, the fieldwork at the regional level had to be conducted in 
three separate occasions in 2004, 2005 and 2008. In March 2004 the new government of 
Nea Dminokratia (ND) was installed, so by the time I made the first attempt to conduct the 
interviews in the summer of 2004 no changes of personnel were made in the relevant MA. 
However, when I visited the MA for the second time in 2005 the changes in personnel were 
more than noticeable. In particular, certain heads of Units were in the midst of leaving their 
position and the rumours circulating in the MA were that this was because they were seen 
as belonging to the pervious governing party of PASOK.  
 
Following that, when in 2008 I made a final attempt to conduct further interviews with 
employees of the ROP MA and looked at the organisation chart through the internet, there 
have been almost wholesale organisational changes with previous incumbents of higher 
positions disappearing altogether from the MA. This was despite the fact that as will be 
shown in chapters 5 and 6 the MAs were introduced with the explicit aim to overcome the 
problems of politicisation and party politics interference that has been an endemic part of 
the Greek public administration in the past. Hence, given the climate of instability that hung 
over the civil servants, it made sense that some of them would be reluctant to offer a semi- 
structured interview or speak frankly to the interviewer for fear of possible recriminations 
that would count against them in the changes described above.  
 
In the case of access to the ROP I managed to partially overcome these difficulties by 
utilising as a gatekeeper to the MA of the ROP for Western Macedonia a contact that I had 
established with an employee during my brief spell as a regional policy consultant in 
Athens in 2003. The consultancy that I worked with was conducting evaluations of the 
regional OP for this region hence I could identify this employee. Thus, although I 
acknowledge that due to its size and geographical position this particular region is probably 
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not the most representative of the 13 Greek regions, the practical advantage of having 
access to its employees were the most important factor in choosing it. Having said that, 
there are similar problems affecting the institutional capacities of the regional MAs in 
Greece; hence the regional OP is not completely inappropriate as a regional case study. 
Besides, I had the opportunity to discuss these issues with both employees that managed 
sectoral OPs and collaborated with regional MAs as well as with former employees of 
regional OPs that then moved to work in a sectoral OP or have since retired.  
 
As a result of these difficulties I had to refocus my research to the whole of the third 
Community Support Framework (CSF) in Greece instead of focusing exclusively at the 
regional level, which was my initial research aim. Admittedly, certain interviewees at the 
central level -especially those working in the CSF MA- were more than willing to offer 
their time in giving me such an interview. Although the problems relating with time 
management were not wholly overcome in that level either, the employees of the CSF MA 
as well as the sectoral OPs that were based in Athens were more open to discussing in an 
open manner the research questions. I can only speculate that this enhanced level of 
openness is linked with the interaction that these employees have had with the Commission 
throughout the programming periods since the employees of the CSF MA are the official 
interlocutors of the Greek government in its communication with the Commission as far as 
the EURP is concerned. As the Commission conducts evaluations of the CSFs which 
involve the generation of qualitative information through semi structured interviews, it may 
have been the case that employees at that level were more used to the idea of offering their 
subjective perspectives as far as the progress of the EURP was concerned, which is one of 
the aims of conducting such an interview.   
 
Most importantly however these difficulties prompted me to follow a line of enquiry that 
was interested in broader aspects of institutional interaction rather than to analyse 
individual administrative processes for the implementation of the structural funds. As will 
be shown in chapter 4 the regulatory framework that accompanies the implementation of 
the EURP in the recipient countries entails the adoption of a series of principles and 
management tools in the operation of the relevant implementing bodies. These aim at 
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improving the internal capacities of the administrations that implement the programmes as 
well as their capacities in working with the surrounding socioeconomic environment. 
Moreover, the aim of these principles and tools is to provide sufficient spillovers to the 
broader policy making machineries of the recipient countries thus providing the 
opportunities for the creation of long lasting effects through the execution of the policy.55In 
particular, the principles and management tools of programme design, financial 
management, evaluation and reporting aim at improving the internal administrative 
capacities of the recipient countries. Those of partnership, project selection and monitoring 
aim at affecting the manner in which the implementing bodies would interact with the 
surrounding socioeconomic environment. Certainly, this dichotomy is not absolute and 
there is interaction amongst the operations described.  
 
Given that as will be shown in chapter 3 the Greek state has never managed to develop 
institutional capacities that could promote a coordinated programme of socioeconomic 
transformation, the influences exerted through the principles and the management tools 
would be more that significant in altering these dynamics. Moreover, identifying this 
influence in relation with the EU, thus substantiating more explicitly the parts of the 
conceptual framework that relate with Europeanisation would also be important. Hence, it 
would be interesting to distinguish the extent in which any Europeanising influence was 
internalised in the domestic administration through any of these tools and principles or 
whether the already existing top-down and bottom up characteristics of the Greek political 
economy proved indisposed to any such influences. However, the difficulties that I 
encountered in conducting the semi-structured interviews proved detrimental in not 
allowing me to pursue this line of enquiry with more vigour. For example, the identification 
of the exact processes that were followed in the implementation of the management tool of 
project selection would surely touch on sensitive issues of corruption which I discussed 
above.  
 
Most importantly the difficulties were more salient when it came to the identification of the 
influences exerted through the regulatory framework accompanying the implementation of 
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the EURP in connection with the manner in which the administrative authorities interacted 
with the surrounding socioeconomic environment. My initial research design involved 
identifying and interviewing representatives of socioeconomic interests as they participated 
in the institutional network either as Intermediate Bodies (IBs), final beneficiaries and/or 
members of the Monitoring Committees (MCs). This would have been particularly useful 
given the importance that I attach in the theoretical insights offered by the concept of 
‘embeddedness’ and would provide empirical backing particularly in connection with the 
implementation of the principle of partnership.  
 
During the three periods that I conducted the fieldwork I attempted to conduct interviews 
with representatives of civil society organisations that participated in the CSF MC as well 
as the MC of the regional OP for Western Macedonia. However, I encountered significant 
difficulties in establishing relationships of trust with these actors, whilst it became obvious 
that their knowledge on issues relating with the third CSF was partial to say the least. This 
of course was not as important an issue as the fact that -in most cases- after repeated 
attempts to pinpoint the relevant actors through examining the minutes of the MCs I 
realised that most of the organisations representing civil society either did not exist in 
reality or the volunteers that worked there could not identify specific actors that 
participated in the MC. If anything, these problems in conducting this part of the fieldwork 
provide empirical backing to the problem of the low levels of social capital and civil 
society in the country.   
 
In consequence, I integrated the discussion about the influence of the regulatory framework 
that governs the operation of the EURP to the research that dealt with broader aspects of 
inter-institutional cooperation in the framework of the third CSF. Although this was not my 
initial research aim I found out that this line was equally important to my initial aims. This 
is the case because the administrative network that was introduced in Greece in 2000 has 
not been researched in its entirety before. As was mentioned above, it was created with the 
explicit aim to overcome the rigidities of the Greek civil service that I described above and 
impacted upon the process of fieldwork. Moreover, its introduction has signalled some 
important innovations in terms of policy orientation and administrative planning. It was the 
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first time that such an administrative network with specific operational purposes for 
regional and sectoral interventions was created. Furthermore, the fact that it was endowed 
with such constitutional autonomy from the core civil service of the country made it a 
potential vehicle for the creation of spillovers to the political and administrative systems of 
the country. Thus, the research direction that I followed as a result of the difficulties that I 
initially encountered gave me the opportunity to study in depth the extent to which these 
aims were achieved in the third CSF. That does not mean of course that specifying the 
patterns of Europeanisation in connection with the specific regulatory requirements of the 
EURP is not a research avenue worth pursuing in the future. If anything the results of such 
an endeavour would enhance those presented in the thesis.  
 
The fieldwork that involved semi-structured interviews with employees of the sectoral and 
regional MAs was complemented by desk research covering programme documentation, 
implementation reports, evaluations and Greek media reports. This involved Greek media 
reports from the main Greek daily newspapers which provided coverage for the issues that I 
identified through the interviews as significant impediments in the implementation of the 
third CSF in Greece. Admittedly, newspaper articles can suffer from reduced legitimacy 
when compared to other research methods. Nevertheless, they can also provide some 
insights about the inner workings of the institutions involved if they are used in 
combination with other research methods. The documentary research involved Greek 
Government documents and particularly the ones that support the sectoral and regional OPs 
as well as minutes of the CSF Monitoring Committee of the third CSF. Admittedly, the 
incorporation of specific actions for the enhancement of information technologies in the 
second and the third CSFs meant that a set of useful information that would otherwise be 
inaccessible became available through the internet. Finally, the documentary research 
involved the documents that the DG Regional Policy of the Commission makes available in 
the form of Progress and Cohesion Reports as well as the Annual reports on the 
implementation of the Structural and the Cohesion Funds and the ex post evaluation of the 
ERDF interventions for the period 2000-2006. The Annual Implementation Reports 
provided significant sources of information relating with the practical aspects of the 
implementation of the projects financed by the Structural and the Cohesion Funds 
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particularly as far as the rhythm of the execution of the programmes was concerned. Also, 
they were a useful source of information in order to substantiate the specific problems that 
some of the projects financed encountered. Where for example the reports by the Greek 
dailies were useful in describing the broader aspects of the third CSF that proved 
problematic, the Annual Reports could identify specific implementation difficulties.   
 
In addition, quantitative information that describes specific aspects of the Greek state is 
employed in order to provide a context to the arguments that I present. They originate from 
World Bank publications and specifically the Governance indicators. These are useful 
indicators that attempt to quantify issues such as government effectiveness, the rule of law, 
control of corruption, and accountability and regulatory quality. Moreover, the interactions 
between the Greek state and the surrounding socioeconomic environment are discussed 
with reference to a series of variables. The extent of the ‘shadow economy’, comparative 
levels of corruption, trust of citizens in the civil service, and a series of indicators about the 
levels of social capital are presented. While these are data which have been collected by 
other researchers, they are a useful resource to draw upon, and together with the World 
Bank Governance indicators they highlight the context in which the Greek state’s 
implementation of the EURP was taking place.    
 
1.7. An overview of the structure of the thesis 
The introductory chapter has presented a general statement of the empirical aims of the 
thesis and the conceptual framework that it develops in order to answer the research 
questions. As discussed, the broader aim is to account for the ineffective deployment of the 
opportunities offered by the EURP in Greece. This is done through the incorporation of two 
branches of literature and the deployment of qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
Chapter 2 analyses in greater depth the conceptual framework of the thesis. In particular, it 
begins with an elucidation of the concepts of the internal and interactive state capacity. The 
main point that I make is that the two spheres of internal and external state action are not 
researched in isolation from each other. I avoid conceptualising the patterns of this 
interaction in zero-sum terms and I present them as an entity with distinct yet 
simultaneously complementary characteristics.  
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The second element of the conceptual framework that I offer – that of the comparative 
approaches to analysing the relationship between the EU and the member states – is 
presented in the next sections of chapter 2. It begins with a short discussion of the theories 
that attempted to conceptualise the process of European integration. The limitations of 
these theories are addressed by the theories of Europeanisation and implementation, which 
are discussed in the two sections of the chapter. They both share a conceptual interest in 
capturing the specificities of the dynamics between the member states and the EU and 
particularly the impact that the participation in the supranational entity has for specific 
sectors and/or policy areas in the countries. Finally, the theories that examine the patterns 
of implementation of the EURP through the conceptual prism of administrative and 
absorption capacity are reviewed in the last section. These integrate the points made in the 
previous theories as they focus on issues of capacity and the impact of Europeanisation 
simultaneously.  
 
Chapter 3 attempts to provide the first empirical substantiation of the hypothesis that I 
provide through the conceptual framework presented in chapter 2. It is divided into three 
sections, with each one addressing one of the elements of the conceptual framework. Thus, 
the section after the introduction discusses the internal capacities of the Greek state and 
puts forward specific characteristics of the Greek state as constituting the limited abilities 
for successful coordination of its actions. Then, a series of issues that hinder the ability of 
the Greek state to form meaningful state-society synergies with the actors representing civil 
society and the industry are discussed. The final section discusses the process of 
Europeanisation in the country and the patterns of compliance of domestic institutional and 
administrative actors with EU requirements.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the concept of the ‘added value’ that accrues for the member states 
through their participation in the EURP and is divided into three main sections. The first 
part attempts to locate the debates that surround the need for the existence of a 
supranational redistributive policy in the theoretical discussions that informed its 
establishment. Moreover, it provides a description of the political and financial details that 
have been accompanying its execution and how they developed historically. It then focuses 
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on the principles that govern the operation of the EURP and discusses the role that each of 
these is supposed to play in the different stages of the policy. The final section attempts to 
link the material that was provided in chapter 4 with the information that I presented in the 
previous chapters.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the empirical aspects of the implementation of the EURP in 
Greece, mainly during the third CSF but also throughout the previous three programming 
periods. Chapter 5 discusses the main difficulties that were presented to the domestic 
authorities during the implementation of the EURP. Chapter 6 then focuses on the 
institutional impact that the EURP had for Greece. In particular, the first section of chapter 
5 provides a brief discussion of the ‘regional problem’ that the country faces, which the 
EURP was supposed to help in solving or ameliorating. The next section of the same 
chapter discusses the main parameters of the patterns of the implementation of the first 
IMPs and the first two rounds of coordinating assistance in the form of the first and the 
second CSF.  It also discusses the legacy that the implementation of these three rounds of 
structural assistance has left for the third CSF, which is the focus of the next two sections. 
In particular, the subsequent section presents the main financial and programming details of 
the third CSF for Greece, whilst the penultimate section elucidates the main problems that 
were presented during the process of the implementation of the programme as they were 
revealed during the fieldwork. This section is sub-divided in five sub-sections each one 
addressing the specific issues that have hindered the implementation of the third CSF in a 
more effective manner.  
 
As I mentioned above, chapter 6 focuses on the institutional issues that affected the 
implementation of the CSFs in Greece. The section that follows the introduction elaborates 
on the institutional authorities that implemented regional development policies in the 
country before 1986 and after the introduction of the first IMPs. Then the focus moves on 
to the institutional issues that affected the implementation of the first and the second CSFs, 
whilst the subsequent section examines these issues about the third CSF. This section is 
also subdivided in four sub-sections each one of which discusses the difficulties that the 
institutional authorities faced during the implementation of the third CSF as they were 
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revealed through the fieldwork. The penultimate section attempts to link the conceptual 
framework with the domestic institutional issues. It does so by examining how issues of 
state-society interaction interacted with the tangible effects of Europeanisation that the 
introduction of the institutional network for the support of the third CSF signalled.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the research and presents the main substantive findings. After a brief 
introduction, the second section provides an overview of the research aims and empirical 
findings. The third section discusses the limitations of the existing literature on the EURP 
and the Greek political economy and the ways in which the thesis attempts to address them. 
The fourth section focuses on the policy implications that arise from the thesis in relation 
with the EURP and the other recipient countries.  
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Chapter 2. The Conceptual Framework  
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the conceptual framework that I employ in order to answer the 
research questions posed in the thesis. It discusses the theories that examine the internal and 
the interactive capacities of a state as well as the comparative approaches in the study of the 
relationships between the EU and the member states. Specifically, the next section presents 
the theories that focus on the internal capacities of the state. Then the focus turns to the 
capacities of the state to interact successfully with the surrounding socioeconomic 
environment. The conceptual framework is enhanced through the incorporation of the 
insights offered by the theories that attempt to capture the dynamics of the complex and 
often contradictory forces between the EU and the member states. In order to achieve this, 
the theories of Europeanisation and implementation are discussed in the remaining sections 
of chapter 2. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the theories of administrative 
capacities in the context of EURP implementation, which incorporate elements from both 
the theories on state capacities and Europeanisation/ implementation.   
 
2.2. Internal state capacities  
The internal state capacities are discussed in this section with reference to Evans’56 
distinction of the states as either ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ ones.57 This classification is performed 
in accordance to their administrative capacities. In short, a strong state is one which: 
in the first respect has a bureaucracy that is sufficiently resourced and trained and is 
able to carry out the policy. In the second it needs to enjoy sufficient independence 
from firms and other actors to pursue wider public interests while at the same time 
engaging with those groups in order to define and follow up those wider goals.58  
 
Evans employs the concept of the ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy in order to illustrate the manner 
in which an administration needs to operate in order to be successful in its intervention in 
the socioeconomic domain. Weber himself analyses different aspects of national 
bureaucracies; his main contribution in the comparative analysis of the bureaucratic 
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structures is the fact that he draws attention to the internal organisational features of 
national bureaucracies and in particular their role in promoting or hindering development. 
In this discussion the implication is that contrary to the popular identification of too much 
bureaucracy in an economy with unproductive activities, more bureaucracy is needed in 
order to promote development rather than hinder it.  
 
To be more precise, Evans and Rueschemeyer59 provide a description of the Weberian state 
as:  
a set of organisations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for 
people and organisations juridically located in a particular territory and to 
implement these decisions using, if necessary, force.  
 
Furthermore, Evans claims that a state apparatus that promotes development should operate 
according to the principle of meritocracy, provide long-term career paths to its employees 
and create a stable system of incentives in accordance with rules and established norms. In 
addition, apart from the formal elements of the structure of a national bureaucracy, what is 
equally important is the existence and development of informal networks between the civil 
servants.  
 
Moreover, there are some additional characteristics that the actors that participate in a state 
with strong internal capacities, that is the state officials, must obtain, apart of course from 
the very high level of skills acquired at the University or National Public Administration 
Schools. To begin with, the state bureaucracy is motivated by the type of ambition that 
Loriaux describes in his discussion of the French ‘developmental state’:  
that ambition is not only one of economic growth but also one of protection and 
promotion of the national interest, as perceived or determined by the administrative 
elite. The developmental state elite often directs its attention to perceived 
vulnerabilities, such as dependence on foreign suppliers … the ambition can assume 
revolutionary dimensions when the state bureaucracy seeks to address those 
vulnerabilities by promoting radical change in social structures and norms.60 
 
In order to promote that ambition, the state officials should have the power to employ the 
mechanisms they think appropriate in that direction. There are some important normative 
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elements in the approach suggested here in that clearly the ambition described does not 
refer to the standard macroeconomic criteria that usually determine the outcome of 
developmental policies based on neoclassical grounds. Indeed, Loriaux goes on to specify 
the moral ambitions of the successful interventionist state as those goods such as ‘social 
stability’, ‘social cohesion’, and ‘self-sufficiency’ which ‘are not valued solely or even 
primarily for the economic externalities they produce’.61 A similar point is made by 
Johnson62 when he discusses the differences between the ‘market- rational’ and the ‘plan- 
rational’ states. He points out that in the former, the main criterion employed in order to 
evaluate government actions is that of ‘efficiency’, whereas in the second type – in which 
the state plays a much more active role – ‘effectiveness’ is the proper standard of 
evaluation of policy-making by the government.  
 
Achieving these objectives cannot be realistically expected by a government with 
departmental agencies that are likely to fail to coordinate between them. The policy 
objectives of each agency are likely to create situations of inertia that might jeopardise any 
developmental project. A social policy ministry is more likely to promote expansionary 
measures that alleviate the difficulties faced by specific social groups whilst a finance 
ministry is more likely to advance policies of austerity. Conflicting priorities of this type 
are likely to result in the state being unable to coordinate any programme of industrial 
transformation. For these reasons a ‘developmental state’ needs to be coordinated by a 
separate agency that works above the existing ones and is endowed with the specific task of 
promoting rapid socioeconomic transformation. Hence, apart from the obvious 
characteristics of the internal Weberian bureaucracy, a ‘developmental state’ must cater for 
the creation of an extra layer of bureaucracy that is endowed with the assignment of 
coordinating the other governmental agencies involved. Furthermore, it needs to enjoy 
operational autonomy from the broader machinations of party politics and governmental 
rivalries. This was the role played by the MITI according to Johnson’s account in Japan and 
also by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in Korea.63  
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Therefore, the internal administrative capacities are important in determining the possibility 
of the emergence of a ‘strong’ state. A state needs to enjoy strong internal corporate 
coherence and as much autonomy as possible from the broader political realities of the 
country in which it operates. Moreover, it needs to enjoy the backup of a judiciary that can 
provide the capacity to apply the rule of law through the developmental policies that it 
attempts to promote. Nevertheless, by this it should not be inferred that a state with robust 
internal capabilities is capable of imposing its views evenly across all sectors where policy 
is conducted.64 Instead, what most commonly occurs is that states, for various reasons, 
develop strong capabilities in certain sectors and might be unable to enforce their views in 
others. In this particular context the focus is obviously on developmental policy and on 
administrative capability, which is defined as ‘the capacity to devise and implement 
policies that augment society’s investible surplus’.65  
 
2.3. Interactive state capacities  
So far I have highlighted the importance of the state possessing the internal capacity to 
coordinate and facilitate the transformation of the domestic economy.  However, while this 
capacity is a necessary prerequisite it is not sufficient. The state cannot be isolated from its 
socioeconomic surroundings. This section therefore focuses on the external ties that a state 
needs to have with the surrounding socioeconomic environment in order to achieve its 
developmental objectives. In addition to stressing the internal requirements of the state, 
Evans emphasises the way in which the administration works with the private sector or 
other societal actors, especially those involved in the process of development. The focus 
here is on the external ties that connect the state with civil society66 and industry. 
Generally, the state that works according to a ‘developmental’ scheme can also be 
characterised as a case of ‘embedded autonomy’ in which states and industry collaborate in 
a positive manner in order to accomplish a common vision of economic transformation. 
Conversely, the ‘predatory state’ will largely ignore any participation of societal actors in 
the policy-making process and will either operate along authoritarian lines or fail to 
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implement successfully any project of economic development. An ‘intermediate state’ has 
either not taken the necessary actions in order to operate as a ‘developmental’ one, or 
having done so, the structures of the country were not appropriate for that type of 
intervention because of the diminished capacities of either the state itself or civil society or 
both of them.  
 
The explanatory concept of ‘embeddedness’ is central to the works of social theorists that 
discuss the ways in which the social structures impact upon an individual’s actions. 
Polanyi67 originally made use of the concept to exemplify the way in which capitalist 
relations – in particular those revolving around market functions – are inextricably 
constrained by pre-existing institutional and cultural structures. Additionally, Granovetter68 
employs the concept in the discussion of the ways in which social structures affect both 
individual behaviour and institutional outcomes. By doing so he provides a middle range 
theory between the utilitarian accounts of individual action and those accounts that assign 
sole importance to the socially constructed incentives of the individuals. Furthermore, it is 
worth noting that the different ways in which the notions of ‘embeddedness’ are employed 
in social sciences lead to the establishment of a distinct field of studies of structural 
analysis in sociology, economics and politics In this context, Hollingsworth and Boyer69 
provide an elaboration of the embeddedness of the markets in the social and institutional 
arrangements of different localities in all three territorial levels of analysis.   
 
In the thesis, the concept of ‘embeddedness’ is employed in order to describe the collective 
outcomes of the collaboration – or rather lack of it – between public officials and societal 
actors that are supposed to respond to the developmental incentives provided by the state. 
Evans suggests that although the above-mentioned internal elements of a national 
bureaucracy provide for the autonomy of the state from the wider political machinery, they 
do not necessarily mean that the state is insulated from the society as well. As he puts it: 
[on] the contrary, these internal characteristics are embedded in a concrete set of 
social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for 
the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies. Either side of the 
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combination by itself would not work. A state that was only autonomous would lack 
both sources of intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralised private 
implementation. Dense connecting networks without a robust internal structure 
would leave the state incapable of resolving ‘‘collective action’’ problems, of 
transcending the individual interests of its private counterparts. Only when 
embeddedness and autonomy are joined together can a state be called 
developmental.70  
 
Therefore, Evans attempts to avoid theorising about the state and the society in zero-sum 
terms, which is for example what Migdal71 does. Instead, he aims to integrate the state-
society analysis in a distinct conceptual framework that can capture the particularities of 
their interactions. Similar to Evans, Weiss72 also assigns much importance to the 
interrelationships between the state and society and avoids theorising them as separate 
entities. In doing so, she elaborates Evans’ concept of embedded autonomy and introduces 
the concept of ‘Governed Interdependence’ which refers to a specific kind of 
institutionalised linkage between the government and the surrounding socioeconomic 
environment. As she puts it: 
in a system of Governed Interdependence…the question of ‘‘who initiates’’ loses 
much of its meaning and importance. Both the state and industry can and do take 
policy initiatives but this takes place within a negotiated relationship in which the 
state retains a guiding role, exercising leadership either directly or by delegation to 
industry. 73  
  
Therefore, through a system of ‘Governed Interdependence’, far from losing in strength, the 
state actually gains by delegating responsibilities to the non-governmental actors, as the 
projects that it initiates are implemented more effectively. Furthermore, this relationship is 
institutionalised, with the state using its technical expertise in order to provide information 
and guidance in exchange for the commitment of the non-state actors to collective goals of 
development.  
Following this line of argument, in a later addition to his theory Evans74 discusses the 
concept of ‘state-society synergy’, with synergy referring to mutually reinforcing relations 
between governments and groups of engaged citizens in the area of a developmental policy. 
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He distinguishes between two elements that constitute synergy: complementarity and 
embeddedness. The former is described as ‘synergy based on complementary actions by 
government and citizens’ and the latter as ‘synergy based on ties that cross the public-
private divide.’75 He goes on to assert that complementarity entails a clear division of 
labour between the government and the non-governmental actors. Each one delivers the 
outputs that it is best suited to deliver and putting them together produces greater results 
than what would be produced if the two acted separately. For example, the state delivers an 
environment in which the rule of law prevails, which increases the effectiveness of local 
organisations and institutions.76  
 
Furthermore, complementarity can also promote the formation of social capital and a 
vibrant civil society in an area. This is achieved through the incorporation of the notion of 
‘embeddedness’ which provides the institutional potential for the fruition of the 
complementary activities. In this sense the synergistic relationships that are developed in 
accordance with complementarity are reinforced through embeddedness and the two turn 
out to be mutually supportive.77 In empirical terms, an example would involve government 
officials being directly involved in trying to create better horizontal relationships amongst 
the stakeholders that participate in a developmental programme. Through this, they attempt 
to increase the levels of trust amongst the latter and provide the necessary presuppositions 
for productive interaction. They will do this, however, without leaving the bureaucratic 
roles which they sustain throughout the process. Therefore, through the incorporation of the 
concept of embeddedness, complementarity is enhanced, since social capital enters the 
conceptual discussions.  
 
On the whole, the literature on ‘social capital’ is extensive; Putnam78 explains the 
normative implications of the concept together with evidence that relate declining levels of 
civic association in the USA. The concept of ‘social capital’ and its relationship with 
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development in particular is usually associated with the research provided by Putnam79 and 
his associates on the correlation between the low levels of civic engagement and economic 
underdevelopment in Southern Italy. To be sure, Bourdieu was actually the first to 
elaborate the concept.80 Nevertheless, as Outhwaite81 puts it:  
Bourdieu’s focus is closer to Marx in looking at the way in which these forms of 
capital and the ways in which they are used by their bearers reinforce social 
inequalities and antagonisms between classes.  
 
The results of Putnam’s and his associates study in general and particularly the fact that the 
Southern part of the country is juxtaposed with its Northern counterpart as far as economic 
development and levels of civic association go, attracted extreme levels of disagreement 
from several theorists. Apart from scepticisms expressed about the normative implications 
of the concept as such it is thought that other historical and economic reasons are more 
suitable to explain the North-South divide in Italy and similarly economic inequalities 
inside a nation’s territory in general.    
 
In particular, it is thought that the ‘social capital’ theories do not address collective 
outcomes but are very much preoccupied with the role of the individual in an entity. That 
persistence on individual action makes it rather difficult for the theories to be differentiated 
from other theories such as ‘public choice’, which seem to be using the term ‘public’ or 
‘social’ in an abstract way. In addition, the rather simplistic nature of explaining the 
creation and constellation of social interests in a locality, that is the perceived homogeneity 
of interests and the insufficient description of class struggles among a population make the 
theories of ‘social capital’ insufficient for explaining issues of underdevelopment.82 In the 
same vein some analysts think that what Putnam does is to actually romanticise a ‘for ever 
gone’ community, which probably did not even exist.83 That is the case mostly about 
‘Bowling Alone’ in which Putnam contradicts an old period of increased collectivist spirit 
in the American society with the modern lifestyle of individualisation. Finally, the usage of 
the theory in a positive fashion, in other words the quest for the ‘top-down creation’ of civil 
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structures in a lagging area or the explanation of divergent economic performances 
exclusively due to the lack of civil structures adds to the frustration caused to some by the 
theory.  
 
Despite the justified –to a certain extent- criticisms that can be addressed to those theories 
that employ those particular pecuniary elements of social interaction –trust, capacity for 
associational relationships- in order to describe an areas’ developmental prospects, a 
particular perspective of ‘social capital’ theory is necessary, if anything for analytical 
purposes.84 In such a perspective, the actions of the government are still the centre of the 
analysis, however the state officials are not considered isolated from the society that 
surrounds them. Rather, they participate in the latter not only as citizens themselves but 
also during the course of their operation as agents of development. The former perspective 
can elucidate cases of corruption or rent-seeking activity on behalf of public officials, 
whilst the second can be of use for the description of developmental projects. The state 
cannot be considered to be working in separation from the society or vice versa.  
 
Broadly, that is the approach taken by Evans in his examination of the synergistic 
relationships between the actions of the government and the surrounding society. He does 
favour the adoption of a method that spans the ‘public-private divide’ and examines the 
state-society linkages in a thorough way. He also accepts the supposition made by Putnam 
and his associates about the crucial role played by the low ‘endowments of social capital’ in 
the Southern part of Italy that lead to its underdevelopment relatively to the Northern part.85 
Nonetheless, he comes to the conclusion that the Third World countries, which he examines 
and seem to lack in the incorporation of successful state society ‘synergy’, are not short of 
pools of ‘social capital’. Thus, he points out that ‘based on these cases it seems reasonable 
to argue that if synergy fails to occur, it is probably not because the relevant 
neighbourhoods and communities were too fissiparous and mistrustful but some other 
crucial ingredient was missing’, adding that ‘the most obvious candidate for the missing 
ingredient is a competent, engaged set of public institutions’.86  
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There is an additional argument that can justify the usage of elements of the theory that was 
elaborated by Putnam and his associates when examining the interaction between different 
layers of social analysis. Although the thesis does not adopt an approach that favours the 
adoption of geographical factors in determining developmental outcomes, the fact that the 
type of policy that is examined requires the active participation of actors at the regional and 
the local levels cannot be ignored. Having said that and since the influence of the 
‘embedded’ elements of social interaction in individual action is a central principle in the 
thesis we must acknowledge that as Hollingsworth and Boyer put it:  
at the regional and local levels, trust and tacit knowledge are better nurtured within 
communities and networks’.87  
That point is later enhanced when they point out that the institutional arrangements of the 
local communities  
are based on trust, reciprocity or obligation and thus are not derived from the pure 
selfish computation of pleasure and pains.88 
 
To conclude, the current section attempted to provide the first component of the conceptual 
framework employed in the thesis. In particular, it broadens the concept of state capacity 
which was discussed in the preceding section by integrating the conceptual discussions that 
analyse the interactive capacities of the state-society relationships. Robust internal 
bureaucratic structures can only result in successful developmental interventions if they are 
complemented by successful state-society synergies. These are achieved through a 
combination of complementarity and embeddedness. However, as Evans puts it:  
Complementarities create the potential but do not provide an institutional basis for 
realising it. Most examples of synergy involve concrete ties connecting state and 
society which make it possible to exploit complementarities. Norms of trust built up 
from intimate interaction and are not restricted to relations within civil society. 
People working in public agencies are closely embedded in the communities they 
work with, creating social capital that spans the public-private divide.89   
 
2.4. Europeanisation  
On the whole, the study of EU integration is conducted by those theorists who view the 
EC/EU as a product of negotiations between sovereign member states and those who 
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theorise it as a distinct supranational entity that enjoys significant leeway for autonomous 
action from the constraints of the member states.90 In the first case,91 European integration 
is driven by the interests of the participating countries, which have created a supranational 
organisation with functional characteristics and responsibility in areas of ‘low politics’.  In 
the latter,92 the project of European unification is viewed as a distinct case of the creation of 
distinct supranational functional interests which in the future could take a discrete form. 
Usually, the former contributions arrive from the field of International Relations (IR) whilst 
the latter employ methodological tools that are usually associated with comparative politics 
and public policy.   
 
The discussion about the roots and the impact of the project of European unification has 
contributed significantly towards an understanding of the unique political experiment which 
is the EU. However, it suffers from a series of weaknesses: firstly, it fails to account for the 
role that other mediating factors play in the interplay between the member states and the 
EU.93The assumption that on the one hand the member states are passive pawns that adopt 
activities stemming from the EU or conversely that the EU becomes uniformly influenced 
by the countries that participate, regardless of their national histories and cultures, is 
difficult to accept. In order to compensate for these shortcomings, a number of middle 
range theories, broadly influenced by neo-institutionalism, have been developed in the last 
fifteen years. Their conceptual objective is not to disregard the traditional theories of 
European integration but rather to supplement them by providing additional levels of 
analysis and also explanatory frameworks. Two of them are discussed in this context: 
firstly, the approaches that are broadly included under the rubric of Europeanisation and 
secondly those of implementation of EU policies. The former are discussed in the 
remaining of this section.  
 
Europeanisation is a relatively recent addition to the theoretical literature on EU Studies, 
embracing both the process of European integration and the dynamics of European social 
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and political change. The starting point of the arguments employed by the writers that 
employ these theories is that since the European integration is currently established in 
specific areas, the theoretical justification for examining only the supranational elements of 
that cooperation is not always obvious. They suggest that we cannot ignore the fact that for 
many countries the external pressures emanating from Europe –through the EU- exist and 
the EU has a direct influence on these countries' domestic political and institutional 
developments. Therefore, they propose a conceptual framework that is sensitive to this 
reality and examines the influence that domestic mediating factors play in the relationship 
between the domestic and the supranational levels.94 An extensive account of the 
theoretical discussions that have been proposed in this area falls outside the scopes of this 
paper.95 It could be generally argued however that the principal theoretical and empirical 
aim of these studies is to capture the impact that the membership in the EU has on different 
domestic institutional spheres. The national parliaments, party systems, patterns of interest 
intermediation, state structures and territorial relationships are some of those institutional 
spheres.96 Furthermore, it is obvious that there are two issues that seem to be common in 
these discussions. Firstly, that there is little convergence amongst the member states as far 
as their adaptation in the common EU policies is concerned. Instead, divergent outcomes in 
what is considered common regulatory influences emanating from the EU are the norm. 
Secondly, the precise outcome of these interactions is dependent on the ‘goodness of fit’ 
between the supranational requirements and the pre-existing domestic political and 
institutional practices.   
 
The EURP is the policy that entails specific and tangible impact of Europeanisation through 
the introduction of the common regulatory framework that guides its activities; hence, it has 
gained prominent attention in these debates. In this context, Leonardi97 offers a conceptual 
framework that aims at addressing the possible responses of the domestic national and sub-
national governmental authorities to the structural funding of the 2000-2008 period. He 
distinguishes between three types of possible administrative responses, namely negation, 
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adaptation and learning. In the case of negation, the domestic administrative authorities 
reject the rules and regulations that are attached as requirements for the implementation of 
the programmes. This is not necessarily an ‘irrational’ response as it could be justified in 
accordance with previously embedded internal administrative and political practices. The 
costs of internalising the norms and procedures inherent in the new regulations outweigh 
the benefits, hence the negative administrative attitude. The impact of this will be minimal 
socioeconomic growth even though that comes as an unintended consequence of the 
practice of negation. 
 
The process of adaptation of the rules and regulations entails a passive incorporation that 
aims at as little administrative innovation as possible. The relevant national and regional 
authorities adopt the processes in an incremental manner and they attempt to 
‘compartmentalise’ any institutional effects into a narrow administrative area. What is 
important in this case is for the authorities to be seen to adopt the regulations in a 
constructive manner even though the reality is different. In practice, there is limited usage 
of methods of regional planning, management and reporting procedures, resulting in the 
partial expenditure of the funds. The socioeconomic impact of the policy is more significant 
than in the previous case, albeit not as important as it was initially aimed to be.  
Finally, in the case of learning, the domestic national and regional authorities fully comply 
with the new rules and regulations and try to take full advantage of the structural spending. 
The new rules are internalised by the relevant bureaucracies and trickle down to other 
collaborating administrative agencies. The policy results in an increased institutional 
capacity, stemming from substantive changes taking place both at the individual and the 
structural level of the actors involved. There is a healthy collaboration between the national 
and sub-national policy actors with their Commission counterparts, and most importantly, 
meaningful partnerships develop with socioeconomic actors. As a result, the policy 
achieves most of its objectives in terms of job creation, increased private investment and 
output growth. A useful sketch of the possible responses in the EURP principles and 
management tools is presented in the Figure 1.  
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Figure 1  
 
 
Source: Leonardi, 2005.  
 
2.5. Implementation of EU policies  
The theories that examine the patterns of implementation of the EU policies by the member 
states aim at explaining the divergence in the application of the directives and regulations 
that govern the activities of the EU by some member states. In other words, the initial 
question in that line of enquiry is fairly straightforward: what happens to the decisions 
taken by the EU Council, the Commission and the European Parliament, or all of them – in 
those areas in which methods of co-decision apply – when they are to be transposed to 
national laws? Since the legal capacity of the EU to enforce that legislation, either via the 
Commission or the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in cases of infringement, is limited in 
particular policy areas (notably the Competition policy), it is mostly up to the national 
authorities to enforce the legislation. By definition that process has direct implications 
about the patterns of enforcement of the common EU policies with the EURP being one of 
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them. This is the case especially since much of the legislation that governs the EURP is 
deliberately left to the discretion of member states in order to take account of specific 
national, regional and local circumstances.98  
 
After a relatively late start, the studies that examine the patterns of enforcement of EU 
legislation by the member states have grown considerably in the last twenty years.99 As 
with the theories of Europeanisation, an extensive discussion of the theories of 
implementation falls outside the scope of this chapter.100 Nevertheless, it is important to 
attempt a presentation of the theories that inform the empirical material presented in the rest 
of the thesis. To start with, Cini101 discusses the implementation of EU policies with 
reference to the distinction between two types of implementation theories, which in turn 
determine the political actors that are mainly responsible for the perceived implementation 
problems. In particular, she distinguishes between the top-down as opposed to the bottom-
up perspectives of the causes of the implementation deficits. This follows the dichotomy 
attempted by the traditional theories of implementation which identify similar processes in 
operation in every policy field.102 Following a similar line of enquiry, Lane103 and 
Parsons104 distinguish between two models of theories of implementation – albeit not in the 
EU context – as those of top-down and bottom-up. Lane furthers his analysis by pointing 
out that implementation is not similar to the evaluation of outcomes of a policy 
intervention. Rather, it implies a process which is not easily measurable but must be 
constantly revisited during the policy cycle. It can come up as a result of both ‘control and 
hierarchy’105 in the top-down model and ‘exchange and interaction’106 in the bottom-up 
one. Dimitrakpoulos and Richardson107 also stress the importance of conceptualising 
implementation as a process rather than a set of outcomes, and argue that this is pertinent 
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for EU policy making in particular. Nevertheless, they conclude that the perfect 
implementation of a programme is not only unfeasible but also unnecessary. 
Implementation is a complex process and is influenced by so many factors that it is normal 
that the outcome will deviate significantly from the ideal type set out at the stage of the 
design of a policy.  
 
Therefore, implementation in the current sense is presented as a process that is influenced 
by myriads of both top-down and bottom-up factors. In this context, a report on the 
implementation of the Structural Funds, commissioned by the European Commission,108 
places implementation in a broader policy cycle, as depicted in Figure 2. It defines 
implementation as the process that generates ‘the operational processes to produce expected 
outputs.’ It is the intermediary stage between on the one hand the identification of the 
problem that a policy action is supposed to solve, and the allocation of the funding and the 
results that are produced on the other. It also stresses the importance of ‘embedding’ the 
process of implementation in the wider socioeconomic and political context in which it 
takes place. It describes the process as ‘frequently mundane, incremental, and the subject of 
bargaining and negotiation’, concluding that the policy programmes ‘are in fact open 
systems that react and interact with a reference context.’109     
 
Finally, in the Commission evaluation of the influence that the Management and 
Implementation Systems (MIS) that were designed in order to support the implementation 
of the programmes co-funded through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
had in the recipient states,110 three types of likely domestic influences are identified; 
institutional, operational and cultural. In the case of the institutional and the cultural 
influences, the possible influences are more or less straightforward and are also covered by 
the literature on Europeanisation discussed above. Thus, in the case of the institutional 
adaptation, the establishment of new structures and fora is the most obvious example of the 
influence of the EURP regulations in the domestic MIS. Similarly, in connection with the 
cultural influences, the prospect of changing established administrative practices that have 
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proved ineffective is discussed. More interesting for the current discussion however is the 
conceptualisation of the possible influences exerted in the operational practices. These 
mainly relate with the modification of procedures and methods of policy implementation 
that come as a result of the establishment of the MIS at the domestic level. These issues are 
discussed in greater length in chapter 4; suffice to point out here that they relate with the 
impact that the four principles that guide the operation of the structural funds –those of 
programming, concentration, additionality and partnership- as well as the management 
tools that are implicit in them have in the operational practices followed by the MIS. 
Through incorporating the insights provided by this evaluation the conceptualisation of the 
patterns of implementation is significantly enhanced. This is because in that way the 
specific influence exerted through each of the principles can be identified hence the impact 
of the regulatory framework introduced through the EURP in connection with patterns of 
implementation in particular can be discerned.  
 
Figure 2. The Policy Cycle  
 
 
 
Source: OIR in association with LRDP and IDOM, 2003, p.11   
 
2.6. Administrative/ Absorption Capacity  
This section discusses the final component of the conceptual framework that I employ in 
the thesis. It introduces the concept of administrative and/or absorption capacity in order to 
Identification of the Problem 
Evaluation of Results Formulation of Solutions 
Implementation Decision on Finance 
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accurately reflect the dynamics of the interaction between the supranational and the 
domestic levels of analysis. The studies that are discussed in this section have developed 
mainly with reference to the administrative preparedness as they were applied practically 
through the PHARE programme for the countries that entered the EU with the waves of 
enlargement of 2004 and 2007.111A further study for one of the former Cohesion 
countries112 is also discussed.  
 
The main conceptual innovation of these studies is that they explain institutional capacities 
with specific reference to the administrative systems that were introduced in order to 
manage the relevant programmes. As with the previous elements of the conceptual 
framework, they focus on the domestic level of the countries that receive EURP funding 
and attempt to explain the patterns of their adjustments to the regulatory framework of the 
policy. In this context, Horvat113 identifies three specific definitions of the absorption 
capacity: 
• Macroeconomic absorption capacity, which is the amount of funding in GDP terms 
that is allocated in each recipient country. 
• Administrative absorption capacity, which is the ability and the skills of the national 
and sub-national authorities to operate in accordance to the rules specified by the 
four principles of the Structural Funds. These rules are discussed in greater length in 
chapter 4; it suffices to point out here that they relate with the ability to prepare 
acceptable plans, projects and programmes in sufficient time, co-ordinate their 
actions with those of the partners representing socioeconomic interests etc.  
• Financial absorption capacity which is the ability of the national authorities to apply 
the rules entailed in the additionality rule and identify appropriate partners to 
provide the part of the national contribution that must arrive from the private sector. 
Again this aspect is discussed in more detail in chapter 4; it has to do with the 
quality of the private sector to participate by providing their financial contribution 
in the projects financed through the structural funds.  
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Milio114  on the other hand focuses explicitly on administrative capacity, which she defines 
as  
‘the ability of the institutions to manage Structural Funds policy according to their rules 
and procedures.’  
She identifies four stages of programme actions, management, programming, monitoring 
and evaluation and discusses specifically how her results correspond according to these 
variables. This definition is in accordance with the second and the third parts proposed by 
Horvat above and are the focus of the current study as well. 
 
The research agenda advanced by these studies is undoubtedly a useful addition in the 
literature that concerns the differential impact that the EURP has in the recipient countries. 
As with the other components of the conceptual framework it focuses on the domestic 
aspects of the implementation of the EURP in order to explain its impact. Furthermore, the 
study of the patterns of the implementation of the programmes along the specific stages that 
are followed rather than a broader discussion of institutional relationships is also a useful 
addition in the relevant literature. However, the fact that these studies seem to attempt to 
isolate administrative and/or absorption capacity from broader political and socioeconomic 
factors is problematic at least as far as the research aims of the thesis are concerned. In 
particular, as will be shown in chapter 3 the administrative performance of the Greek state 
is inexorably linked with broader socioeconomic characteristics of the domestic polity. For 
example, clientelism in its bureaucratic incarnation is the main element that prevents the 
country’s administration to operate independently. Moreover, patronage entails the 
interchange of administrative positions in return for votes. Thus, administrative and 
absorption capacities are inevitably linked with the socioeconomic and political 
environment in which the policy is implemented.    
 
However, there is little doubt that the insights offered by this scholarship add to the 
theoretical aims of the thesis and complement the aspects of the conceptual framework that 
discuss the internal and interactive state capacities. They do so mainly through 
incorporating the regulatory requirements emanating from the EURP in the analysis hence 
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providing a useful addition when examined in conjunction with Europeanisation and 
implementation as they were discussed above. Hence, in the remaining chapters the aim is 
to discuss administrative and broader issues of internal and interactive state capacity as they 
are influenced by the tangible effects of Europeanisation arriving through the regulatory 
requirements of the EURP. Thus, the focus remains on broader institutional issues as they 
manifest themselves in the context of the EURP.   
 
2.7. Conclusion  
In this chapter I attempted an overview of the elements of the conceptual framework that I 
employ in the thesis in order to answer the main research question. The first two sections 
after the introduction analysed the theories of the internal and interactive capacity that 
determine a state’s actions as developmental or not. The next two sections introduced two 
of the middle range theories developed in the last decade or so in order to capture the 
dynamics of the interaction between the EU and the member states from a comparative 
perspective. The theories of Europeanisation and implementation accept that the EU is a 
distinct political entity with significant repercussions for the domestic political and 
administrative systems of the member states. I include them in the theories that discuss the 
internal and interactive capacities of the state in the field of a developmental programme in 
order to explain the role that the external pressures emanating from the EU played in the 
process. Finally, the theories that discuss administrative capacities as they deal with the 
implementation of the EURP in the member states integrate the insights provided by the 
above theoretical discussions.   
 
Therefore, the theories on state capacity offer the general template on which the empirical 
material presented in the next chapters is based. The theories of Europeanisation and 
implementation, on the other hand, aim at capturing the specific dynamics related to the 
role that the EU plays in the process. The theories on administrative and/or absorption 
capacities discuss the insights of state capacity that determine the outcome of the regulatory 
framework entailed in the EURP. What these theoretical frameworks share is an acceptance 
that the domestic compliance with external requirements is highly contingent on issues of 
previously established capacity. Thus, any case of non-compliance or difficulty in 
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producing developmental outcomes should not be seen as intentional. Rather, it is the 
outcome of the influences exerted by many factors that determine the capacity of the 
relevant actors to pursue their objectives. 
 
Furthermore, by adopting this conceptual framework, I aim to theorise the complex and 
often contradictory interrelationships that develop between the external stimuli produced by 
the participation in the EU and the domestic state-society arrangements. Participation in the 
EU entails the adoption of certain requirements that often contradict the logic of domestic 
political and socioeconomic arrangements. In certain cases, the member states are simply 
not ready to internalise the demands that the EU exerts on their domestic institutional 
context. This does not necessarily imply, however, that there is an intention on behalf of the 
member states to deceive the supranational authorities when they enter the EU. The next 
chapter provides a first attempt to apply this conceptual framework by discussing the 
particularities of the Greek political economy. I do so with specific reference to the internal 
and the interactive capacities of the Greek state and the processes of Europeanisation.  
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Chapter 3. Internal and interactive state capacities and the process of 
Europeanisation and domestic compliance with the EU in Greece 
 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter applies the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapters to the 
Greek experience of socioeconomic, political and administrative development and its 
relationship with the EU. As stated in the introductory chapter the main term of reference 
that the study adopts is that the outcomes and processes that influence the patterns of 
implementation of the EURP in Greece are inexorably linked with the domestic context in 
which the policy is implemented. Thus, I discuss the parameters of this socioeconomic and 
political context that provide the mediating forces through which the outcomes of the 
policy are discerned. In the next section I elaborate on these issues by providing a section 
describing the analytical framework that I adopt in the thesis and its relevance to the 
remaining chapters. In the section after that I discuss the internal capacity of the Greek state 
and the ways in which it interacts with the surrounding socioeconomic environment. I then 
explore how the experience of EU membership has ‘Europeanised’ the Greek state and how 
Greece has complied with the requirements of EU membership.  
 
3.2. An analytical framework  
The implementation method for structural funds is essentially a model of implementation 
that has been designed by the European Commission in consultation with the member states 
through the European Council and the European Parliament. As will be shown in chapter 4 
the regulatory framework entails the creation of an elaborate administrative network with 
the specific aim to implement and monitor the sectoral and regional OPs funded through the 
EURP. This network -henceforth Management and Implementation Systems (MIS) -115 
aims to influence most aspects of socioeconomic, administrative and political activity. 
Moreover, it aims to affect both the operation of the OPs as such but also –if possible- to 
provide spillovers to the wider institutional systems of the country in which the 
programmes are implemented. The MIS involve public administration bodies that manage 
the relevant programmes, monitoring committees where representatives of socioeconomic 
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interests and national and regional civil society monitor the programme and a series of 
implementing bodies and final beneficiaries that can either be private sector organisations 
and/or public sector institutions. However, despite the fact that the MIS are designed in 
common for all the recipient countries, there is sufficient leeway of interpretation when it 
comes to both the manner in which they are applied domestically and the patterns of their 
everyday operation. As an ideal type, the network of MIS has been designed to be enforced 
in a specific context (political, socioeconomic, legal, cultural) through which it is 
interpreted.116 Hence, the adaptations in this model are inevitable and the outcomes of the 
policy are interlinked with the particularities of this context. Similarly, the extent of the 
spillovers that will become available to the wider institutional and administrative cultures is 
equally dependent by this context.  
 
Thus, the already existing domestic factors that influence socioeconomic activity will 
undoubtedly impact upon the operation of this network. They provide the administrative, 
socioeconomic, legal and political context in which the MIS are applied hence their 
influence in the implementation outcomes is bound to be significant. In the case of Greece 
this context entails certain features which have characterised the country’s socioeconomic 
and political development and as was stated in the introductory chapter are still relevant 
despite the repeated efforts for the modernisation of the country. These relate with the 
persistence of clientelism and corruption inside the public sector as well as in the manner in 
which the public administration interacts with the surrounding socioeconomic environment 
of the country. The socioeconomic environment of the country is characterised by low 
levels of social capital and diminished stock for the development of relations of trust 
amongst socioeconomic actors. 
 
Moreover, the Greek public administration has been consistently employed as a 
compensating mechanism to balance the lack of meaningful welfare mechanisms which 
resulted in the state being unsustainably large. Furthermore, there is little doubt that this 
process was mainly if not solely driven by party clientelilsm.117 Most importantly, this 
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process was not driven by any programming consideration in terms of the territorial 
distribution of the personnel employed. Therefore, the public administration became 
particularly overcrowded in the centre of the country –Athens- which also reflects broader 
patterns of centralisation of its activity. As a result of both top-down and bottom-up 
mechanisms the Greek state has struggled to allow the expression of significant 
autonomous interests at the sub-national levels. Also, socioeconomic actors from this level 
have struggled to form meaningful relationships of trust with the central state.  
 
Finally, the Europeanisation of the country that has taken place after the singing of the 
Single European Act (SEA) does not seem to have been converted to practical action and to 
have influenced the empirical aspects of the domestic politics and institutions. In particular, 
both the country’s participation in the EU as well as its participation in the common 
currency, enjoy particularly high levels of public opinion approval. Also, politically the 
central government is persistently pushing towards the strengthening of EU integration. 
Nonetheless, when it comes to the practical aspects of this approval- i.e. firstly the patterns 
of implementation of the supranational regulations at the domestic political and 
administrative systems and secondly the patterns of compliance of the domestic political 
system to the requirements exerted through EMU- the picture is different. The rates of 
domestic compliance with EU rules and regulations is far from satisfactory whilst the 
excessive public deficit that resulted in the almost default of the country in 2009-2010 is 
significantly divergent to the macroeconomic criteria demanded by the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). Also, the influence of the EU has been limited in combating a series of 
long term structural difficulties with tax evasion and the diminished tax base being the most 
significant. Therefore, when it comes to examining the socioeconomic, political and 
administrative context in which the MIS were integrated the picture that emerges is one of 
significant domestic resistance to the practical requirements introduced through the 
participation in the EU and the persistence of a series of features more related with 
traditional forms of state-society interaction. The next section examines the first component 
of this context, that of the internal capacities of the Greek state.          
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3.3. Internal state and administrative capacity, limited coordinative capacities  
Overall, the Greek public administration is characterised by a high degree of 
centralisation118 on the one hand and a low degree of legitimacy and institutionalisation119 
on the other. Concurrently, there is a profound lack of any technocratic tradition in the 
country.120 These characteristics persist even though in legal terms the Greek bureaucracy 
is not very different from its Northern and Western European counterparts.121 It is an 
amalgam of influences from the main traditions of Western European statehood, albeit the 
Napoleonic centralised model of administration has been the blueprint for any other 
subsequent model. Nonetheless, the practices that were left over by the Ottoman tradition 
(patrimonialised and fragmented public services) seem to have left the main legacy on 
which any other system was built.122 The result is the creation of a ‘‘quasi-Weberian’’ 
bureaucracy’123 which in theory is constructed along the lines of the Weberian bureaucratic 
rationality but in practice significantly diverges from the ideal type.124  
 
Therefore, the paradox that has been established is that there is in Greece a particularly 
centralised core executive with almost presidential powers, which lacks however 
implementation capabilities.125 In other words the core executive is politically strong and 
able to impose its views to the society but its’ administrative capabilities are limited. There 
are three main factors that contribute to this situation; namely, excessive political 
clientelism at the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, the lack of an institutionalised 
administrative elite, and legal rigidity together with excessive legalism.126  
 
The first is the result of the constant interference of the governing party in the internal 
affairs of the public administration. This takes place via the clientelistic and patronage 
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relationships that have been developed between the political parties and the government, 
where the former employ positions of the latter as an incentive for electoral mobilisation.127 
Clientelism in the current sense is employed in the way that is adopted by Piattoni128 in the 
introduction of her volume. There, it is suggested that an adequate and fair analysis of the 
ways in which clientelism and patronage operate as intervening factors in the interaction 
between actors is one that takes into account the structural contexts in which the actors 
operate. That is, it views such phenomena as existing and being reproduced in the context 
of social networks, friendships and other social alliances rather than a sign of rent-seeking 
activities pursued by individuals. However, that does not imply that the actors are presented 
in this approach as weak and without any choice to alter their structural constraints. Indeed, 
there is more than enough scope for the analysis of the adoption of different ‘strategies’ on 
their behalf that would contribute to the creation of more universalistic and less 
particularistic exchanges.  
 
That being the case, clientelism is discussed here in its bureaucratic incarnation which is a 
continuation and adjustment of the traditional forms of interest intermediation between the 
patron and client that is found – albeit in different forms – in most pre-modern societies.129 
That is, where in the past the unequal relationships between two individuals occupying 
unequal positions would express themselves via personalised exchanges, now it is the party 
political system through which these pre-modern interactions tend to take place. In this 
context public administration positions are employed by the governing party as possible 
rewards for someone who votes for them. Certainly, this is just one form in which 
patronage and clientelism occur. It can extend to cases in which politicians provide 
facilitated access to services that individuals enjoy in any case.130  
 
In practice, one of the consequences is that more often than not there are extensive 
alterations of the upper echelons of the bureaucratic apparatus after each election. It is 
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embedded in the Greek political culture131 that every minister132 who is appointed is 
entitled to bring with him or her number of civil servants from either different 
governmental departments or – more recently – from the private sector. To be sure, this is 
not an unusual practice for countries with more established bureaucracies than the Greek 
one. It makes sense that each newly elected government chooses the civil servants with 
whom they wish to cooperate. Nonetheless, in the Greek case these changes trickle down to 
low managerial levels of the administrative hierarchy, which provides a significant 
qualitative difference in comparison with other cases. In this context, civil servants who are 
thought to belong to one of the parties of the opposition are ‘frozen’ and implicitly ignored 
during the decision-making process. Furthermore, the career patterns of the civil servants 
and their possible promotions to higher positions become inexorably linked to their party 
identification.  
 
As a result, there is instability and insecurity about the decisions that are taken, since 
seemingly technocratic issues become politicised. In the unstable environment that is the 
outcome of the constant changes of personnel and with the suspicion that hangs over the 
senior civil servants, the private relationships developed between the employees of the state 
and the politicians become defined more by considerations of career advancement than by 
official duties. The instinctive need of the civil servants to ensure their position compels 
them to become involved with party politics and develop vertical relationships with their 
political patrons. As a result, any lines of accountability are seriously distorted and the civil 
servants develop networks of association based not on their administrative duties but on 
their party affiliations. 
 
The situation is exacerbated by a second characteristic – the lack of a distinct civil service 
ethos, or esprit de corps, which is characteristic of the administrative elites of the Northern 
and Western European states. The Greek bureaucrats do not form a cohesive group with a 
common social background that could be motivated by any moral ambition for the 
promotion of the national interest that was discussed in chapter 2 about the French civil 
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servants. This could be the result of the late industrialisation of the country, which meant 
that the capacity for the development of horizontal networks of associations was limited. 
These issues are discussed in greater length in the next section.  
 
The third characteristic is the excessive legalism and the legal inflexibility that is endemic 
in the Greek administrative system. The legal principles that govern each policy activity are 
applied in a fragmented manner which leads to the overproduction of laws and decrees. As 
Spanou133 puts it: 
Legalism and formalism do not necessarily mean standardisation, formalisation and 
predictability. Irrespective of formally centralised political administrative structures, 
during the state formation process centrifugal political forces resisted formal 
obligations imposed by modernisation reforms; they perpetuated a high degree of 
fragmentation along with a selective respect for formal rules, while neutralising 
control and sanction mechanisms. Informal practices thus often oppose and ignore 
formal rules.    
 
As a result of these factors – the politicisation of the bureaucracy, the lack of a civil service 
ethos and the excessive legalism and formalism – there is minimum coordination between 
departments of even the same ministries. Consequently,  
Coordination at both the political and the administrative levels…is ‘‘personalised’’ 
or even ‘‘anarchical’’ because it relies on personal communication and cooperation 
between policy makers.134 
   
Therefore, the Greek ministers responsible for each policy area are strong when it comes to 
the level of policy responsibilities that they enjoy when compared with sub-national levels 
of government. However, they lack the capacity to implement these policies because of the 
internal problems of the bureaucratic mechanism which they lead.135  
 
3.4. Interactive state capacities, limited embeddedness  
If the internal capacities fall short of Evans’136 requirements as they were set out in chapter 
2, how far does it manage to embed itself within Greece’s socioeconomic structures? The 
main argument that I present in this section is that the political and social development of 
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the country did not result in the creation of autonomous groups at the intermediate sphere 
between the state and the market.137 This has had a detrimental effect on the ways in which 
the Greek bureaucracy interacts with the surrounding socioeconomic environment, thereby 
limiting the potential for the creation of meaningful state-society synergies.   
 
Interestingly, this happened despite the relative homogeneity of the country’s population.138 
In contrast to other countries with similar socioeconomic characteristics,139 the Greek 
population has been ethnically and religiously homogenous which is reflected in the 
patterns of representation. There are four elements of the interrelationships between the 
Greek state-society nexus that are important in the current discussion.140 These are the 
persistence of political clientelism ‘from below’, the disproportionate character of the 
public sector, the perceived administrative ineffectiveness and widespread corruption 
especially in the lower ranks of the civil service. Together with the latter, the issue of the 
low levels of social capital is discussed.  
 
The first relates to the recruitment processes of the civil service. Despite the repeated 
attempts to minimise the interference of clientelistic party politics and other non-
meritocratic aspects of social interaction, the civil servants are still largely recruited via the 
‘rousfeti’ (political favours).141 The paths of recruitment of the senior civil service have 
been far from standardised. Until 1983 the civil servants would be recruited via entrance 
examinations – conducted by each individual public authority, which left the process open 
to the interference of deputies – and no particular qualifications other than a University 
degree were needed. The first attempt to establish a National School with the exclusive 
purpose of the education and recruitment of the senior civil servants – following the 
blueprint of the French ENA – took place as late as 1983. After many troubles it has fallen 
into great difficulties and now plays only a marginal part in the process of the recruitment 
of high ranking civil servants.142 Moreover, in 1994 the PASOK government established an 
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independent authority charged with the task of recruiting personnel in the public sector 
(ASEP) which was the first attempt to modernise the process. It has been a significant step 
towards the weakening of the impact of patronage and clientelism in the running of the civil 
service. However, despite its formal institutionalisation the authority has not been accepted 
as the sole method through which someone can be recruited in the civil service.143  
 
The practice of making public sector jobs – especially of entry level – so widely available is 
related to the lack of meaningful welfare mechanisms that would create other employment 
opportunities.144 The state would employ these positions in order to absorb the shocks of 
high unemployment. However, as an unintended consequence the public sector became 
overcrowded, especially at the lower levels, which is the second c haracteristic identified in 
the current discussion. Characteristically, in the period between the fall of the 1974 
dictatorship and 1990, there was a doubling of the number of people employed in the public 
sector, with the total number of public employees amounting to around 700,000 in 1990.145  
Furthermore, around half to two-thirds of all University graduates in the 1970s and 1980s 
were employed by the state.146 According to the latest available estimates, the wider public 
sector employs around 35% of the total workforce,147 or around 850,000 people in total.148    
 
This is further indicated by the percentage of GDP that is employed by the state, which is 
very high compared to countries of similar socioeconomic development. Table 3.1 shows 
the percentage of GDP that is devoted to public expenses in Greece and in the other 
European countries of the EU 15. In 2006 Greece’s public expenditure was around 49% of 
the domestic GDP rates, which is close to the average fro Northern Europe which is around 
54% and almost identical to what Germany for example spends. As with the previous 
periods this number did not stop increasing in the period discussed in the Table.  It must be 
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noted that the information presented in this section does not aim at corroborating the 
stereotypical neo-liberal argument that the Greek state is bloated, and hence inefficient. If 
anything, the examination of the data presented in Table 3.2, in which the comparative rates 
of public sector employees are estimated as a percentage of the total population of working 
age, shows that Greece’s rates are not significantly higher than some Northern European 
countries. For example, Ireland and the UK have similar rates of employment to those of 
Greece, whilst the Scandinavian countries register significantly higher rates. Similar 
conclusions are drawn when one compares the data provided in Table 3.1 where Greece is 
by no means at the top of the Table. What this information does, however, is to provide a 
tentative effort to contextualise the interventions attempted by the Greek state, and 
quantitative information is undoubtedly essential in this respect. Nonetheless, the 
qualitative characteristics of this relationship are probably more important.  
 
Table 3.1. Total public expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Southern, Western and 
Northern Europe in 2003 and 2006 
 2003 2006 Variance 2006-2003 
Greece 48.0 48.7 +0.7 
Spain 39.7 40.4 +0.7 
Italy 49.2 48.5 -0.7 
Portugal 47.7 47.8 +0.1 
Average for Southern Europe 46.2 46.4 +0.2 
France 54.6 54.4 -0.2 
Germany 48.8 46.2 -2.6 
Ireland 34.4 34.6 +0.2 
Great Britain 43.4 44.1 +0.7 
Netherlands 49.0 49.2 +0.2 
Average for Western Europe 46.0 45.7 -0.3 
Denmark 55.3 53.5 -1.8 
Norway - - - 
Sweden 58.4 56.6 -1.8 
Finland 50.8 49.8 -1.0 
Average for Northern Europe 54.8 53.3 -1.5 
 
Source: Sotiropoulos, 2007b.  No data is available for Norway 
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Table 3.2. Public sector employees as a percentage of the total of economically active 
population 
 1996 1998 2000 Variance 2000/1996 
SOUTHERN EUROPE     
Greece  21.8 21.3 21.3 -0.5 
Italy 16.1 15.5 15.0 -1.1 
Portugal - - - - 
Spain 18.0 16.7 15.7 -2.3 
South Europe Average 18.6 17.8 17.3 -1.3 
WESTERN EUROPE     
France - - - - 
Germany 18.6 17.7 16.7 -1.9 
Ireland 22.1 - - - 
Netherlands - - 24.7 - 
Great Britain 20.3 19.3 19.2 -1.1 
West Europe Average 20.3 18.5 20.2 -0.1 
NORTHERN EUROPE     
Denmark 35.0 34.6 34.3 -0.7 
Finland 26.8 25.8 25.0 -1.8 
Norway 37.8 37.4 37.1 -0.7 
Sweden 39.4 36.1 33.7 -5.7 
North Europe Average 34.8 33.5 32.5 -2.3 
 
Source: Compilation by data provided by the International Labour Office (ILO) and the OECD, 
available at Sotiropoulos, 2007b. 
 
First amongst these qualitative characteristics is the third trait that has an impact on the 
interactive capacities of the Greek state and which can be loosely termed the Greek citizens' 
perception of the inefficient public sector. In particular, the Greek administration is viewed 
by the Greeks as not only incompetent at performing even everyday procedures, but also 
inherently corrupt. Moreover, the civil service is viewed by the public as a channel of 
provision of steady income but not as an instrument which serves the wider public.149 There 
is a perception that the process of government is somehow detached from the social context 
in which it takes place and that the civil servants are self-serving and egotistical rather than 
representing of the Greek population in general. Therefore, having to deal with a segment 
of the civil service even for activities such as tax purposes is seen as a major problem by 
most Greeks. In this context the Eurostat data about the trust that the citizens of an EU 
country place in the civil service of their country is revealing. The question asked through 
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public opinion research in this context150 was quite straightforward: to what extent the 
people that were questioned felt that they could trust the civil service in their respective 
countries. Only 31% of the respondents replied that they trusted the country’s civil service 
as is shown in Table 3.9.  
 
The final trait of the Greek bureaucracy that impacts upon its interactive capacities is the 
seemingly abundant ‘petty’ corruption, particularly at the lower echelons of the civil 
service.  Table 3.3 indicates that Greece was 44th for 2002 and 78th for 2010 in a list of 
measurement of corruption by Transparency International (TI). The countries with the 
lowest scores are the ones with less corruption. As far as Greece is concerned, there has 
been little long term change in these patterns. Although it is not the only country the 
position of which has deteriorated between 2002 and 2010, it is significant that according to 
the latest measurements it is the most corrupt country of the EU-25. 
 
To be sure, the results presented in Table 3.3 should be read with a certain degree of 
caution. There is still no consensus as regards the validity of the data compiled by the 
Transparency International, which are presented here. These measures present the results of 
fieldwork research compiled through asking individual entrepreneurs about their perception 
of corruption of the public sector in respective countries. Hence, it could be argued that the 
approach adopted is largely constructivist and that entrepreneurs would be more likely to be 
negatively biased as regards the public sector. Thus, they would be more inclined to present 
a negative picture about the capacities of the civil service, which does not necessarily 
correspond to the reality. Certainly, if that is the case the private capital is supposed to work 
in partnership with the public sector in the context of a developmental programme such as 
the EURP. Therefore, if the perception of the private capital is so negative it must have an 
impact on this relationship.    
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Table 3.3. Corruption Index for a sample of countries 
2002 2010 
Ranking Country Index Ranking Country Index 
1 Finland 9.7 4 Finland 9.2 
2 Denmark 9.5 1 Denmark 9.3 
3 New Zealand 9.5 1 New Zealand 9.3 
16 USA 7.7 22 USA 7.1 
31 Italy 5.2 67 Italy 3.9 
44 Greece 4.2 78 Greece 3.5 
64 Turkey 3.2 56 Turkey 4.4 
74 Russia 2.7 154 Russia 2.1 
86 Ukraine 2.4 134 Ukraine 2.4 
98 Angola 1.7 168 Angola 1.9 
99 Madagascar 1.7 123 Madagascar 2.6 
100 Paraguay 1.7 146 Paraguay 2.2 
101 Nigeria 1.6 134 Nigeria 2.4 
102 Bangladesh 1.2 134 Bangladesh 2.4 
 
Source: Transparency International.  Corruption Perceptions Index, 2002 and 2010   
 
Furthermore, tax evasion is still widespread in the country and repeated reforms of the tax 
collecting systems have had little effect in altering the perceptions of the Greeks that 
avoiding paying their share of taxation is not only culturally accepted but also 
commendable.151 Also, the ‘shadow economy’ is a significant source of income for many 
Greeks who either cannot establish networks with the mechanisms of state-party politics 
patronage and/or wish to extend their income. This includes a series of diverse activities 
ranging from private tutorials in secondary and also tertiary education – which is so 
extensive that it leads many to support the view that the country’s educational system is 
only in theory public but in practice private – to hiring undocumented employees in the 
private sector. As with the information presented in the previous Tables, the measurement 
of the ‘shadow economy’ is riddled with difficulties and no consensus exists as to the best 
available method. Vavouras and Manolas152 provide an overview of the relevant literature 
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and conclude that most studies have measured the shadow economy in Greece as 
comprising around 30% of the national GDP. Similar results are shown in Table 3.5 in 
which comparisons with other EU countries are presented. Greece’s shadow economy is 
lower only than those of countries from the last waves of enlargement.  
 
Table 3.4. The size of the ‘shadow economy’ as a percentage of GDP 
 1999/00 2001/02 2002/03 
Austria 9.8 10.6 10.9 
United Kingdom 12.7 12.5 12.2 
Germany 16.0 16.3 16.8 
Sweden 19.2 19.1 18.3 
Spain 22.7 22.5 22.0 
Italy 27.1 27.0 25.7 
Greece 28.7 28.5 28.2 
Slovenia 27.1 28.3 29.4 
Lithuania 30.3 31.4 32.6 
Bulgaria 36.9 37.1 38.3 
Estonia 38.4 39.2 40.1 
Latvia 39.9 40.7 41.3 
 
Source: Schneider, 2005, p.20  
The discussion about the bottom up characteristics of the relationships that are developed 
between the Greek society and the state leads to arguments about the underdevelopment of 
social capital and civil society in the country. To the extent that the terms 'social capital' 
and 'civil society' describe autonomous groups, which flourish in trust and cooperation and 
do not have an obvious utilitarian reason to exist, Greece scores low again.153 In particular, 
the horizontal networks of civic associations are sparse in Greece; rather, vertical networks 
of association based on clientelism and patronage between not only the state and society but 
also the private sector – or the market – and society are be the norm.154   
 
These issues can be quantified in Table 3.5 which depicts wider aspects that are used in 
order to measure a country’s social capital. These were compiled using the Special 
Eurobarometer 223, a survey carried out by the Commission in 2005, as well as the 
European Social Survey carried out by research centres in each country, and were released 
in 2003. The social capital index presented in the Table attempts to capture the link 
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between the main determinants of social capital through measures of associational 
membership and social trust. The 'Vol. Any' column depicts membership of at least one 
voluntary organization, while the 'Vol. Org' shows a number of multiple organisational 
memberships and a combined score of active membership, and no membership at all in any 
category of organisation.155 Greece comes last from most EU-27 countries and is only 
above four countries which entered the EU after the enlargements of 2004 and 2007.  This 
situation must be the result of the low measures of the components that were used for the 
measurements, namely social trust and associational membership.  
Table 3.5. Social Capital Index 
Country N Social Trust. 
Most people can be 
trusted 
Vol. Any Vol. Org Social Capital Index. 
Social Trust and Vol. Org 
Sweden 993 0.65 0.93 2.80 1.82 
Denmark 1010 0.75 0.90 2.38 1.79 
Netherlands 1026 0.62 0.84 2.21 1.37 
Finland 1032 0.61 0.76 1.53 .93 
Luxemburg 384 0.31 0.78 1.87 .58 
UK 1290 0.36 0.56 1.06 .38 
Ireland 1067 0.34 0.59 1.07 .36 
Austria 995 0.33 0.59 1.02 .34 
Belgium 960 0.30 0.58 1.14 .34 
Germany 1505 0.34 0.56 0.98 .33 
Slovenia 1023 0.24 0.57 0.94 .23 
France 982 0.22 0.56 0.90 .20 
Spain 1001 0.36 0.29 0.46 .17 
Estonia 991 0.33 0.37 0.53 .17 
Malta 493 0.22 0.44 0.73 .16 
Italy 1031 0.22 0.33 0.48 .11 
Cyprus 466 0.19 0.39 0.60 .11 
Portugal 1048 0.24 0.25 0.32 .08 
Czech 
Republic 
1110 0.17 0.36 0.47 .08 
Hungary 991 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.7 
Slovakia 1295 0.16 0.38 0.42 0.7 
Greece 1009 0.18 0.26 0.31 0.6 
Latvia 984 0.15 0.27 0.35 .05 
Lithuania 1005 0.14 0.22 0.28 .04 
Romania 986 0.17 0.19 0.24 .04 
Bulgaria  870 0.20 0.16 0.18 .04 
Poland 1020 0.10 0.25 0.34 .03 
EU 15 15297 0.33 0.51 0.93 .31 
EU 25 24774 0.30 0.47 0.82 .25 
NMS 10 9390 0.15 0.28 0.38 .06 
Total  27008 0.29 0.45 0.80 .23 
Note: Social Trust: the proportion responding ‘most people can be trusted’. Vol. Any: the 
proportion of the adult population who say they belong to at least one category of voluntary 
organization.  Vol. Org: the number of organizational sectors to which people belong.  
Source: EuroBarometer 62.2 (2004). Data weighted.   Available at: Paraskevopoulos, 2007. 
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Furthermore, inward looking organisations such as the church, the police and the army tend 
to enjoy higher degrees of trust by the Greek citizens, as depicted in Table 3.6. The trust 
expressed in these organisations is in contrast to the trust expressed in groups that could 
contribute to a democratic and vibrant civil society, such as the parliament, political parties, 
etc. The latter provide opportunities for the creation of ‘bridging’ relationships between 
institutions whilst the former only cater for their members through the exclusion of non-
members. Similarly, Table 3.7 shows that three institutions with a protective mandate – the 
army, the police and the justice system – enjoy much higher levels of trust than the political 
parties and the national government.  
 
As with the data presented previously in this section, measuring the levels of social capital 
is riddled with difficulties, whilst the relevant research has not produced a common 
definition. Nonetheless, I have presented different studies and sources that attempt to 
measure the levels of social capital in Greece from a comparative perspective and they 
seem to draw similar conclusions. The legacy of authoritarianism has left a social sphere 
that is low in levels of trust and capacity for collective action. Despite the influences 
exerted by the modernisation of the country in the last twenty years, protective institutions 
enjoy higher degrees of trust, and a public sphere that would facilitate democratic exchange 
has not yet emerged.  
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Table 3.6. Expressed Confidence in Various Institutions 
 High Confidence Medium Confidence Low Confidence 
European Union 68.9 22.8 6.1 
Church of Greece 68.0 21.2 9.4 
Greek Parliament 56.9 29.6 11.0 
Political Parties  46.7 34.2 17.1 
Armed Forces 68.9 23.6 5.2 
Ecumenical Patriarchate 68.1 21.4 7.2 
Police 54.5 30.3 13.4 
Newspapers 49.4 32.1 15.6 
Confederation of Greek 
Industries  
32.8 39.8 21.5 
Radio 59.1 29.3 9.5 
Large Private Sector 
Firms 
46.6 25.4 14.2 
Large Public Sector 
Firms 
44.9 35.4 16.5 
Television 57.1 29.2 12.6 
Labour Unions 55.8 28.0 12.6 
 
Source: MRB Attitudes to Various Institutions Trends, December 2001. Available at Lyberaki and 
Paraskevopoulos, 2002 
 
Table 3.7. Trust in institutions. Eurobarometer (2001-2010) 
EB Political 
Parties 
Police Justice 
System 
National 
Government 
Army National 
Parliament 
Civil 
Service 
European 
Parliament 
EU UN 
2001 (55) 18 63 62 38 86 49 31 60 - 43 
2002 (57) 16 58 61 39 80 51 31 58 58 38 
2003 (59) 17 68 69 43 81 56 - 62 55 31 
2004 (61) 28 72 73 55 84 63 - 70 68 40 
2005 (63) 23 - 53 40 - 47 - 59 57 30 
2006 (65) 25 - 55 43 - 56 - 63 63 36 
2007 (68) 21 - - 46 - 52 - 77 65 38 
2008 (70) 14 - 44 23 - 32 - 59 58 36 
2009(72) 19 - 52 44 69 47 - 60 60 34 
2010 (74) 7 64 44 24 67 27 - - 40 26 
 
Source: European Commission. Eurobarometer 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 68, 70, 72, 74.  
 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 attempted to provide a first empirical substantiation regarding the 
internal and the interactive capacities of the Greek state. A first attempt at linking the 
empirical information with the conceptual framework that was provided in chapter 2 
reveals a state with limited capacities to engage in meaningful transformative programmes 
of the domestic economy. This is due to a combination of factors related to internal 
difficulties, interactive capacities and the complementary actions that emerge from the two. 
An even more thorough picture of these issues emerges from an examination of the World 
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Bank Governance indicators (see Appendix II). In these, an effort is made by the World 
Bank to measure the internal and external capacities of the states along certain variables. 
These are: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule 
of law and control of corruption.  In a comparative perspective with other countries, Greece 
emerges as scoring low in all those categories, whilst there is little change over time.  
 
Again, the data presented in the Governance Indicators need to be read with certain caution, 
since many commentators have expressed strong reservations regarding their validity.156 In 
particular, as well as  reservations about the validity of quantifying governance issues in 
general, the fact that the Governance Indicators present perceptions regarding the issues 
measured, leaves them open to biased measurements. There is little doubt that the ‘experts’ 
who were interviewed must have been influenced by the basic parameters of the 
‘Washington Consensus’ that has dominated development issues in the last twenty years. 
One of the tacit components of the consensus is a deep suspicion regarding the role of the 
state in the process of socioeconomic development. Hence it is to be expected that they 
must have expressed reservations about the quality of the governance process in their 
country. Moreover, it is not clear how comparable these indicators actually are for countries 
with such distinct socioeconomic, political and administrative traditions and histories. 
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, the fact that Greece scores low in all six categories 
measured must provide a useful snapshot regarding the internal and interactive capacities of 
the Greek state.    
 
On the whole, it must be pointed out that the empirical information that emerges through 
the data in this chapter and the analysis that accompanies them, does not aim to corroborate 
the stereotypical argument that the Greek state is incompetent and the country’s civil 
society weak.157  That is, I do not aim to offer two distinct sets of empirical information that 
fail to capture the dynamics of the interactions between the state and the surrounding 
socioeconomic environment. Following the conceptual framework that I set out in chapter 
2, I provide the empirical information in this chapter in order to depict the difficulties that 
                                                 
156
  For example, Arndt and Oman, 2008 amongst others. 
157
 Voulgaris, 2006. 
  
 
68 
emerge when the two spheres attempt to form meaningful synergies in the field of a 
developmental policy. Therefore, by presenting the information on the internal capacities I 
point to the diminished coordinative capacity of the Greek state on the one hand.  By 
presenting the information on the embeddedness and the interactive capacities, I postulate 
the diminished stock of trust in Greek society so as to describe a situation where the state 
does not find it easy to successfully embed its developmental activities in the society. This 
can also be read differently, however, in that the actors that come from the civil society also 
find it difficult to establish meaningful relationships with the government officials in order 
to promote the development of their area.  
 
Furthermore, this diminished capacity for successful state-society synergies does not mean 
that the interaction between the two spheres does not produce any results as some 
commentators seem to assume.158 If anything, it becomes clear from the above information 
that for example through petty corruption in relation to the public sector, the actors from the 
civil society do manage to acquire governmental resources. Furthermore, through the 
clientelistic interchanges that involve party politics and public sector jobs, voters also 
manage to obtain governmental resources. One cannot possibly argue, though, that these 
practices are consistent with any notion of universality that is integral in a liberal 
democratic context.  
 
Similarly, as far as the internal state capacities are concerned, it would be wrong to assume 
from the above that the Greek state is weak in imposing its views on the society. As was 
shown in the case of the imposition of the common currency in the 1990s – as well as the 
broader steps towards the modernisation of the country taken in the last thirty years – the 
state is indeed able to act autonomously in relation to society.159 The short term sacrifices 
that were demanded in order to achieve the convergence criteria were accomplished. This is 
a case of what Weiss and Hobson160call the ‘despotic capacity’ of the state and its 
capability to resist vested interests and promote long-term objectives. Nonetheless as will 
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be discussed in greater length in the next section, this has happened because of the political 
architecture of the project of EMU which does not require the explicit consent of social 
groups. The quest for the accomplishment of the EMU criteria became largely a top-down 
affair and the social groups were only indirectly involved in providing their consent. Hence, 
they could not engage in any attempt to ‘sabotage’ the imposition of the currency by 
protecting their vested interests which is a usual response in the case of EU induced 
reforms in Greece.   
 
However, when it comes to the need to implement a policy such as the EURP that – as will 
be shown in chapter 4 – explicitly states the requirement for state and non-state actors to 
collaborate effectively, the situation becomes different. The aim of the EURP is not to 
impose a regulatory framework to the recipient countries but to actively involve state and 
non-state socioeconomic and political actors in internalising the parameters outlined by this 
framework. Because of the top-down and the bottom-up characteristics discussed in the 
previous two sections, the scope for the effectiveness of these aims is limited. Therefore, in 
the area of EURP the state does not manage to insulate its actions from societal demands 
and also civil society does not allow the state to successfully embed itself in its activities.  
 
3.5. The process of Europeanisation and patterns of domestic compliance with EU 
requirements  
Two distinct phases can be identified in the relationship between the EC/EU and Greece. 
When the country entered the EC there was increased hostility at what was perceived to be 
a loss of national autonomy. Since the introduction of the Single European Act (SEA) there 
has been a profound change in the relationship, with these patterns intensifying during the 
1990s. The political relationship between Greece and the EC begins with the Association 
Agreement that was signed in 1961. Because of the seven year dictatorship the Association 
Agreement did not influence the relationships between the country and the supranational 
entity and it was suspended in 1967.161 It was after the restoration of democracy in 1974 
that Prime Minster Karamanlis applied for full membership of the EC. However, the initial 
stages of the relationship between the country and the EC were not without problems.  
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As a result of two factors – the extensive intervention of the USA and the devastating result 
of the Cyprus crisis – anti-American and anti-Western feelings were created amongst the 
Greek population at the time of the submission of the application. This was the public 
perception on which the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) built its support 
before its election into government in 1981, which coincided with the accession of Greece 
to the Community.  In practice this stance meant that the first wide-ranging socialist party 
of the country cooperated with the Communist Party (KKE) in their opposition to the 
country’s accession to the EC. Both these parties, in order to demonstrate their disapproval 
of the accession, abstained from the vote that took place in Parliament in 1979 and that 
would ratify the country’s entry into the Community.162   
 
Although PASOK toned down its opposition against the Community after the elections of 
1981, its leader Andreas Papandreou never stopped being suspicious of the objectives of 
further market integration. This however does not imply that he became an advocate of an 
alternative project of European political or cultural unification but he retained his animosity 
towards the EC.163 It was only a year after the accession of the country to the EC and the 
election of PASOK into government that the latter submitted a Memorandum to the 
Commission in which it appealed to the EC to take into account the ‘economic 
peculiarities’ of the country. The Commission replied that the instruments of the incipient 
Regional Policy of the Community would be deployed in order to indicate to Greece that it 
did take into account her peculiarities.164 The largest part of the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes (IMPs) would be diverted to Greece as a way of alleviating these 
‘peculiarities’.   
 
To conclude the first part of the section, during the initial stages of EC participation the 
Community was identified by the governing party and a segment of the left as representing 
the ‘foreign multinational capital’ and there were few signs that the suspicion of the Greek 
authorities towards their EC counterparts would alter. Nevertheless, there was indeed such 
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a change in the period after 1985 and especially after 1987 there was a u-turn, this time in 
the foreign policy of PASOK, which had direct implications for the domestic front as 
well.165 The ambiguity that characterised the party’s relationship with the process of 
European integration altered.166 Especially after the signing of the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1986 the party became more identified with an orthodox European social 
democratic perspective of the project of EC unification.167 Especially after the election of 
the Simitis government in 1996, the accomplishment of the convergence criteria became a 
central aspect of the country’s economic policy-making. 
 
These changes seem to signal a partial, at least, Europeanisation of the Greek polity and 
more active patterns of participation in the supranational entities that were filtered at the 
domestic level. Nevertheless, the attitudinal and discursive changes of the country in 
relation to the EU were not confined just to the elites –both those responsible for running 
the country and ‘public intellectuals’ that were not directly involved in party politics- and 
who in any case have traditionally been more in favour of Europe than the citizens.168 The 
support trickled downwards and is identified in the measurements of the Eurobarometer in 
relation to the attitudes of the public towards EU/EC membership and support for the main 
practical element of the completion of the common market, which is the single currency. 
With regard to the former, although the perceived benefits from the EC/EU membership 
were apparent to only 42% of the population in 1985, this increased steadily throughout the 
subsequent two decades (78% in 1990, 72% in 1995 and in 2000, and 67% in 2005). The 
last three points have been higher than the average EU 15 (46%) and EU 25 (52%).  Even 
during the fiscal crisis of 2010 61% of the respondents thought that Greece has benefited 
from EU membership (53% average for the EU 27).  
 
Similarly, during the same period the percentage of those who believe that EC/EU 
membership has been a good thing has been growing (45% in 1985, 75% in 1990, 63% in 
1995, 61% in 2000 and 54% in 2005) with 57% and 69% the relevant percentages for the 
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EU 12, 56% and 50% for the EU15 and 50 for the EU25. Even during the fiscal crisis of 
2010 44% replied positively in this question and 34% responded with ‘neither good nor 
bad’ (49% and 29% the EU27 average). Similar results are recorded about the euro; 
although the support for the common currency was higher before its introduction than 
afterwards (64%, 67% in 1990 and 1995 respectively), it peaked at 70% in 2000 and in 
2003 at 64%, which are amongst the highest percentages in the eurozone countries.  In the 
slightly modified question of whether an economic and monetary union with a single 
currency is a good thing 64% of the respondents agreed. Finally, without delving into 
details, there is similar appetite on behalf of the Greek population for the promotion of 
political integration at the EU level.  
 
Therefore, the benefits of participating in the EU have become obvious to the Greek 
population in recent years, which was not the case during the first period of EC 
membership. The question, however, is to what extent these broader changes of attitude 
have had any influence on practical institutional aspects, which is of more relevance to the 
question posed in the thesis. That is, there is no doubt that the Greek polity has become 
‘Europeanised’ during the last twenty years or so. Nonetheless, the extent to which this 
widespread acceptance has signalled any changes in the patterns of the internalisation of the 
practical EU demands to domestic administrative, institutional or even political practices is 
doubtful. Thus, it is still unclear whether these changes were anything but epiphenomenal 
or indeed if there was any substantive change to speak of.  
 
The patterns of transposition of EU regulations to the domestic administrative and legal 
systems substantiate the point that the Greek public administration has struggled to cope 
with the practical demands of participating in the EC/EU.169 The most authoritative study of 
the patterns of domestic compliance to EU regulations and norms of member states in the 
last ten years170 has termed Greece an ‘awkward partner’ and belonging in the ‘world of 
neglect’ in that respect. In other words, apart from some ‘pockets of efficiency’ the wider 
political and administrative systems of the country are finding it very difficult to deal with 
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the technical requirements that are involved in the EU ‘acquis communautaire.’171 Apart 
from certain segments of the political and administrative systems which are constitutionally 
required to deal with the Commission and the Council-relevant secretariats in ministries- 
the Greek political system struggles when it comes to coping with the practical demands of 
EU integration.172 The administration exerts significant resistance when it comes to 
internalising the demands that accrue from EU membership and is more interested in 
sustaining the status-quo and avoid significant disruption to its internal workings.173    
 
Furthermore, the public debt that has accumulated during the last thirty years has created an 
unsustainable fiscal position that resulted in the near default situation of 2009-10. In 2009 
the government deficit reached 13, 6% and the public debt escalated to around 115% of 
GDP, which lead to the inability of the government to repay its loans. This resulted in the 
introduction of a low-interest loan of 110 billion euros funded jointly by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the 
imposition of strict monitoring by these organisations. True, this crisis has raised serious 
concerns about the economic governance arrangements at the EU level relating in particular 
with the lack of fiscal arrangements that would accompany the EMU but also the political 
power of the credit agencies which played a pivotal role in the whole affair.174 Moreover, 
the slow response of the German government during the crisis only served to exacerbate 
these problems.175 However, few commentators would now suggest that the crisis has not 
primarily been the result of embedded characteristics of the domestic political economy 
which were sustained as a result of the lack of domestic reforms that could have eased the 
participation in the common currency.  
 
What is more important however is that there is little evidence to suggest that the fiscal 
expansion that resulted in this situation has had any redistributive impact in terms of 
alleviation of poverty, with the country being amongst the least effective EU members in 
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combating poverty.176 Likewise, the Greek welfare state has been primarily funding 
pensions and the majority of public expenditures has been directed to pensions enjoyed by 
those that have benefited from party political clientelistic and patronage exchanges and no 
Europeanising impact has been identified in that respect.177 Any welfare state reform in the 
past 25 years that aimed at altering this situation and improving the redistributive impact of 
the welfare policies has met with considerable resistance from private interests and 
bureaucratic mechanisms.178  
  
Similarly, there is little evidence to suggest that the fiscal expansion has had any lasting 
impact in alleviating the structural problems of the Greek economy and improving its 
competitiveness.179 True, the problems of low competitiveness are compounded by the 
exposure of the country in the EU markets through its participation in the EMU without 
enjoying the economic capacity to compete in such an environment. Furthermore, the loss 
of the ability to devalue the currency that came as a result of participating in the eurozone 
has not helped in averting the crisis of 2010. In any case the point remains that -in the short 
run- the adoption of the common currency was not accompanied by successfully 
implemented domestic structural reforms that would have eased the participation of Greece 
in the eurozone; hence the impact of the EU in this policy area remains limited.    
 
The problems that relate with the paradox of fiscal expansion with insignificant 
developmental and/or redistributive outcomes are compounded by the persistent tax 
evasion, which was discussed in the previous section and affects the fiscal position of the 
country. The tax collecting capacities of the Greek state were amongst the least affected 
areas by the EU; hence the fiscal expansion is not accompanied by any extension of the tax 
base, which remains narrow. That means that contrary to popular belief, the Greek fiscal 
difficulty is not primarily a problem of expenses but more one of collecting revenues.180 
The situation is made worse by the extensive shadow economy and the extensive 
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corruption, which were also discussed in the previous section and show little signs of 
diminishing.  
 
To conclude, there is little doubt that during the last thirty years the Greek polity has come 
closer to the norms and expectations broadly and maybe simplistically defined as 
‘European’. Given the authoritarian tendencies of large segments of the Greek society –
discussed in the above section about the rates of social capital- this is an undoubtedly 
positive development. However, there is equally little doubt that the changes in attitudes 
and values did not affect the Greek institutional and administrative systems. The influence 
of the EU in altering the empirical aspects that determine administrative and institutional 
outcomes has been limited. Successive governments have attempted to reform the Greek 
political economy along the lines postulated by EU membership but have failed to acquire 
the necessary social and political support that was needed in order to succeed. Thus, it can 
be concluded that the Greek population remains strongly pro-European when it comes to 
measurements of public opinion. However, things change when the discussion turns to the 
issue of the domestic adaptation to institutional and administrative EU requirements. 
 
3.6. Conclusion   
The aim of chapter 3 was to provide a first attempt to link the conceptual framework 
provided in chapter 2 with the empirical elements that can answer the research question that 
I pose in the thesis. The first two sections discussed the issues of the internal administrative 
and interactive capacities of the Greek state. In those, it became clear that the Greek 
bureaucracy lacks the necessary characteristics to contribute to the creation of 
developmentally meaningful state-society synergies. The third section of the chapter 
discussed the issue of the Europeanisation of the Greek polity and the patterns of 
compliance of the Greek political system to the requirements of EU membership. It 
concluded that during the last twenty years there have been significant changes in relation 
to the impact that the participation in the EU has had on the country’s polity. Nonetheless, 
these changes have not had any profound impact on the administrative capacities of the 
Greek state.  
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In other words, it is unlikely that the changes identified in the third section and relating 
with Europeanisation contributed to reversing the dynamics of the state-society 
relationships that were identified in the previous two sections. The Europeanisation of the 
country did indeed affect the capability of the Greek state to act autonomously from 
societal interests in issues of greater significance. However, as will be shown in chapters 5 
and 6, when it comes to the structural programmes that were funded through the EURP, the 
ability to form meaningful state-society synergies have remained limited. This has followed 
the broader patterns of discrepancy between supranational requirements and the domestic 
reforms identified in the last part of section 3.5. In the case of the EURP of course the 
element of conditionality for the attainment of the structural funds is even stronger than the 
broader attempts to reform domestic institutional systems. Hence, the impact of the policy 
on domestic institutional and administrative practices is bound to be stronger. This is 
because the Commission does not simply transfer funds from the EU budget to the poor 
member states; it attaches a series of principles that the member states are to aim to 
integrate into their domestic political and administrative systems so as to receive the funds. 
The next chapter attempts to provide an overview of these requirements and to link them 
with the conceptual framework of the thesis.  
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Chapter 4. The ‘added value’ of the EURP 
 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter outlines the principal features of the EU’s Regional Policy, emphasising the 
particular requirements that are set by the Commission for all the countries that receive 
funding from the structural funds. The next section deals with the establishment of the 
EURP and attempts to position the debates surrounding it within the relevant theoretical 
frameworks. It also provides a brief historical account of the development of the policy 
before focusing, in the following section, on the operational framework designed in the 
1990s. The regulatory framework accompanying the provision of the funding is described 
as the ‘added value’ of the EURP. This mainly refers to the non-financial advantages that 
accrue to the recipient countries through their participation in the policy. These can be 
general effects on domestic governance structures or processes of implementation, and/or 
specific effects relating to the impact that each of the principles governing the operation of 
the EURP has on domestic institutional practices. These effects complement and contribute 
towards the main aim of the EURP which – as described in Article 158 of the Treaty –is the 
reduction in interregional and inter-country disparities and the achievement of 
socioeconomic cohesion within the EU. The penultimate section of this chapter provides a 
first attempt to link the regulatory context of the EURP with the conceptual framework that 
I developed in chapter 2 and substantiated about the Greek case in chapter 3. The final 
section concludes.  
 
4.2. Establishing the EURP 
The European Union Regional Policy (EURP) is the second most important policy area of 
the EU in budgetary terms.181 It is the policy implemented through the Structural and the 
Cohesion Funds and its main target is the harmonisation of the development of the 
European territory and the alleviation of regional imbalances between and inside the 
different member states. It is the supranational version of the policy developed after the end 
of World War II in many West European countries as part of an extension of Keynesian 
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macroeconomic management.182  Essentially, the aim of the policy is to do for territories 
that lag behind in terms of equality what social policy does for individuals.183 
 
To be sure, the theoretical underpinnings of the EURP are far from straightforward. In 
addition to the logic set out by Keynesianism, the theories of ‘cumulative causation’ have 
also provided essential theoretical components on which the empirical aspects of the policy 
are based.184 According to these theories, and contrary to the assumptions made by the neo-
classical models, the unfettered operation of the markets does not lead to convergence 
amongst regions. Instead, in a completely free market context, the already established 
disadvantages from which the poor areas suffer are exacerbated.185 This will happen 
because capital and employment will be attracted to the areas where they will have greater 
returns on their investment, which are the rich regions. This will create a situation in which 
political resources as well as economic ones will continue to agglomerate in or around the 
rich regions, with the poor ones gradually being left even more behind.186  In terms of the 
policy implications, the main result drawn from the theories of ‘cumulative causation’ is 
that if there is no governmental intervention that seeks to reverse these dynamics the poor 
areas will only become poorer, since the cumulative causes will continue to attract 
investment to already rich areas.  
 
This is the point where the theoretical insights of the previous paragraph and those of the 
agglomeration theories meet. In order to reverse the dynamics identified by the theories of 
‘cumulative causation’, active governmental intervention as practised by policies 
influenced by Keynesianism is indispensable. This is why the EURP has also been 
identified as the main instrument of the proponents of ‘managed’ as opposed to unfettered 
capitalism in the EU.187  Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that the aim of the EURP is 
not simply to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor regions. Instead, the 
establishment of proper mechanisms for fiscal federalism that provide a permanent channel 
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through which this transfer takes place is indispensable in the logic adopted to accompany 
the execution of the programmes funded through the EURP. This involves the local 
populations in the process and will provide them with the necessary motivation to utilise 
the redistributed funds.188  
 
The Treaty of Rome included some chapters with redistributive elements, such as the 
chapter on social policy.189 Nevertheless, the relatively homogenous levels of economic 
development among the six founding member states and the high growth rates that each of 
them achieved during that period190 made the development of a large scale EU regional 
development policy unnecessary. Furthermore, the idea that the EC could or should 
intervene in the economic management of the member states on such a micro scale had not 
gained any credibility.191 Therefore, a supranational policy that would include the national 
and sub-national authorities in its execution was not seen as a priority;192 hence, the 
regional policy was ‘the great absentee’ of the Treaty of Rome and the coordination of 
national regional policies was preferred.193   
 
The first time that the Commission decided to examine the EC’s ‘regional problem’ was in 
1964. As a result, it asked an ‘expert group’ to produce a report that would discuss the 
differences of economic development amongst the areas that comprised the EC. This was 
done with reference to the theories of ‘cumulative causation’ and the main result was that 
there was an obvious need for the Community to address the regional differences of its 
territory.194 These efforts should complement the operation of the market forces that were 
promoted through the single market. It was thought that the unfettered operation of the 
markets would create asymmetrical effects in countries with different socioeconomic 
structures; hence an EC redistributive policy could compensate for those effects. Successive 
reports by the Commission adopted the recommendations of the 1964 ‘expert group’.195 
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Also, the Directorate-General for Regional Policy was created in 1968, which was a clear 
sign of increased interest in these issues.196 
 
The need for regional intervention on behalf of the Community started to become fully 
realised with the accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1972.197  The accession of 
the UK also raised the political need to provide tangible returns to the country from the EC 
budget. This was the case because the UK was not eligible for funding arriving through the 
other redistributive policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).198  In 1973 the 
‘Thompson Report’199 on the enlargement of the EC sought to address some of the regional 
policy concerns highlighted by the previously noted ‘expert group’. It concluded that 
although the objective of the enlargement of the EC had been achieved, the balanced and 
harmonious development of its territory had not.200 As a result of these considerations, the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was introduced in 1975 in order to support 
individual projects of regional economic development in the poorer member states. Its logic 
was wholly intergovernmental201 in that it did not impose any administrative or regulatory 
changes and only provided funds to the recipient countries for the implementation of 
specific projects. It entailed a commitment to co-financing of the projects by the recipient 
countries, a principle which has remained an integral part of the policy ever since.202 
Generally however, the national governments were the main actors in the implementation 
of the policy and viewed these finances as reimbursements for their contributions to the EC 
budget.203  
 
After the next two waves of enlargement in 1981 and 1986, the disparities amongst the 
member states of the EC widened significantly. Furthermore, there was a consensus 
between the Commission and the Council that the political developments that would lead to 
the completion of the single market were likely to let loose centripetal economic forces that 
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would benefit the countries of the European core at the expense of the underdeveloped 
periphery.204 As a result, the first Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) were 
designed in 1985 with their main innovation being the multi-annual programming 
perspective and the implementation of large scale programmes rather than the individual 
projects which had hitherto been funded by the ERDF.205  Greece, Italy and France were 
the countries which would benefit from this funding. The political impetus was provided, 
amongst other factors, by the Commission's need to respond to the Greek threat to 
withdraw from the EC unless the Commission took into account the country’s special 
socioeconomic ‘peculiarities’, which was discussed in section 3.4.206  
 
It was the first Reform of the Structural Funds in 1988, however, that effectively introduced 
the policy with the initiation of the four Structural Funds. The reform followed the signing 
of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, which provided the catalyst for the 
intensification of the then EC’s economic and political integration. The SEA included an 
explicit commitment to strengthen the economic and social cohesion of the EC through the 
amendment of the structure and the operational rules of the Structural Funds.207 Therefore, 
following the Reform, the previously existing European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) was amalgamated with the European Social Fund (ESF) and the guidance section 
of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). The Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) was added in 1993. The aim was better 
coordination between the funds and other EC financial instruments such as the European 
Investment Bank (EIB).208  
 
Therefore, that was when the external stimuli for the Europeanisation of the national and 
sub-national authorities – and, through them, of the countries involved – started taking 
shape. In other words, it is the first time that the efforts to decrease the interregional and 
inter country disparities within the EC involved the Commission and the member states 
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more actively. Nevertheless, the aim was not to cancel the previously existing national, 
regional and development policies. Far from that, through the introduction of the principle 
of additionality the aim was to ‘add a European dimension and level to already existing 
national development policies.’209 Therefore, the Commission would be responsible for the 
drawing up and formulation of the main rules and regulations that governed the activities of 
the EURP. That would happen following consultation with the recipient countries. To be 
sure, the extent of the Commission’s involvement and authority in the stages of the design 
and the implementation of the EURP is still contested. Some scholars attribute more 
importance to the influence exerted by the member states and others see the supranational 
executive as the most important actor.210 There is little doubt, however, in both positions 
that the Commission exerts significant influence through which the forces for 
Europeanisation of the recipient countries emanate. 
 
The EURP was further consolidated when the 1992 Maastricht Treaty created a new 
financial instrument, the Cohesion Fund. This would assist the four poorer member states 
of the time – Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland – in enhancing their capacity in terms of 
physical infrastructure (such as roads) and the environment. The rationale of the 
intervention attempted by the Cohesion Fund is slightly different from that of the Structural 
Funds in that it finances individual projects and was established with the explicit objective 
to assist the recipient countries in achieving the convergence criteria and enter the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Furthermore, the requirement for the co-funding of 
the projects by the national authorities is not so strict in the case of the programmes funded 
by the Cohesion Fund. For the Structural Funds, the domestic authorities need to come up 
with at least 50% of the funds, whilst in this case the Commission’s contribution would 
reach around 80% of the budgets for each project. Nonetheless, in this thesis these 
interventions are examined concurrently with those of the Structural Funds because the 
administrative framework that was created in order to support their interventions is 
common. The Structural Funds also contribute to the financing of the Community 
                                                 
209
 ibid. 
210
 This literature is vast. For a review and a critical appraisal of both positions see Bahtler and Mendez, 2007. 
  
 
83 
Initiatives and the Innovative Actions that follow a different approach and do not form part 
of the current study.   
 
The decade of the 1990s was the heyday of the EURP. After the first Community Support 
Framework (CSF) was implemented in 1989-1993, the introduction of two new 
programming periods of CSFs –1994-1999 and 1999-2006 respectively – followed. In 
1999, the regulations that govern the activities of the Structural Funds were reformed, with 
the main aim being the decentralisation to the member states of the implementation of most 
competences related to the projects’ implementation.211 In financial terms the significance 
of the regional projects continued to increase, since the total amount of funds that the EU 
devotes to the effort to decrease regional disparities has more than doubled since the end of 
the 1980s.  Overall, the Structural Funds were allocated €195 billion (at 1999 prices) for the 
period 2000-2006.212 In addition, the Cohesion Fund would provide €18 billion for projects 
of enhancement of physical and natural infrastructure implemented in the recipient 
countries.213 According to a calculation, the regional development policies of the 
Commission increased in budgetary terms and they grew from representing a mere 10% of 
the Communities budget and 0.09% of the EU-15 GDP in 1980 to more than one third of 
the budget and around 0.37% of the EU GDP on average for the period 1998-2001.214  
 
Despite the increase in the funds devoted to the structural programmes of the Commission, 
it is worth pointing out that in real terms the financial implications of the regional budget 
are not as significant as is usually assumed. The main reason for this is the admittedly low 
level of the EU budget in general, which determines the amount of funding available for 
regional spending.215  Despite this, the EURP is very significant for the poorer EU 
countries, which under periods of austerity imposed by the participation in the common 
currency would probably find it difficult to finance similar programmes from national 
resources. For example, in the case of Greece the Commission estimated that as a result of 
the EURP funding of the period 1995-2005 the country reduced its gap with the rest of the 
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EU, moving from 74% to 88% of the EU average in 2005.216 This point is reinforced 
through the examination of the contribution of EURP funding in the national public capital 
expenditure. The Commission estimated that for the period 2000-2006, this reached 60% in 
Portugal, 48% in Greece and 24% in Spain.217  Overall, the conclusion that can be drawn 
from the above is that from its very humble beginnings, the EURP has acquired increased 
significance as a common regional development policy at the EU level. Both financially 
and constitutionally, the objectives of reducing socioeconomic disparities within the EU 
countries and regions have consolidated over the years.  
 
4.3. The principles of the EURP 
According to most commentators of the EURP, its importance lies not only in what the 
policy does – it is the most important mechanism with explicit redistributive as well as 
developmental elements at the EU level – but also how it does it.218 The structural funds 
provide assistance to the recipient countries in accordance with certain criteria which have 
significant implications for all the actors involved. This is what is described in the relevant 
literature as the ‘added value’219 of the policy, delineating the qualitative impact that it has 
on the domestic institutional structures, as they emanate from the regulatory framework that 
governs its operations. Certainly, an accurate definition of the term ‘added value’ has not 
yet been provided. The Commission itself describes the ‘added value’ that accrues from the 
EURP as related not only to the financial expenditure incurred but also to the method of 
implementation of the programmes. As it puts it in the Third Report on Economic and 
Social Cohesion: 
Beyond the net impact of policy on GDP or employment, (the EURP’s) added value 
arises from other aspects, like the contribution made to regional development by 
factors such as strategic planning, integrated development policies, partnership, 
evaluation and the exchange of experience, know-how and good practice between 
regions.220   
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The most systematic attempt to capture the specificities of what the term ‘added value’ 
describes in the context of the EURP is made by Bachtler and Taylor.221 Although they 
admit that what can be included in the term is highly subjective, they attempt to provide a 
definition of it as: ‘something which has been enabled or which could not have been done 
without Community assistance.’222   
 
Furthermore, they examine the concept in relation to five parameters: namely those of 
cohesion, politics, policy, learning and operational added value. They also point out that the 
added value of the EURP inevitably varies greatly across different geographical parts of the 
EU, with the impact being dependent on a combination of domestic administrative and 
programming arrangements. Therefore, the impact of the policy on the recipient countries 
goes beyond the potential reduction in socioeconomic disparities, as general institutional 
effects are equally important. These may range from improving coordination, inclusiveness 
and long-term strategic planning in the process of public policy making, to diffusing 
European values and attitudes and steering domestic policies in a ‘Europeanised’ 
direction.223   
 
In general, the logic of the intervention attempted by the Structural and the Cohesion Funds 
is much more complicated than what is assumed by those who are not familiar with the 
EURP. These commentators tend to assume that redistribution from rich to poor areas is the 
sole objective being pursued.224 However, in reality the funds do not attempt to transfer 
financial resources in the recipient areas as is being done for example through the CAP. 
Instead, the aim is to select the areas that benefit from the intervention in such a way as to 
diffuse the responsibility for the projects and enhance the endogenous capabilities of the 
private sector in the areas that benefit. As Leonardi225 puts it: 
the reason for insisting on this multi-level and multi-actor logic in the 
operationalisation of EU cohesion policy is the belief on the part of the Commission 
and a majority of member states that the mere expenditure of public resources will 
not be sufficient for the mobilisation of development. Instead, the public allocation 
                                                 
221
 Bachtler and Taylor, 2003. 
222
 ibid. 
223
 Manzella and Mendez, 2009. 
224
 Mairate and Hall, 2001. 
225
 Leonardi, 2005. 
  
 
86 
of resources must, in the final analysis, be able to mobilise investment from the 
private sector to create a multiplier effect… 
 
The aim of promoting the endogenous capabilities of the regional economies is achieved 
through the four principles that regulate the financing of the projects; namely, those of 
programming, concentration, additionality and partnership. Broadly speaking these four 
principles aim at attributing responsibilities to actors involved in all stages of the EURP, 
the designation of specific sets of objectives, the establishment of an appropriate 
framework for intervention and the deployment of instruments.226 These principles were 
decided with the first major reform of the structural funds in 1988 and have remained an 
integral and surprisingly consistent part of the operation of the programmes throughout the 
last twenty years.227  Despite some changes that occurred as a result of further reforms in 
1993 and 1999 the rationale has remained more or less unchanged.228  The principles’ main 
role is to distribute the competencies and responsibilities for the execution of the policy 
among the territorial levels involved: the EU, the national and the regional/local ones. Thus, 
they constitute the mechanisms through which the forces of Europeanisation are transferred 
to the national and regional levels. Although the regulatory framework through which the 
principles are applied are the same for all the recipient countries, there is sufficient scope 
for interpretation, which defines the patterns of the implementation of the programmes.229   
 
In particular, the four Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund finance projects in specific 
areas, in accordance with the Objectives set out by the Commission. An area becomes 
eligible for assistance from projects financed from each of these objectives in accordance 
with certain criteria. Then national authorities of the member states design the projects 
incorporated in each CSF and submit these to the Commission for approval. The CSFs are 
designed on the basis of recommendations offered by the regional authorities of each 
country that submits Regional Development Plans (RDP). The Commission negotiates 
these proposals with the member states individually and finances the projects that 
contribute to the objectives.  
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Broadly, this process is the outcome of the influence exerted by the regulations related to 
the programming and the concentration of the funds diverted through the EURP. The 
programming component ensures that the transfers do not finance individual projects that 
may have questionable developmental effects. Instead, the aim is to integrate the finances 
with programmes that can have a positive economic impact on the locality where they are 
implemented. These are the previously mentioned CSFs, which are multi-annual plans and 
entail specific developmental objectives for each region. There is a specific need, however, 
to demonstrate coherence between the projects funded in each administrative area. In 
addition, the concentration of the developmental objectives by the Commission imposes 
reliable and functional criteria on the management of the funds.230  
 
Generally, the logic of programming adopted by the EURP follows a distinction between 
the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ interventions.231 The former provide funding for physical infrastructure 
projects whereas the latter support programmes that attempt to increase the tacit elements 
of a regional and national economy such as the levels of education or vocational training. In 
both the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ interventions, the objective is to deliberately influence 
economic activity by employing appropriate measures.  
 
There is also a distinction between the national – or sectoral – and the regional levels of 
intervention in the design of the EURP, and particularly the principle of programming.232 
The sectoral and regional Operational Programmes (OPs) are the two instruments through 
which the EURP is channelled via the supranational to the national and regional levels. 
Each OP specifies in as much detail as possible the priorities for the sectoral or the 
geographical areas of intervention in accordance with the general priorities included in the 
CSF. The operational interventions anticipated by each OP are implemented through multi-
annual measures and funding. The financial significance that each group of OPs acquires as 
well as the patterns of the implementation for each case reveal a frequently contradictory 
picture in the aims of the programmes.233  If an area suffers from high levels of regional 
                                                 
230
 Allen, 2000. 
231
 Halkier, 2006. 
232
 Halkier, 2006; Molle, 2008. 
233
 Halkier, 2006. 
  
 
88 
inequalities, the regional OPs are likely to receive more funding. That means that there are 
a large number of institutions and stakeholders involved in the implementation of the OPs.  
 
Both these two types of intervention – ‘hard’ vs. ‘soft’ and national vs. regional – aim at 
amalgamating elements of the two ideal types of intervention normally financed through 
the regional policy as well as the geographical foci of the policy.234 Thus, on the one hand 
there are the ‘hard’ measures that normally aim at upgrading the physical infrastructure of 
an area and on the other there are the ‘soft’ measures that direct funding to the more tacit 
elements of a locality’s economic and social activity. Also, both the sectoral and the 
regional components of the programme combine elements of top-down and bottom-up 
interventions. In the first case, the national authorities are the ones that implement the 
policy whilst in the second there is more focus on the endogenous social and political 
institutional structures. What is worth mentioning in this context is that the distribution of 
the funding to the national and the regional components of the EURP is the exclusive 
prerogative of the member state.235 The Commission acts as a consultative body but both 
the initially designed appropriation and the finally allocated funds remain the responsibility 
of the national authorities.  
 
The implications of the principle of concentration are more straightforward. Since 1999 the 
Structural Funds have operated in three developmental Objectives. Objective One relates to 
the assistance of regions facing significant developmental problems, which are those 
regions whose GDP per capita measured in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) is less than 
75% of the EU GDP. The second Objective concerns the areas that face broader structural 
difficulties: high unemployment rates, de-industrialisation, and dependency on a particular 
economic sector. Finally, Objective Three supports projects for education, technical skills 
and training. It is probably worth indicating that only the first Objective specifies the 
quantifiable aims of the intervention. The fact that the remaining two Objectives do not 
employ similar criteria has made them the focus of criticism of the policy.  
 
                                                 
234
 Halkier, 2006, pp. 35-53 provides an interesting discussion of the ‘philosophy’ behind the regional 
policies.   
235
 Leonardi, 2005. 
  
 
89 
The three Objectives decided after the review of the Regulations of the Structural Funds in 
1999 are not very different from those that existed during the previous periods. The main 
change was the amalgamation of the previous six Objectives into three new ones, a reform 
made more for reasons of simplification than anything else. All four Structural Funds 
finance projects in the Objective One areas. Moreover, the ESF is responsible for the 
finances provided under the third Objective, and both the ERDF and the ESF are 
responsible for the projects of the second Objective.  
 
Having clarified the main operational roles played by the principles of programming and 
concentration I will now turn to the other two principles governing the operation of the 
Structural Funds: additionality and partnership. The principle of additionality ensures that 
the programmes initiated by the Commission do not replace any attempts made by the 
national authorities to reduce inequalities in income or employment within their territory.236  
Moreover, it aims at ensuring that the EURP funds will maximise the impact of public 
intervention.237  As mentioned above, even during the period prior to the 1988 reform of the 
regulations of the structural funds, when the Community was involved in the first projects 
of regional development financed solely by the ERDF, the projects were intended to 
complement those initiated in the recipient countries. With the reform of the regulations in 
1988, that principle was reinforced.238 As Allen puts it: 
the member governments are…required to demonstrate additionality when they 
submit their planning documents to the Commission and the Commission has 
successfully threatened recalcitrant areas with the withholding of funds if they do 
not comply. 239 
 
Although there were obvious problems in the enforcement and monitoring of the principle, 
which in the case of the UK are documented by Bache,240 the Commission retained the 
principle in the 1999 reform of the regulations. It attempted to simplify the process by 
introducing the notion of ‘negotiated additionality’241 but the intention was always that the 
recipient country should secure a certain level of expenditure before the Commission would 
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fund the agreed projects. Nevertheless, even after these reforms, there is significant scope 
for interpretation of the requirements imposed by the additionality principle.242  
 
In particular, because of the scarcity of resources for the implementation of redistributive 
policies at the national level there is always the temptation for national governments to 
employ these funds in order to replace existing public finances. Moreover, there is the 
danger that they may employ the funding in order to ‘close’ holes in their public finances 
rather than for developmental purposes. In addition, it is not clear to what extent redirecting 
funds from one OP to another constitutes infringement of the principle of additionality. The 
Commission responds to these problems by capping the relevant resources at a certain level 
– 75% for projects of the Objective One regions – and intensifying its monitoring of the 
member states in that respect.243  However, as will be shown in chapter 5, this process can 
cause difficulties in the relationships between the national and the Commission officials 
and the objective measure of capping the resources at 75% of the total cost is not always 
robust enough to prevent practices that do not comply with the principle.  
 
Finally, the principle of partnership aims at including in the process of the implementation 
of the EURP stakeholders that were previously excluded from the execution of similar 
programmes at the national level. This principle is closely linked to the principle of 
subsidiarity, which implies that the decisions should be taken at the level most competent to 
carry them out within the context of a broader co operative network so as to be able to pool 
resources and experiences.244 The Commission placed increased emphasis on the inclusion 
of partners from the regional and the local levels that would promote not only democratic 
accountability but also the effectiveness of the financed programmes. The Commission’s 
view was based on the assumption that the actors from these levels would have a more 
thorough view of the problems that their areas face.245 The participation of sub-national 
actors is mainly in the process of the monitoring of the OPs, whilst in exceptional cases 
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they may be involved in project selection.246 In comparison with the other principles 
governing the operation of the structural funds-concentration, programming and 
additionality- partnership is the only principle that does not have a purely managerial 
dimension.247 Although the importance of the relevant partners working together in order to 
achieve the desired objectives is presented as promoting the efficacy of the programmes, 
the enhancement of the democratic process is an unintended consequence. 
 
As with the other three principles, it was introduced in 1988. However, its importance was 
significantly enhanced with the reforms of 1993 and 1999. The meaning of the principle 
also changed substantially through these reforms. In 1988, the framework regulation 
adopted by the Council defined partnership as:  
close consultation between the Commission, the member states concerned and the 
competent authorities designated by the latter at the national, regional, local or other 
relevant level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal.248 
 
In that respect, the aim of the principle was to actually penetrate the domestic political 
system of the recipient states and to involve the sub-national partners in the process.249 The 
hegemonic role of the central governments in the process was directly challenged, which 
was a very important development particularly for countries with limited traditions of 
decentralised governance structures.  
 
With the reform of 1993 the principle of partnership was extended to include 
the competent authorities and bodies –including within the framework of each 
member state’s national rules and current practices the economic and social partners 
designated by the member states.250 
 
Therefore, the definition of the partners that could be involved was extended to economic 
and social partners such as the trade unions. Nonetheless, the identification of these 
partners remained the prerogative of the central government.  
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Finally, the 1999 reforms included environmental and gender groups among the candidates 
of groups to be selected by the member states. Thus, partners could be actors from both the 
vertical and the horizontal dimensions of the policy.251 In relation to the former, 
partnerships would contain actors from the member states and the Commission. As far as 
the vertical dimension was concerned, there was the need to include actors from all 
territorial levels – regional and local – as well as representatives of social and economic 
interests from those levels. Although the vertical dimension is straightforward, the 
horizontal can become more complicated, since it is not always clear who the social and 
economic actors at local levels are.252 
 
The enforcement of the principle of partnership aims at creating ownership of the 
programmes implemented, by motivating the actors with the relevant expertise to be 
involved in a practical manner in all stages of the implementation of a project.253 As the 
Commission puts it:  
By contributing their specific knowledge on a certain subject or region, their 
awareness of potential project applicants, partners can improve programme 
effectiveness by raising the efficiency of project selection. Generally speaking a 
widely drawn partnership leads to greater commitment and ownership of 
programme outputs and hence to a direct interest in the success of the 
programme.254  
 
Furthermore, the participation of the regional and local actors representing the civil 
societies legitimises the processes followed and counterbalances any efforts to influence the 
programmes through non-institutionalised means. Thus, the transparency of the projects is 
improved, since the local populations can be actively involved in the selection processes. 
Through the enhancement of democratic participation by the regional and local actors, 
improved institutional capacity is achieved as well as a more effective application of the 
principle of programming.255 Thus, the logic adopted by the Commission is that through the 
adoption of a principle with dimensions that relate to the enhancement of the democratic 
processes, the other principles of the EURP are also positively affected. As a result, the 
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capacity of the institutional authorities involved is improved and the chances for the 
programmes to be effective are increased.  
 
Nonetheless, not all actors are intended to have the same type of responsibility. Each of the 
participating organisations – the Commission, the member states, the regional authorities 
and the final beneficiaries (the respective project managers) – is assigned specific tasks in 
the process. They are asked, however, to cooperate with each other in all stages of the 
policy by each adopting the role that they are meant to play in accordance with the 
regulations in order to produce the most effective outcome. In practice, the institutional 
channels through which this takes place are the Monitoring Committees (MCs), which were 
established as part of the regional and sectoral OPs. These meet twice a year and 
representatives from socioeconomic interests express their views about the programme. 
These views may refer to developmental priorities that need to be followed as well as the 
progress of separate actions and projects.  
 
To summarise the current section, there are four principles that govern the operation of the 
Structural Funds. Firstly, the principle of programming mainly aims at integrating the 
financed projects in broader developmental programmes that entail developmental 
objectives for regions and sectors of the national economy. Secondly, the principle of 
concentration ensures that the funds that become available from the Commission are 
directed towards the areas that are most in need according to specific objective criteria. 
Thirdly, the principle of additionality aims at ensuring not only that the EU funding does 
not replace any national finances for regional development purposes but also that the 
recipient countries co-finance the projects with the Commission. Finally, the principle of 
partnership aims at including representatives of socioeconomic interests from all territorial 
levels in all stages of the programmes. These principles have some interesting implications 
in relation to the empirical aims of the thesis. The principles of programming, additionality 
and partnership in particular are drawn by the Commission but the way in which they are 
implemented at the national level depends on the stock of administrative capacity and the 
ability of the state to form meaningful state-society synergies. The interplay between these 
two elements – the supranational requirements established through the four principles and 
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the domestic administrative and political practices – is the main issue that I explore in the 
next section. The aspects of this interplay are discussed with reference to the management 
tools that accompany the application of the four principles and provide practical guidance 
about the mechanics of the implementation of the regional and sectoral OPs.  
 
4.4. The principles and the conceptual framework  
According to the conceptual framework developed in chapter 2, the internal administrative 
as well as the interactive capacities of a state are the main elements that contribute to the 
success of a developmental policy. The two spheres of the internal bureaucracy and the 
capacity to interact with the surrounding socioeconomic environment were presented as 
complementary in the process. The concepts of ‘state-society synergies’256 and ‘Governed 
Interdependence’257 were employed as the most accurate conceptual descriptions of a state 
which is both embedded in the surrounding civil society and complementing its actions. It 
was also noted however that the extent of the success of this relationship is contingent on 
the levels of social capital enjoyed in the area where the intervention is attempted.  
 
This framework was opperationalised in chapter 3 where a first attempt to provide 
empirical substantiation for this argument in relation to Greece was provided. As far as the 
internal capacities of the Greek state are concerned, the main conclusion was that the state 
does not enjoy the elements that endow a bureaucracy with sufficient autonomy from the 
wider political workings of the country. Furthermore, the lack of a civil service ethos and 
the excessive legalism and formalism of the Greek bureaucracy exacerbate its ability to 
develop strong internal capabilities. As a result, the Greek bureaucracy mainly suffers from 
a limited ability to coordinate its actions internally, with different government departments 
working in isolation. As regards the interactive capacities of the Greek state, it was noted 
that the persistence of political clientelism ‘from below’ contributes to the creation of a 
large public sector especially at its lower echelons. In addition, the perceived administrative 
ineffectiveness and widespread corruption, especially in the lower ranks of the civil service, 
diminish its interactive capabilities.  Finally, the low levels of social capital were 
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documented in order to provide an addition to the argument that there is limited scope for 
the creation of meaningful ‘state-society synergies’ in the country.  
 
In addition to the elements of the conceptual framework that discussed the reduced 
capacities for the creation of successful complementarity and embeddedness between the 
Greek state and the surrounding socioeconomic environment, I also discussed the theories 
of Europeanisation and implementation in chapter 2. These provide the second component 
of the conceptual framework that I employ in the thesis. They are used in order to capture 
the dynamics of the impact that Europe – through the participation in the EU – has on the 
domestic structures. In chapter 3, I attempted to operationalise these relationships for 
Greece by presenting a framework that divides the country’s relationships with the EC/EU 
in two periods. The first period – before the signing of the SEA – was one of reluctance to 
accept even the basic requirements that stemmed from participation in the supranational 
entity. The second is after 1986, when it can be argued that the Greek polity started to 
become more ‘Europeanised’.  
 
There is little doubt that the introduction of the EURP played a significant role in this 
process. The introduction of the common regional policy was accompanied by the 
requirement to integrate the four principles governing its operation into the domestic 
political and administrative system. This happens through the incorporation of a series of 
management tools that the recipient countries are required to adopt. These are:  
programming, project selection, monitoring, evaluation, financial control, performance 
reserve, information and publicity, as detailed below:258  
• Programming is a management tool as well as one of the four principles and entails 
the determination of objectives to be achieved and the specific priorities and 
measures capable of converting these objectives into individual projects. It is 
conducted at the beginning of a policy cycle (CSF) and involves the identification 
of developmental needs and challenges -at both regional and sectoral/national 
levels-, an elaboration of a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) 
analysis, the ways in which the EU funding will contribute towards the 
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accomplishment of the developmental strategy, justification for the allocation of the 
funding, details of the targets to be achieved and relationships of EURP funding 
with other EU policies.259 These are covered in the programme documents which 
are the CSF, the regional and sectoral OPs and Single Programming Documents 
(SPD) that include both. Moreover, implementation details at measure level 
(quantifiable indicators, final beneficiaries and financial allocation) are included in 
the separate Programme Complement.260 This describes both the sectoral and 
regional OPs and the classification of the funding in these two components of the 
CSF provides the framework for the financial allocation of the resources.  
• Project generation, appraisal and selection enforce the principles of programming, 
partnership and concentration and entail the selection of the final beneficiaries in 
accordance with the rules incorporated in those principles. The process also 
incorporates the tools of information and publicity which aim at the widest possible 
dissemination of information related to the structural funds, so that the interested 
stakeholders can be more actively involved. The process involves many steps from 
informing potential applicants, the organisation of expertise for project appraisal to 
the final approval of selected projects and the signature of the contract. It 
necessitates the decision on project selection systems, the preparation of appropriate 
documents for calls, transparent appraisals, the clear definition of selection criteria 
and the preparation of templates for applications and contracts.261 It must be noted 
however that this process does not apply to the selection of major projects, which 
follows different requirements. Detailed information about the nature of the 
investment, its financial implications and location, a timetable for its 
implementation and a cost-benefit analysis have to be submitted to and approved by 
the Commission.262  
• Monitoring and reporting are intended to make sure that the projects are 
implemented in accordance with the strategic priorities outlined in the SPD. They 
involve regular examination of the resources employed and the outputs achieved, 
                                                 
259
 EPRC, 2009.  
260
 OIR in association with LRDP and IDOM, 2003.  
261
 ibid. 
262
 ibid. 
  
 
97 
using specific reports, reviews and monitoring indicators. They entail the 
submission of an annual progress report which is published by the Commission 
following the collection of data by the member states. The latter include information 
that they have collected by the regional and sectoral OPs. A major innovation in the 
direction of assisting the process of monitoring was the introduction of electronic 
data processing systems which were centrally coordinated and required the 
participation of all the Managing Authorities (MAs). The elaboration of quantifiable 
indicators that could be used in order to monitor the progress of each action was a 
challenge for some categories of intervention.263 For example, it is not always easy 
to come up with quantifiable indicators about a project of combating 
unemployment, whilst it was easier to do that for a project of physical 
infrastructure.  Monitoring takes place at both the strategic level (that of the CSF as 
a whole), programme level and sub-programme level.  
• Evaluation entails the judgment of the programmes against the desired outcomes, 
using specific criteria collected for the purposes of the process. It has gained 
increased prominence during the three programming periods and became an integral 
part of the EURP cycle in the third CSF.264 In this period the regulations required 
that the member states conduct three stages of evaluation; ex-ante, mid-term and ex-
post. Ex-ante evaluation is conducted at the programming stage of the policy and 
involves the structured assessment of the socioeconomic situation of the area where 
the intervention will take place. The mid-term evaluation is conducted in the middle 
of the programming period and aims at identifying the extent in which the 
programme strategy is still relevant in light of the trends that followed the initial 
phase. Both these stages of evaluation are carried out by the member states and are 
usually assigned to independent evaluators. Ex-post evaluation is the duty of the 
Commission in collaboration with the member states and is also assigned to 
independent evaluators.265 The process of evaluation is clearly strongly linked with 
that of monitoring since it is primarily conducted in accordance to the data collected 
through the monitoring procedures.         
                                                 
263
 OIR in association with LRDP and IDOM, 2003; EPRC, 2009. 
264
 Bachtler and Wren, 2006.  
265
 ibid. 
  
 
98 
• Financial control and management aims at averting practices of corruption and 
waste and ensuring the application of the principle of additionality. The process of 
financial control was enhanced in the third CSF probably following the corruption 
scandals that engulfed the Santer Commission in the late 1990’s as well as broader 
trends towards the increase in demands for transparency and ‘good governance’. 
The main instrument in this context is the distinction between commitment and 
payment for a project. This includes the ‘n+2’ rule that stipulates that the 
Commission retains the right to de-commit any parts of the commitment not paid by 
the end of the second year after the original commitment. Broadly speaking the 
operations relating with financial control became a top priority for the recipient 
states, which have to follow strict and detailed rules and perform regular ‘audit 
trials’ in order to enjoy the EURP funding.266 Financial control and management are 
closely connected with the operations relating with monitoring and reporting and 
can take place at project level or at the level of the whole programme.267 A 
significant component of financial control and management during the third CSF 
was the performance reserve. It was introduced in 1999 and aims at improving the 
efficiency of the programmes through installing elements of competition between 
the relevant authorities that manage them.  
 
Through the incorporation of these management tools the pressures of Europeanisation 
become even more evident to the domestic authorities. They entail obvious operational 
elements which directly challenges domestic operational practices. The impact of the 
principles and the procedures embedded in them in the domestic political and 
administrative systems of the recipient countries is filtered through the administrative 
structures that were set up as part of the EURP. These are the above mentioned 
Management and Implementation Systems (MIS)268 and more specifically are the 
Managing Authorities (MAs), the above-mentioned Monitoring Committees (MCs), the 
Certifying Authorities (CAs) and the Audit Authorities (AAs). The introduction of the MIS 
indicates that the Europeanising influences of the EURP take concrete institutional 
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dimensions.269 They intend to encapsulate the spirit of the four principles and the 
management tools that were discussed above and -if possible- provide sufficient spillovers 
to the institutional systems of the countries where they are set up.270  
 
These institutions were created with the reform of the Structural Funds regulations in 
1999.271 The Commission does not actively participate in the frontline implementation of 
the programmes but has delegated this task to the national and local authorities. Those 
however do not deliver the results; instead, they choose final beneficiaries that produce the 
end product, whilst in the structure that deals with the implementation there are also the 
Intermediate Bodies (IBs) that act as intermediaries between the MAs and the MCs on the 
one hand and the final beneficiaries on the other. The IBs can be either existing 
organisations – such as banks, local authorities or private consultancies, which undertake 
projects of this type as part of their broader operation – or organisations created with the 
explicit aim of participating in the programme.  
 
More specifically, the MAs were created in order to start operating with the third CSF, and 
although the Commission provides the general regulatory blueprint their final composition 
is the responsibility of the recipient country. Before that, the existing national and regional 
authorities were required to implement the programmes, which left the national authorities 
with an undesirable level of leeway in interpreting the Structural Funds regulations.272 
There is one MA for each OP and one that manages the CSF (CSF MA) as a whole. The 
delegation of tasks between the CSF MA and the regional and sectoral MAs is not uniform 
amongst member states and reflects administrative, political and cultural traditions.273 Also, 
whether a separate administrative network would be created or the MIS would be integrated 
in existing administrative systems was left at the behest of the member states. The role of 
the MAs was specified as mainly consisting of ensuring that the programmes are 
                                                 
269
 Leonardi, 2005. 
270
 ibid. 
271
 EC (EC), Council Regulation 1260/1999. 
272
 Leonardi, 2005. 
273
 OIR in association with LRDP and IDOM, 2003; EPRC, 2009. 
  
 
100 
implemented in accordance with the EURP regulations. In particular, they are responsible 
for:274 
• The selection of projects and development of a project plan 
• Ensuring that the co-financed products are delivered by the specified time 
• Establishing proper computerised systems for the management, monitoring, 
evaluation and audit of the programmes 
• Providing administrative backing and guide the work of the MCs 
•  Organize the mid-term evaluation of the relevant OP or the programme as a whole 
in the case of the CSF MA  
• Ensuring that the Certifying Authority (CA) receives all the information that it 
needs in order to carry out its procedures  
• Preparing and passing on to the Commission annual implementation reports of the 
Ops 
• Ensuring compliance with other Community policies (environmental, competition 
etc) 
 
The MCs are also the responsibility of the member states and there is one MC for each OP. 
They are chaired by a representative of the relevant MA and their main role is the 
monitoring of the programme. Similarly to the MAs there is one MC for each OP and one 
for the CSF as a whole. The former are usually manned by around 20 to 30 representatives 
whilst the latter is much larger, with 100 delegates participating in certain cases. The latter 
encompasses representatives of national associations representing socioeconomic interests, 
and a representative from every individual MC. As with the MAs however the exact 
composition of the MCs is left at the behest of the member states and reflects domestic 
administrative, political and cultural practices this time relating with the patterns of bottom-
up participation of socioeconomic actors in decision making. In terms of decision-making 
powers they are more important than the MAs and they are the main institutional channel 
through which the principle of partnership is implemented. Broadly, they have the 
following tasks:275 
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• Consideration and approval of criteria for the selection of the operations  
• Periodic review of the progress made towards achieving the objectives 
• Examination of the results of implementation, particularly the achievement of the 
targets for the mid-term evaluation 
• Consideration and approval of the MA reports before these are sent to the 
Commission 
• Proposal of adjustments to the programme that could help towards the achievement 
of the objectives 
• Consideration and approval of any proposal for the amendment of the content of the 
OP  
 
As far as the numbers of IBs participating in each OP are concerned, they may range from 
ten for small member states to several hundred in the larger ones. They can be divided into 
‘first level’ and ‘second level’ IBs depending on their level of participation in the project, 
whilst ministries or other governmental agencies that manage other OPs can be IBs for a 
project funded by a different OP.276  For example, a regional authority that runs a regional 
OP can be an IB for a sectoral OP. They can be bodies that were set up specifically for the 
purpose of the implementation of a project or be part of the existing institutional network. 
Again the patterns of this operation differ between member states and reflect domestic 
administrative, political and cultural practices.  
 
The main function of the CA is to make sure that the expenditure that it authorizes is in 
conformity with the EURP rules and regulations. It is in direct contact with the 
Commission in order to ensure that the expenditure is indeed spent on EURP projects and 
not on other national expenditure. There is usually one CA for the whole CSF. Finally, the 
AA’s role is to audit the programmes and ensure their sound financial management. It does 
so by sampling the relevant projects, and there is one relevant service for each OP as well 
as one that oversees the whole CSF.   A basic sketch of the responsibilities and tasks of the 
major institutions involved in the implementation of the programmes is shown in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1. Responsibilities and tasks of major institutions involved in the 
implementation of the EU Cohesion Policy* 
 
 
NSRF 
MA OP MA IB MC CA AA 
Creating institutions       
Appointing and organising the IB  R     
Organising monitoring committees R R     
Setting up a management information 
system R R x R R R 
Preparation of management 
guidelines/job aids R x x R R R 
Training of staff R R R R R R 
Building partnerships       
NSR F R x R    
OP R R R    
Programming actions       
NSR F R x     
OP x R R    
Managing implementation       
Creation of a project pipeline  x R    
Assistance and information to 
applicants   R    
Setting up a financial and statistical 
information system R R R   x 
Check on compliance with community 
policies R R R R R x 
Ensuring correctness of operations R R R R R R 
Making adjustments to the programme x R R R   
Annual implementation report x R R R   
Monitoring progress       
Monitoring operations, reporting and 
corrective actions on operations  x R R   
Monitoring priority NRSFs, reporting 
and corrective actions R x  R x  
Monitoring measures/priorities OPs, 
reporting and corrective actions  x R R x  
Financial management and control       
Certification of expenditure and 
control  x x  R  
Payments     R  
Internal audit R R R  R R 
Full audit      R 
 
Note:   R: responsible; x: contributing 
*The table gives only an overview of the main responsibilities of the bodies at the central level, and 
represents the most common situation. Slight deviations from this common division of tasks and 
responsibilities are possible for individual member states. 
 
Source: Molle 2008 
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At this point I return to the issue of the relationships between the conceptual framework of 
the thesis and the regulatory framework introduced by the Commission to the domestic 
political and administrative systems. What becomes obvious from the above descriptions is 
that through the regulations of the EURP there is a mix of public and private organisations 
participating in the delivery of the final product of either a physical or tacit nature.  Hence, 
the ‘Europeanising’ influence not only manifests itself in the public sector but in the private 
sector too.  In particular, the MAs, the CAs and the AAs are supposed to directly affect the 
national civil service whilst through the IBs and the final beneficiaries the private 
companies are also affected. Furthermore, through the MCs the third sector that 
encompasses organisations of wider civil society is affected. Certainly, the whole network 
influences each constituting part, since for example one of the main functions of the MAs is 
the identification of the IBs and the final beneficiaries that will contribute the most to the 
programme. It is worth considering whether the regulations have had any impact on either 
state capacity or the quality of public-private interactions in the case of Greece.  
 
It might be expected that in addition to the wider influences exerted by the principles, each 
of them could have a potential impact on the conduct of domestic authorities and actors. 
For example, the principle of additionality requires the national MAs to identify national 
sources of funding before they apply for funding by the Commission. Also, the principle of 
partnership requires the creation of strong state-society relationships in order to implement 
each programme. The MAs are required not only to consult but actively to involve 
socioeconomic actors coming from the civil societies of the respective OPs in both the 
programming and the implementation stages of a programme. However, as was shown in 
chapter 3, this has never been achieved in Greece, where the state has struggled to identify 
proper complementarities with the surrounding civil society and simultaneously embed 
itself successfully in it. This process, however, is the main requirement imposed by the 
principle of partnership. The state is meant to have a stronger role in the process since it is 
the one that chooses the participating partners. Thus it must identify and impose the 
complementary roles that each stakeholder plays in the process. At the same time, however, 
the state has to guide the actors representing the civil societies towards the most effective 
ways of executing the task. The low rates of social capital, however, do not allow the 
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creation and sustaining of such relationships. Hence, the identification of the final 
beneficiaries that can contribute productively in a co-financed programme also suffers, and 
this in turn impedes the application of one of the main elements of the principle of 
additionality.  
 
Furthermore, the principle of programming requires domestic administrative authorities 
with strong coordinative capacities. It states that the OPs funded through the CSF need to 
coordinate their actions in order to pursue their common developmental objectives. These 
are integrated into multi-annual plans where the problems and the instruments that will be 
used in order to combat them are identified in great detail. The different agencies that deal 
with each problem are required to work closely in order to achieve the wider objectives set 
out in the CSF. As shown in chapter 3, however, the Greek state suffers from a series of 
weaknesses that primarily manifest themselves in the area of internal coordinative 
capacities. This is the case firstly in horizontal terms such as the ministries at the national 
level.  
 
As I will show in the chapters that follow, two of the largest ministries responsible for the 
developmental policy of the country –Economy and Public Works – have always found it 
difficult to coordinate their actions. Thus, the existing stock of institutional capacities in 
terms of the cooperation between national ministries is limited. The problems are more 
significant, though, in terms of the coordinative capacities between the national and the 
regional authorities. In chapter 6, the issue of the absence of meaningful decentralisation in 
Greece will be cited as only one reason behind the limited capabilities of the regional 
authorities. Therefore, the problems are even more important when it comes to the capacity 
for coordination between the national and the regional OPs. The same reason will be 
examined as the main factor impeding the proper application of the principle of partnership. 
The lack of decentralisation, together with the low levels of social capital, as well as 
corruption and clientelism from below, has created local civil societies that do not always 
appreciate the developmental opportunities that accrue from the programmes. Instead they 
seem to be trying to capture the financial benefits that accrue from these interventions for 
the achievement of short term objectives.  
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Moreover, the introduction of stricter rules in terms of the auditing and financial controls of 
the programme has also had interesting implications. This is exemplified by the 
introduction in the third CSF of the automatic de-commitment rule or n+2 rule277and a 
general increased activity in the field of introducing performance and evaluation criteria.  
The former is exemplified by the above-mentioned performance reserve278 which states that 
unless the recipient country spends the money allocated to it within two years, the unused 
sum will be held back by the Commission. Furthermore, each regional and sectoral 
Operational Programme (OP) needs to be evaluated so as to show its developmental 
contribution. If this does not become clear, the Commission retains the right to use 4% of 
the programme to reward other more productive OPs. The introduction of the procedures is 
a positive step towards both the further political integration of the EU through the 
strengthening of the Community method. Also, it is important to combat unproductive 
practices in the member states, albeit by introducing harsh measures. Nonetheless, as will 
be shown in chapters 5 and 6, it is debatable whether the stricter practices have actually 
contributed to any improvements in the case of Greece. This is because the regulations 
were applied in a manner signifying a continuation of the practices identified in chapter 3, 
rather than in the way intended. This is the result of the excessive legalism and formalism 
that is a characteristic of the Greek bureaucracy that I discussed in chapter 3. Overall, the 
chapters that follow will show that the introduction of the MAs and the principles 
embodied in them has have provided empirical backing in the process of the 
Europeanisation of the country.  Nevertheless, the MAs became embedded in the 
previously existing administrative structures and were not successful in altering the patterns 
of state-society interaction as documented in chapter 3.    
 
4.5. Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of the development of the EURP and its principal 
mechanisms. After an analysis of the financial and the political implications of the policy 
and, in the second section, how these have developed historically, the focus turned on the 
four principles that govern the operation of the Structural Funds in the third section. The 
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implications of the principles of concentration, programming, partnership and additionality 
were explained. These formulate the regulatory framework for the required implementation 
at the national and the regional levels. The section after that provided a first attempt to 
discuss the implications of this regulatory framework in relation to the conceptual 
framework that I employ in the thesis. After the reform of the Structural Funds in 1999, the 
Commission introduced separate administrative agencies that would coordinate the actions 
specified by the regulations. Hence, the implications in relation to the internal and the 
interactive capacities of the Greek state as discussed in the previous chapters acquired more 
empirical support. The next chapter attempts to move this discussion by providing more 
detailed evidence about the manner in which the EURP was implemented in Greece.  
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Chapter 5. Substantiating the limited coordinating and interactive 
capacities of the Greek state in the process of the EURP in Greece 
 
5. 1. Introduction  
In this chapter I attempt to build on the argument that I presented in the previous chapters 
by elucidating the dynamics of the Greek government’s implementation of the Structural 
and the Cohesion Funds. The main aim is to substantiate the argument that the 
implementation of the EURP in Greece has encountered a series of difficulties which did 
not allow the structural spending to be effectively employed. There have been four 
programming periods of EURP intervention in the last twenty years. I begin the next 
section by attempting to place these interventions in the context of the problems they aimed 
to solve. Thus, the next section outlines the main parameters of the ‘regional problem’ in 
Greece. This mainly consists of an overconcentration of population and economic activity 
in and around the metropolitan centres, which creates significant interregional disparities. 
In the section after that, I discuss the methods that the Greek government employed in order 
to tackle this problem when the opportunity of the IMPs and the two first rounds of CSFs 
arose. An analysis of the main problems that have been identified in connection with the 
implementation of the programmes during these periods is also included in the section. 
These provided the legacy inherited by the third CSF, the details of which are discussed in 
the subsequent section. In the penultimate part I attempt to elucidate the main issues that 
hindered the implementation of the third CSF as they were identified during the fieldwork. 
The last section concludes.  
 
5.2. The Greek ‘regional problem’  
The regional inequalities in Greece do not follow the pattern found in other countries 
known for their acute interregional disparities. Whereas, for example, one encounters a 
distinct north-south divide in the UK or the three parts of Italy – northern, central and south 
– which delineate the interregional disparities that coexist in a country, the situation in 
Greece is more complex although not unique as France and many Central and Eastern 
European Countries are facing similar patterns of regional disparities. A series of physical 
peculiarities have resulted in many areas being remote from the centralised economic 
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activity, which is heavily concentrated in and around Athens and to a lesser degree 
Thessaloniki. For example, around half of the national GDP is produced in the region of 
Attica (48.8%) and another 10% in Thessaloniki, while the two regions host around 46% of 
the total population.279  
 
There are important historical and geographical factors that have contributed to the creation 
of this situation.280  As far as the former are concerned, the establishment of the capital in 
the southern part of its territory, which became the most secure part of the country as the 
northern areas were gradually incorporated, is the first of these. Secondly, after the Asia 
Minor disaster in 1922, the greatest part of the migrants relocated to Athens. In relation to 
the geographical factors, Greece is a mountainous island country, which exacerbates the 
difficulties of connecting its areas. In particular, 34% of the country’s geography is 
comprised of mountainous areas and 30% is semi-mountainous areas. Additionally, there 
are around 222 populated islands and more than 400 islands overall. 
 
Both these sets of reasons directly impact upon the domestic economic geography. 
Transportation and accessibility costs for the areas not belonging to the two major 
agglomerations have increased. Furthermore, the centripetal forces that created these two 
agglomerations in the first place seem to have been inexorably consolidated during the last 
thirty years. The suburbs and satellite cities and regions of Athens and Thessaloniki have 
increased their importance, and this exacerbates the problem of the unequal distribution of 
population and economic activity.281 
 
Moreover, Greece suffers from a particularly high degree of peripherality, since until the 
accession of Bulgaria it had no common borders with its EU counterparts. The relationships 
that have developed with most of the country’s neighbours (Turkey, FYROM, Albania) 
have resulted in limited or no economic exchanges with countries of similar socioeconomic 
development. As a result, the main economic exchanges have developed with the countries 
of the advanced North, with Greece enjoying limited comparative advantages in that 
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respect. The transportation costs involved in these interactions are obvious, which means 
that Greece ends up losing in the competition for the attraction of capital for investment. 
Even more so, since the lion's share of economic activity is by default concentrated far 
away from the European core, as the capital is located in the southern part of the country. 
Likewise, the national products cannot become competitive for countries of the EU core, 
since other countries can produce similar products with the distributor having to face more 
competitive prices. Finally, the urban areas in the north have only recently become able to 
trade with the countries of the former socialist bloc.  
 
These aspects of the domestic economic geography are reflected in the internal regional 
classification according to the GDP per capita. Overall, according to the principle of 
concentration the country is divided in 13 NUTS II regions, which can be classified into 
three categories according to the level of economic development. The regions of Attica, 
Central Greece and Southern Aegean comprise 43% of the total population and have a GDP 
per capita higher than the 75% of the EU average. That makes them the richest regions of 
the country, although it must be pointed out that the fact that they currently exceed the 75% 
threshold is the result of the statistical impact of the 2004 enlargement on the average EU 
GDP growth rates. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum are the poorest regions in the country: Western Greece, 
Epirus, Thessaly and Eastern Macedonia-Thrace account for 22% of the country’s 
population and have a GDP per capita lower than 60% of the EU. Finally, the regions of 
Central Macedonia, Western Macedonia, Ionian Islands, Peloponnese, Crete and North 
Aegean comprise a middle category with a GDP per capita between 60%-75% of the EU-
15. Some basic quantitative information about the economic and social characteristics of 
the 13 Greek regions is included in Table 5.1. From this Table the high levels of 
employment in the agricultural sector are apparent. These are high not only for the country 
as a whole (16.1%) but also for specific regions (Eastern Macedonia-Thrace with 36.5% 
and Crete with 34.9% are the highest).   
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The interregional disparities in the country are more accurately described in Table 5.2. 
There, an Index that aims at capturing broader determinants of socioeconomic development 
– the Composite Index of Welfare and Development (CIWD) – is employed concurrently 
with the GDP measurements. For both these measures the disparities are obvious, with the 
region of Attiki scoring 74.5 as far as the CIWD is concerned and enjoying 36.7% of the 
country’s GDP on the one hand, and Epirus scoring 22.2 and 2.47% respectively. At the 
same time, the same Table indicates the limited convergence that has been achieved 
between Greece and the core EU-15 countries.  
 
There are two kinds of results that can be drawn from the information presented in these 
Tables for the country as a whole and for the interregional disparities inside the country. 
Firstly, the country is still largely dependent on the agricultural sector, unemployment rates 
are strikingly high and it suffers from certain geographical disadvantages that only 
exacerbate the structural difficulties. Because of this, in accordance with the principle of 
concentration Greece was designated an Objective One region from the outset of the policy 
and has remained so throughout all the ensuing programming periods. This means that her 
GDP has not increased above the level of 75% of the EU average, which is the threshold for 
the inclusion of an area in this objective. Secondly, the disparities between the two major 
urban areas – Athens and Thessaloniki – and the rest of the country are striking. This 
remains so even after the 2004 and 2007 waves of enlargement, with eight out of thirteen 
Greek regions belonging to the group of 70 EU-25 regions with a GDP less than the EU 
average.282 These two sets of structural weaknesses are what the EURP attempted to 
combat with its intervention.  
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Table 5.1. Economic and social characteristics of the Greek regions  
 Population Employment levels (%) Education (%) Unemployment (%) 
 2001 Agriculture Industry Services Low Medium High  
Eastern 
Macedonia 
Thrace 
611,067 35.5 20.0 44.5 62.5 24.9 12.7 10.4 
Central 
Macedonia  1,874,214 16.2 24.9 58.9 48.4 33.1 18.5 11.5 
Western 
Macedonia  301,522 20.4 33.5 46.1 58.1 29.2 15.0 14.7 
Thessaly 753,888 29.7 18.8 51.5 58.4 27.0 14.5 10.6 
Epirus 353,820 25.8 21.1 53.1 58.8 26.2 15.0 10.6 
Ionia Islands 212,984 23.2 12.5 64.4 63.1 26.4 10.5 9.0 
Western 
Greece 740,506 32.8 17.0 50.2 61.1 27.0 11.9 10.5 
Central 
Greece 605,329 24.8 29.9 45.3 63.1 29.1 7.8 9.8 
Peloponnese 638,942 36.5 15.7 47.8 56.7 31.5 11.8 7.3 
Attica 3,761,810 1.2 24.5 74.3 33.7 43.3 23.0 9.2 
Northern 
Aegean 206,121 22.4 18.0 59.6 54.7 34.4 10.9 9.2 
Southern 
Aegean 302,686 7.1 21.8 71.2 59.2 31.5 9.3 14.2 
Crete 601,131 34.9 14.7 50.4 55.5 29.1 15.5 7.7 
ELL 10,964,020 16.1 22.5 61.5 47.3 35.1 17.6 10.0 
EU15 379,604,000 4.0 28.2 67.7 35.4 42.9 21.8 7.8 
EU25 454,349,000 5.4 28.8 65.8 32.6 46.7 20.6 9.0 
 
Source: European Commission, 2004 and ESYE, Population Census, 2001.  
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Table 5.2. Regional Population, GDP per capita and Composite Index of Development 
(CID) for the NUTS II Regions of Greece 
 
Regional 
Level 
Regional 
Population 
Regional 
share of 
Population 
Regional 
Share of 
GDP 
GDP per 
capita in 
PPS 
GDP per 
capita in 
PPS EU 
15=100 
Composite 
Index of 
Welfare and 
Development 
Regions 
(NUTS II) 
2001 2001 2000 2000  Max=100 
EU-15    22576 100  
Greece 10,964,020 100.00  15098 67  
Attica 3,761,810 34.31 36.96 (1) 17046 (3) 76 74.5 (1) 
Central 
Macedonia 1,874,214 17.09 17.18 (2) 15139 (5) 67 39.2 (3) 
Continental 
Greece 605,329 5.52 7.28 (3) 17474 (2) 77 29.4 (7) 
Thessaly 753,888 6.88 6.46 (4) 13832 (8) 61 27.4 (8) 
Peloponnese 638,942 5.83 5.48 (5) 13010 (9) 58 26.0 (10) 
Western 
Greece 740,506 6.75 5.29 (6) 11379 (12) 50 18.9 (13) 
Crete 601,131 5.48 5.25 (7) 14781 (6) 66 38.8 (4) 
Eastern 
Macedonia-
Thrace 
611,067 5.57 4.34 (8) 12250 (11) 54 26.1 (9) 
Southern 
Aegean 302,686 2.76 3.05 (9) 17790 (1) 79 52.6 (2) 
Western 
Macedonia 301,522 2.75 2.91 (10) 15226 (4) 67 23.4 (11) 
Epirus 353,820 3.23 2.47 (11) 10474 (13) 46 22.2 (12) 
Northern 
Aegean 206,121 1.88 1.67 (12) 14563 (7) 65 35.0 (5) 
Ionian 
Islands 212,984 1.94 1.67 (13) 12956 (10) 57 33.9 (6) 
Max/min    1.70  3.98 
CV    0.16  0.71 
Source: Petrakos and Psycharis, 2006 
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5.3. The IMPs, the first two CSFs and their legacy for the third CSF 
After 1986 the Greek attempts to reduce the geographical economic disparities became 
fully incorporated in the emerging EURP.  Since the inception of the IMPs and continuing 
with the CSFs, the EURP has been providing the sole avenue for the implementation of a 
developmental policy in the country.283   In 1986 the implementation of the first IMPs was 
initiated, which lasted until 1992. It entailed initially six and then thirteen regional IMPs 
and one national IMP, and the EC provided 2 billion ECU to the Greek authorities. The 
principle of additionality was initiated with the IMPs; consequently the domestic authorities 
were required to provide an additional 1. 2 billion ECU that would arrive from the Greek 
national budget.  The financial inputs of both the Community and the Greek government 
would be channelled through the Greek Public Investment Programme (PIP), which in the 
past had been used in order to cover the expenditure of the Ministry of Economy for the 
financing of all public works. The Commission expenditure would be released only after 
the national contribution had been secured. The programmes comprised projects for the 
enhancement of physical infrastructure, the support of the agricultural sector and the 
training of the personnel of the public administration. In particular, the bulk of the finances 
were directed towards the construction of some local road networks and the creation of 
sewage systems, although some ‘soft’ interventions – such as the enhancement of Research 
and Development activities – were also included.  
 
The IMPs were experimental, and the national legislation that governed their practice was 
not very different from the pre-existing framework regulating the finance of ERDF 
projects. There were some innovations such as the introduction of the multi-annual 
programming periods and of mechanisms for the evaluation and monitoring of the projects, 
although these were not applied systematically throughout the programming period. 
Nonetheless, their general impact on the processes followed was negligible, and in terms of 
their implementation patterns they set the tone for what was to follow after the introduction 
of the CSFs.  
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Specifically, the rates of absorption for the period between 1987-89 were only 23%.284 
However, at the end of the programme the rates of absorption were satisfactory as they 
reached 91% in 1992.285 The domestic authorities managed to achieve this result by 
effectively ignoring the requirement to provide integrated programmes and by significantly 
distorting all the initial objectives.286 The funds were dispersed across numerous minor 
projects with insignificant developmental implications. There were constant modifications 
of the initially agreed programmes in order to satisfy the pressures for the inclusion of 
individual beneficiaries in the projects undertaken. 
 
Consequently, the view of incomplete works became the norm in the Greek countryside, 
with buildings that would support actions not only for the enhancement of the physical 
infrastructure but also the enhancement of the productive base of the regions being started 
but never finished. In that way the beneficiaries could take the money that was supposed to 
come from the IMPs without providing their own part for the completion of the project. By 
doing so, of course, they inadvertently provided parts of what was to be implemented via 
the first CSF, since it was easier to include projects that were already semi-completed in the 
programming of the new funding.  
 
The overall situation regarding the patterns of implementation of the IMPs was mainly the 
result of weak enforcement in the monitoring procedures and the auditing of the 
programmes, and this allowed the clientelistic interchange between the political authorities 
– especially at the local level – and the patrons.287 The former would provide finances for 
the implementation of projects to the latter and in return they would receive votes. 
Certainly, this was not a new state of affairs. Even before the introduction of the IMPs the 
finances that would become available through the PIP at the regional level would be 
distributed in accordance with this mechanism.288 Consequently, the projects included in 
the PIP would be far more than what the national economy could afford to finance and they 
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were not integrated in any broader developmental plan.289 Therefore, any developmental 
mechanism would almost inevitably be used as a means of ensuring political support.  
 
The first reform of the Structural Funds in 1988 reinforced the importance of pursuing 
equitable distribution of regional economic growth as a counterbalance to the opening of 
the Common Market by 1992. For the first time, the countries that were to receive the 
funding – and in particular their sub-national authorities – would become actively involved 
in the policy process. The institutionalisation of the principles of partnership and 
programming meant that the countries had to submit comprehensive long term plans for the 
promotion of national and regional economic development to the Community before 
receiving any funding. This would provide not only the national but also the sub-national 
authorities – both at the regional and the local levels – with the opportunity to mobilise in 
the direction of developing their own localities. In this manner not only state but also non-
state actors coming from civil society would be able to design, implement and monitor the 
progress of the developmental projects related to their areas.  
 
Significantly, with the reform of 1988 the amount of funds available for the purposes of the 
EURP increased substantially. The total amount devoted to Greece for the first CSF came 
to 15.4 billion ECU in 1994 prices. After the inception of the first CSF, the country 
internalized the EURP in the domestic politico economic process. The ‘Five Year Plan for 
the Economic and Social Development’ that was designed for the 1988-92 period was 
redrafted and submitted to the Commission as the basis of the negotiations for what was to 
become the first Community Support Framework (CSF) for the 1989-93 period.290 
According to one estimate, since 1989 Greece has been receiving annually around 3% of its 
GDP in the form of EURP assistance.291 This is a significant sum, which has provided 
substantial developmental inputs in the economy. This is the case especially in relation with 
domestic investments in transport infrastructure which is an area where the country has 
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traditionally lagged behind. In this area EU funding has substantially added in national 
investments.292  
 
The principle of programming stipulated that the projects financed via the Structural Funds 
were to be divided between the regional and sectoral components. The former relate to each 
of the 13 regions of the country, whilst the latter include interventions that aim at the 
enhancement of specific sectors of economic and social activity and are applied to the 
whole country. As a result, the country was divided into 13 administrative areas, each of 
which had to submit an application for inclusion in the national Regional Development 
Plan (RDP). The aggregate result produced by the RDPs would become the first CSF.  
 
The number of specific interventions financed via the sectoral sections of the first CSF 
reached 30. These included: the improvement of the basic infrastructure (transport, 
communications, research and technology, environment), the development of the 
agricultural sector, increase in the competitiveness of enterprises, sustainable development 
of tourism and the development of human resources.  In order to implement the 
programmes, the national authorities designed 13 regional OPs and around 30 sectoral OPs.  
 
The first CSF was a novel experience for Greece. It was the first time the country had been 
involved in such a large-scale programme, whilst the active involvement of the Community 
authorities placed significant constraints on the way the public administration operated. In 
particular, there had never been a broader economic development plan that involved the 
breaking down of resources into specific regional and sectoral objectives. The initiation of 
the first CSF brought about a new ‘policy environment’293 which required not only the 
participation of different levels of government but also the inclusion of social actors that 
had never participated in similar ways in the past.  
 
The main objective became the enhancement of the physical infrastructure of the country, 
which lagged behind the level of infrastructure of countries with a similar level of industrial 
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development. The country’s physical fragmentation imposed significant constraints in the 
implementation of the first CSF. For this reason the finances were dispersed into small 
infrastructure works that mainly covered areas outside the capital Athens. The large bulk of 
resources covered a great number of small projects, which had small developmental 
effects.294 At the conclusion of the first CSF, the projects that had aimed at the 
improvement of the physical infrastructure ended up being small scale interventions like 
provincial road networks, irrigation works, sewage systems and small projects in the urban 
areas.295 The industrial sector and indeed the private sector in general, which could improve 
the competitiveness of the country, were not seen as priorities at that stage.296   
 
Overall, the implementation patterns of the first CSF seem to have continued on the path set 
by the IMPs and to have provided a precedent for the next two CSFs. The difference 
between the former and the latter was that the Europeanising impetus was much stronger 
after the reform of the Structural Funds and the imposition of the earlier mentioned 
principles. In particular, the principle of programming was hardly justified, since the OPs 
basically ended up being lists of projects that were almost unrelated.297 Most of these 
projects were again selected according to the criterion of justifying the clientelistic 
interchange between the central and local politicians.298 Moreover, yet again similarly to 
the IMP’s, the majority of the projects were left incomplete.299  
 
This happened because in the majority of the projects the projected costs as calculated at 
the stage of the design of the plan turned out to be wrong during the implementation.300  In 
particular, at the bidding process, the beneficiaries would deliberately underestimate the 
projected costs of the project so that they could benefit from the funding. Given that the 
authorities who were supposed to estimate the financial details of each bid were primarily 
interested in spending the available money and did not examine the financial viability of the 
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bidder, the beneficiary would receive the Commission’s contribution.301 However, during 
the construction of the project the beneficiary would run out of funds so the project would 
be left incomplete.  
 
As it is difficult to make accurate estimations about the projects that were left unfinished, it 
is probably enough to quote the then Secretary General of the Ministry of the National 
Economy who was responsible for the EU programmes, who reported that the majority of 
the projects financed by the first CSF remained incomplete.302 In terms of the road 
networks, only 60 km of main roads were produced by the end of 1993.303 The constant 
modifications of the initial plans again became an integral part of the implementation of the 
programmes in order to achieve better rates of absorption. On the whole, the amount of 
funds spent compared with the total allocations was not unsatisfactory, as it reached 84%, 
better than Italy for example which only achieved 73% over the same period.304  As was the 
case with the IMPs, however, this was achieved by hastening the rates of absorption during 
the last stages of the programme and by including projects that did not contribute to the 
initially decided developmental objectives.  
 
Nevertheless, the most serious issue was the difficulty that the regional OPs faced at the 
implementation stage. Even though half of the first CSF was devoted to the regional OPs – 
40% was the initial appropriation, which reached 50% of the total budget at the end of the 
programme – there was hardly any alleviation of regional disparities.305 If anything, there 
was a slight increase in regional disparities as measured by the GDP in the country during 
the same period.306 The negligible impact of the regional OPs in the decrease of regional 
inequalities must have been affected by the fact that in order to artificially increase the rates 
of absorption, the domestic authorities reverted to the method of redeploying to the sectoral 
OPs funds that had been left over from the regional ones.307 These related to very small 
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scale projects, and exacerbated the problem of the dispersion of the projects that was 
mentioned above.  
 
Therefore, since the inception of the first CSF there has been a neglect of the need to 
address the ‘regional problem’ of the country and there has been more focus on addressing 
the issues of backwardness that had been identified at the national level. The EURP was 
used in Greece more as a national developmental policy rather than as a regional one. The 
political priority of entering the EMU, and also the previous inadequate institutional 
responses to the issue of regional inequalities, provided the impetus to employ the finances 
at the central level. Thus, the potential to achieve the convergence criteria by 
simultaneously decreasing the inequalities amongst the localities of the country was 
ignored. This is indicated in quantitative terms by the share of the total support that was 
diverted to the sectoral OPs, which according to one estimate308 was 62% in the first CSF, 
rose to 68% in the second and remained at around 67% in the third programming period. It 
must be noted however that the exact estimations of the percentages that the sectoral and 
the regional components received is not feasible. Different studies employ different 
methods of estimating these percentages, hence in the following sections I might provide 
slightly different estimations.  
 
To be sure, there is nothing inherently negative in employing the funds arriving through the 
EURP as promoters of national socioeconomic upgrading. Indeed, this is part of the logic 
of the intervention attempted through the sectoral OPs. However, the redirection of the 
funds from regional to sectoral programmes was exclusively motivated by the need to 
absorb the funds by the required time and avoid any sanctions by the Commission.309 That 
is to say, there would be nothing wrong if the domestic authorities were to attempt to 
increase the productive capabilities of the Greek economy by pursuing a national strategy 
based on the EURP funding. However, this was never explicitly stated –because it would be 
against the regulations of the Structural Funds – but that is what has happened because of 
the difficulties in absorbing the funds devoted to the regional OPs.  
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The pattern of assigning more importance to the accomplishment of the convergence 
criteria, hence the financial priority in the national section of the CSF, remained a 
characteristic of the second CSF that started in 1994 and lasted until 1999. In fact, at the 
end of the programme, the national component ended up absorbing an even larger part of 
the total expenditure – 75% as opposed to 25% of the regional component.310 Furthermore, 
the initiation of the second programming period marked the launch of the finances from the 
Cohesion Fund. Together, the Structural and the Cohesion Funds contributed 32.78 billion 
ECUS to the Greek economy. This represents an almost doubling of the resources that 
became available, as can be seen in Table 5.3 – which only shows the funding that arrived 
from the CSFs. In this Table the per capita spending of regional programmes for the three 
CSFs is shown for each of the 13 Greek regions. Despite the increase in the funds that 
became available, however, the hierarchy of the Greek regions with respect to resource 
allocation – as presented in the brackets – did not alter significantly. What becomes clear 
from the Table is that although the per capita spending increased during this period, the 
ways in which the funds were distributed amongst the country’s regions stayed the same. 
Therefore, the priorities of the Greek authorities concerning the regional imbalances did not 
alter.  
 
Table 5.3. 1st, 2nd and 3rd CSF per capita spending (in ECU) 
 
Region  1st CSF 2nd CSF 3rd CSF 
East Macedonia and 
Thrace 
551 (1st) 1,156 (4th) 1,629 (5th) 
Central Macedonia 215 (11th) 459 (12th) 655 (12th) 
Western Macedonia  362 (6th) 986 (5th) 1,726 (3rd) 
Epirus 383 (5th) 932 (6th) 1,765 (2nd) 
Thessaly 289 (9th) 685 (9th) 990 (9th) 
Western Greece 206 (12th) 573(11th) 926 (11th) 
Continental Greece 342 (7th) 857 (7th) 1,132 (8th) 
Attica  114 (13th) 259 (13th) 399 (13th) 
Peloponnese 237 (10th) 629 (10th) 937 (10th) 
Ionian Islands 475 (2nd) 1,194 (2nd) 1,577 (6th) 
North Aegean 467 (3rd) 1,481 (1st) 2,361 (1st) 
Southern Aegean 385 (4th) 1,159 (3rd) 1,702 (4th) 
Crete 305 (8th) 775 (8th) 1,158 (7th) 
National Average 240 581 921 
Source: CSF I, CSF II, CSF III, National Statistical Service of Greece, Population Census, 2001. 
Available at Plaskovitis, 2008. 
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If the convergence criteria imposed certain limits on the capacity of the Greek authorities to 
implement the second CSF in a more redistributive manner, the situation was more 
straightforward with the Cohesion Fund. The reduction of the national budget deficits was 
the main precondition for any country to receive funding from the Fund, as decided at the 
EC Summit in Edinburgh in 1992. The main aim of the Cohesion Fund was to provide 
assistance to the four poorest countries – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain – to enter the 
EMU. Certainly, the national spending of the cohesion funding would have regional 
significance since approximately 2,688 out of the total 6,670 billion drachmas would be 
allocated to the thirteen regions.311 The Cohesion Fund was not incorporated into the 
Structural Funds; rather, it was designed as an additional instrument for the financing of 
projects mainly related to physical infrastructure and the environment. During the 1994-99 
period, the Cohesion Fund approved the co-financing of 174 projects, of which 129 were 
environmental, 44 for transportation and one project for technical assistance.312    
 
To return to the second CSF, the length of the programme increased and it would last for 
six years, whilst the sectoral component now comprised 17 OPs and the regional had 13. 
Also, for the first time there was a separate OP for Technical Assistance. The responsibility 
for the Olympic Games in 2004 contributed significantly to the focus turning towards the 
enhancement of the infrastructures of the already congested capital city. Several projects 
that were part of the package submitted to the Olympic Committee in the preparation for 
the bid for the games were included in the second CSF. Therefore, not only the alleviation 
of the environmental and traffic problems that Athens was facing but also infrastructural 
projects such as stadiums and other athletic areas received substantial funding from the 
second CSF.  
 
The main aim pursued through the second CSF was a reduction in the geographical 
marginalisation of the country and the promotion of big infrastructure networks that would 
allow the country to integrate with its neighbours. This objective would absorb 27.8% of 
the total finances whilst 25.3% would be directed towards the objective of developing the 
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competitiveness of private enterprises. Two other objectives, those of the improvement of 
the quality of life and the enhancement of the employment prospects of the population, 
would receive 9% and 12.5% respectively from the total funds. As mentioned above, the 
remaining 25% would be directed towards the regional operational programmes with the 
explicit aim of reducing not only the interregional disparities but also the isolation of the 
islands. It has become clear that in relation to the contents of the OPs, the priorities pursued 
through the second CSF remained basically unchanged when compared to the first CSF, 
albeit the finances increased substantially. This picture emerges more clearly from Table 
5.6, which shows the evolution of the financial allocations for each category of intervention 
for the IMPs and the three CSFs. There, it can be seen that the largest part of the 
programmes was diverted to the basic transport, social and environmental infrastructures. 
Transport infrastructure in particular was clearly receiving the lion’s share of the funding.    
 
The redirection of resources from OPs that would not achieve the desired absorption rates 
to those with better rates of absorption again became a characteristic of the implementation 
patterns of the second CSF. Admittedly, these practices were followed to a lesser extent 
when compared to the first CSF.313 This was mainly because the new regulations did not 
allow extensive use of these practices. There was a clear change in the priorities of the 
Commission in that period towards strengthening the procedures that would improve 
transparency and avoid financial waste. Nevertheless, the dispersion of resources into small 
scale projects of physical infrastructure at the expense of the ‘soft’ actions was not averted. 
The difficulty in the implementation of actions that aimed at upgrading the skills of the 
population was consolidated in this period, and as will be shown in the part that deals in 
detail with the problems of the implementation of the third CSF, it continued in the next 
programming period. Moreover, there were problems in the implementation of physical 
infrastructure projects mainly because there were discrepancies between the requirements 
of these projects and environmental legislation. In some cases these projects would have to 
be built in conservation areas, and such actions would be opposed by the Commission and 
the Greek Council of State,314 which is a branch of the judiciary that among others deals 
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with issues of environmental legislation. Overall, the implementation rate was 73% for the 
1994-99 period, considerably lower than the previous one.315 As I will show in the section 
that deals with the third CSF, a substantial number of projects were carried through as 
‘bridge projects’316 during the third programming period. This method was followed in 
order to avoid more significant forfeiting of the funds.  
 
On a more positive note however, in the second CSF there was a much better deployment 
of resources in the field of the large scale projects of physical infrastructure largely as a 
result of the deployment of Public Private Initiatives (PPIs) as a novel method of co-
financing317 The construction of large motorways such as PATHE (Patras, Athens, 
Thessaloniki Evzoni), Attiki Odos, and the Egnatia Motorway, and also the new El. 
Venizelos airport, the Athens Metro and the Rio Antirio bridge started during the second 
CSF. To be sure, most of those projects had already been included in previous development 
plans, some even dating back to the 1960s.318 Nevertheless, the Olympic Games, the 
insistence of the newly elected modernising wing of PASOK on tangible aspects of 
efficiency, and the pressure of the Commission seem to have contributed to the completion 
of the projects. There is little doubt that these projects modernised the country and provided 
it with a first-class physical infrastructure. For example, the Egnatia Odos project has 
helped to reduce the time needed to travel between the port of Igoumenitsa and the border 
with Turkey from over 11 hours to 6.  Moreover it brought isolated regions like Epirus and 
Western Macedonia closer to the rest of the country.319  
 
Nevertheless, this project was probably the exception in benefiting the Greek regions as 
most projects were constructed in and around the city of Athens so as to assist the 
successful carrying out of the 2004 Olympic Games. Hence, they seem to have exacerbated 
the problem of the concentration of activity in and around the already congested area of 
Athens, with the population and economic activity of this area increasing even more in the 
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period leading to the 2004 Olympic Games as a result.320 In addition, there does not seem to 
have been a plan that included these projects in a broader programme of balanced 
socioeconomic development. Rather, they seem to have been motivated by the PASOK 
government's need to improve the Greek citizens’ ‘everyday’ quality of life. Admittedly, 
not all these projects finished on time at the end of the second CSF; the majority continued 
as ‘bridge’ projects in the third CSF and were mostly completed just in time for the 
Olympic Games in August 2004.  
 
Finally, in relation to the practicalities of implementing the second CSF in Greece it is 
worth pointing out the case of ‘kthmatologio’, which is the Greek cadastre or Land 
Registry. Greece is possibly the only country in the EU-15 that does not have a proper 
system for registering all the land encompassed in its territory. This means there are still 
areas in which the ownership of land is undefined and two or more individuals can claim 
ownership of the same section of property. After repeated attempts in the past, the Simitis 
government decided to go ahead with the implementation of this large scale programme. 
The result was an unmitigated disaster, since the executives of the state enterprise 
established to oversee the programme were accused of extensive corruption. All of them 
were appointed by the central Government and they were accused of stealing around €110 
million. As a result of the legal intervention the project collapsed321 and the government 
returned funding earmarked for that purpose to the Commission.322 This followed on the 
spot controls conducted by the Commission in 2003 which decided that only 7% of the total 
land was registered by that time. The programme was revived by the ND government in 
2004 and is still ongoing. This time however there is no contribution of finances by the 
Commission and the programme is wholly financed by national resources.323  
 
The current section identified the basic parameters of the first three programming periods 
of EURP as well as the main difficulties that the implementation of the programmes 
encountered in this period. A tentative conclusion as far as the programming stage is 
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concerned is that the developmental priorities that were to be pursued by each programme 
remained more or less unchanged and reflected the growing structural weaknesses of the 
Greek economy as identified in section 5.1. The sectoral parts of the programmes absorbed 
the available funds much more easily, which motivated the domestic authorities to redirect 
funding from the regional to the sectoral OPs. After the initiation of the second CSF, the 
EURP became almost identified with a national strategy for upgrading the domestic 
structures. The Olympic Games and the efforts to achieve the convergence criteria provided 
a further incentive for this process. The relatively successful Olympic Games and the 
modernisation of the capital’s infrastructure are largely the result of these efforts. 
Simultaneously, there have also been a few examples of mismanagement. These patterns 
provided the legacy, on which the third CSF would build, the details of which I now 
discuss.   
 
5.4. The third CSF 
The third CSF comprised 24 OPs, 11 of which were sectoral whilst the regional remained 
13. There was also a separate OP comprising Technical Assistance. In total, the finances 
that became available for the operation of the programmes were €48.3 billion from both the 
Structural and the Cohesion Funds, which represented significant increases in comparison 
with the two previous CSFs and the IMPs.  Table 5.4 shows the total finances as they 
originated from the Community, the national level and the private contributions. From this 
Table, it can be inferred that the finances continued to increase and in the third CSF the 
country managed to finance what was undoubtedly the most ambitious developmental 
programme in its history.   
 
The third CSF entailed seven priority axes that were pursued through the regional and the 
sectoral OPs. The sectoral OPs again received the majority of the funding.  In terms of their 
financial significance, there was an obvious emphasis on the improvement of the 
transportation networks (28.8%), whilst the aim of improving the competitiveness of the 
labour force would absorb 14.5% of the total funds. The priority of the enhancement of the 
human resources and the employability of the labour force would absorb 10.7% with the 
promotion of rural development and fisheries, the improvement of the quality of life and 
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the advancement of the information society absorbing the rest of the funds. As in the 
second CSF, the priority of the promotion of equitable regional development would absorb 
almost 26% of the available funding. What becomes obvious is that although the priority 
axes have changed in comparison with the previous programming periods, the objective of 
the enhancement of the physical infrastructure – in this case the transportation networks – 
remained the basic priority in the third CSF as well. A major change however was the 
inclusion of a separate priority axis for the ‘Information Society’, which indicates a concern 
that the country is lagging behind in terms of the new technologies as well as an increased 
concern on the part of the Commission about these issues.  
 
Furthermore, there was a renewed interest in the educational and social infrastructures, 
through which the main structural problem of the Greek economy would be addressed. 
Nevertheless, the ‘hard’ infrastructure once again took the lion’s share of the funding. This 
becomes clearer from Table 5.6 which shows that this particular sector of intervention 
benefited from 31% of the total finances following 13%, 28% and 26% for the IMPs, the 
first CSF and the second CSF respectively. Another estimate324 puts the percentage 
received by such actions at around 40% of the sectoral OPs, whilst one needs to add the 
similar actions included in the regional OPs. In short, the enhancement of the physical 
infrastructure remained the most important priority funded through all three programming 
periods in Greece. One would expect that at least after the first two rounds of CSF these 
issues would have been solved and there would be more emphasis on the enhancement of 
productive capacities. The relative neglect of the ‘soft’ actions is further indicated by the 
low percentages that were committed to ‘Research and Development’ (2%). The 
environmental infrastructures continued to receive less funding, following the trend 
established in the second CSF when the proportion fell to 8% from 20% in the first CSF.  
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Table 5.4. Financial Tables of co-financed development programmes in Greece 
1986-2006 (according to the initial EC approvals) 
 
IMP 1986-1989* 
In thousand ECU 
(1986 prices) 
CSF I 1989-93 
In thousand ECU 
(1989 prices) 
CSF II 1994-99 
In thousand ECU 
(1994 prices) 
CSF III 2000-06 In 
thousand euro 
(2000 prices) 
Total Budget 2,101,933 14,342,054 29,721,300 44,363,540 
National Public 
Participation  
695,740 5,802,196 7,069,900 11,126,075 
Community 
Participation  
2,576,000 7,193,241 13,980,000 22,707,000 
Private 
Participation  
210,193 1,346,617 8,671,400 10,730,465 
*After 1989 the IMPs were incorporated into CSF I 
Source: www.hellaskps.gr 
 
Table 5.5. Finances approved by the Commission at the beginning of each 
programming period 
 CSF 2000-2006 Cohesion Fund Total 
Community Participation 22.70 3.24 25.94 
National Participation 9.72 2.01 11.73 
Total Public Expenditure 32.42 5.25 37.67 
Private Participation 9.53 1.10 10.63 
Total 41.95 6.35 48.30 
Source: www.hellaskps.gr 
 
 
Table 5.6. The Evolution of Financial Allocations (%) by Category of Intervention 
 IMPs CSF I CSF II CSF III 
Transport Infrastructure  13 28 26 31 
Social and Educational 
Infrastructure 
5 15 10 9 
Environmental 
Infrastructure 
6 20 8 9 
Industry (incentives, 
services, infrastructure) 
33 4 11 8 
Tourism (incentives, 
services, infrastructure) 
4 5 7 9 
Agriculture and Fisheries 18 4 15 20 
Research and Development 3 1 1 2 
Human Resources 9 18 12 7 
Other 9 5 10 5 
Total  100 100 100 100 
EAPTA & disadvantaged 
areas 
15 14 20 9 
The percentage of EAPTA & disadvantaged areas is not included in the total because it contains 
actions already covered by other categories. 
Source: processed data from the official financial tables of the programmes. Available at 
Plaskovitis, 2008. 
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Apart from the financial alterations, however, there have been significant changes in the 
regulatory framework that governs the activities of the third CSF in Greece, which affected 
the potential for diffusion of the ‘added value’ of the policy in the domestic administrative 
and management practices. The reform of the regulations of the Structural Funds325 entailed 
important institutional changes, which are discussed at greater length in chapter 6. 
Nonetheless, the new regulations also had significant operational repercussions which are 
more pertinent for the analysis presented in this chapter. The new regulations attempted to 
promote the reformulation of the principles of partnership and additionality between the 
Commission and the member states. The main aim was the handover of greater 
responsibility to the recipient countries as far as the initial policy stages –that of 
programming- were concerned. This process would limit the scope of programme 
negotiations largely to priority level.326 Most importantly the reforms aimed at clarifying 
the levels of responsibility in connection with the financial management of the funds.327 
Therefore, the Greek authorities would have to play a more active role in the programming 
of the regional and sectoral OPs that would comprise the CSF. The Commission would 
retain a non-interventionist role at these stages, expecting the national Governments to 
‘express more leadership in defining the development priorities of their 
country.’328However, the Commission retained the right to intervene more proactively at 
the stages of the implementation of the policy.  
 
As far as the stage of the implementation of the policy was concerned, the regulations 
introduced more stringent obligations on the member states.329 These applied to: reporting 
and specifically the obligation to submit an annual report on the progress of the 
programme; monitoring and the obligation to submit to the Commission the details of each 
OP as a separate Planning Supplement (PS) that would include performance indicators for 
every project, ex ante evaluations and technical reports that would ensure the compatibility 
between the stated aims of the OP and the ongoing results; evaluation (each OP would have 
to undertake a mid-term evaluation and an update of this every two years). Most 
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importantly, those changes aimed at affecting the process of expenditure management and 
financial control. The former was exemplified through the introduction of the ‘n+2’ 
automatic decommitment rule, which meant that if the domestic authorities had not 
absorbed the funds available for a project two years after the time stipulated by the initial 
OP, the funds would be lost. Moreover, there was the introduction of the performance 
reserve that aimed at instilling a sense of competition amongst the OPs and would be 
awarded following the mid-term review. In short, that entailed the awarding of further 
funding to the best performing OPs that would be redirected by the less effective ones. 
Finally, financial control was intensified with the introduction of new requirements on 
management and control systems and an intensification of audit.   
 
These changes suggest a general trend towards the strengthening of the procedures for the 
monitoring and evaluation of the projects that comprise the OPs. Where in the previous 
programming periods these processes were more lenient – possibly reflecting the need to 
allow some time to the domestic authorities to get to grips with the demands of the EURP – 
now the approach has become stricter. This regulatory framework imposed some strict 
constraints on the domestic authorities which might have exacerbated the problems they 
had encountered in the previous programming periods. These were the general parameters 
of the regulatory framework that was introduced in the third CSF in all the recipient 
countries. It is now time to examine how it was applied in the case of Greece. We start this 
process in the next section by identifying the main issues that were presented as problems 
in the attempt to improve the developmental impact of the third CSF.  
 
5.5. The difficulties with the implementation of the third CSF  
As was established earlier, the previous CSFs and the IMPs were characterised by 
significant difficulties and delays by the domestic authorities in absorbing the funds. The 
picture was similar for the third CSF as well whilst the problems that have contributed to 
this situation were also similar. In particular, there was a general ‘anxiety’330 in the 
domestic authorities because of a lack of ‘mature’ projects that could be incorporated in the 
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OPs and would be in accordance to the EURP regulations. As a Commission employee331 
put it,  
it constantly seemed that there were never enough projects for the available money. 
 
This situation required the relevant authorities to constantly reorganise the CSFs and hence 
the OPs so as to avoid losing the funds. That led to extensions in the implementation of the 
programmes, which can explain why each CSF would finish at least three to four years after 
the stated date of completion.  
 
The rates of the absorption of the funds of the third CSF could provide evidence for these 
difficulties. According to the official announcements by the Ministry of Economy, in 
March 2004 the absorption rate for the third CSF was 23%, which rose to 75.18% at the 
end of 2007, which is one year after the official completion of the programme. 
Furthermore, only 57.7% of the funding available via the sectoral OPs and 58.5% from the 
regional OPs was absorbed by 2006.332 This barely rose in the following year, reaching 
60.8% and 62.4% respectively in June 2007.333  
 
At this point it is important to clarify what it is that the absorption rates indicate. They 
describe the rates in which the progress of the payment processes as demonstrated by the 
regulations of the structural funds take place. In the first instance, that process entails the 
selection of an eligible project from the Managing Authorities and the Monitoring 
Committees at the national level. Then, the national authorities apply to the Commission 
for the funding and the EU contribution is committed for deployment after the national 
contribution is secured. When that happens the Commission releases the funding to be 
spent in the project.  
 
True, it is normal to have low rates of absorption at the initial phases of any developmental 
program. The projects of either the ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ infrastructures need to ‘mature’ before 
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the absorption rates increase.334 Particularly for the projects of ‘hard’ infrastructure, the 
time it takes to select suitable projects for funding can be influenced by many factors. Also, 
securing the national contributions that is needed before the Commission funding is 
released is far from straightforward. Also, at the end of the third CSF Greece did indeed 
manage to spend the majority of the available funds and avoid significant forfeiting. In 
particular, the percentage of absorption for the third CSF as a whole was 92% in 2008 and 
by 2010 most of the available funds had been absorbed. However, as will be seen next this 
happened at the expense of any policy change as the race for the absorption of the funds 
intensified in the last years of the policy cycle and the projects included satisfied the criteria 
set by the Commission in order to release the funds but were not consistent with those that 
were included in the programming stage. Hence, the persistently low rates at such advanced 
stages of the programme should provide some cause for concern, especially since the rates 
of absorption are exclusively singled out by the Commission as the main criterion, based on 
which the flows from the Structural and the Cohesion Funds arrive in the recipient 
countries.335 In other words, if a country is consistently failing to absorb the funds that it is 
supposed to absorb in a given year, the next year it will receive less funding.  
 
More specifically, the difficulties that the projects funded through the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) faced in finding proper financial backing at the start of the 
third Greek CSF were identified by the Commission in the ex-post evaluation report for the 
period 2000-2006 that it published in 2010.336 In this report, the Commission estimates that 
only around 20% of payments by the ERDF were made by the end of 2003 and almost 60% 
of the payments were made after 2006. This rate is juxtaposed with other comparable 
countries such as Ireland where over half the payments were made by the end of 2003 and 
90% by the end of 2006, Spain (41, 6% and 78, 5% respectively), and Portugal (42, 8% and 
78% respectively). True, as will be shown at the conclusion the payments made for the 
whole programme were satisfactory at the end of the policy cycle. Nonetheless, this delay 
in receiving the payments is clearly a sign of significant implementation difficulties that 
have an impact on the outcome of the programme.   
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With regard to the projects financed by the Cohesion Fund in particular, through its Annual 
Reports on the Cohesion Fund the Commission has identified a series of problems, mainly 
related to the slow rates of absorption as in 2004, the absorption rate for the Cohesion Fund 
was 7%. These problems particularly related with the projects that would support the 
environment, with the projects of physical infrastructure progressing better. For example, in 
2007 it concluded that substantial efforts were taken concerning the closure of projects that 
had been adopted in the 1993-99 period with five projects of that type finishing in 2007. 
Also, four ‘bridge projects’ that had been financed in the previous period as well as during 
2000-06 were finished in the same year. However, after noting the late submission of the 
projects, it also expressed concern as to whether the projects were submitted in order to 
absorb the funds or because of their functioning importance, noting that:  
The closure process revealed certain aspects that require further attention such as 
whether projects are operational upon completion.337 
 
This judgement by the Commission was based on the experience of previous periods:  
in the course of closures carried out so far this has proved to be a persistent problem 
in particular as regards environment projects.338  
 
Similarly, in 2008 it noted the ‘serious delays’ in the projects financed as part of the 
environmental interventions and ‘very low absorption’ in one specific project. It suggested  
close monitoring and accelerated efforts…are required in order to ensure that the 
projects are completed and put into operation within the timeframes set.339  
 
Therefore, it is interesting for the current section to identify the reasons for these delays, 
which affect the rates of absorption. These are not only to do with institutional rigidities 
that prevent the programmes being implemented in accordance with the initial plans agreed 
between the Commission and Greece; other bottom-up characteristics seem to have played 
an important role too.  
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5.5.1 Reasons for the delays of the third CSF  
First and foremost amongst them – as identified by most of the interviewees – is a tendency 
of the final beneficiaries to turn to every legal procedure available in order to promote their 
bid for the construction of a project. The final beneficiaries are public or private firms that 
are responsible for the commissioning of the operations. The projects include not only 
physical infrastructure projects – where one could assume that the variables that influence a 
decision are more or less irrefutable – but also programmes of ‘soft’ actions – such as 
training courses. In particular, following the publication of a tender for a certain project, the 
competitors – individuals or companies – of those who win the tender do not always accept 
the result.340  They try to make their point by lodging an appeal ‘regardless of their chances 
of winning’.341 As a result, certain projects which are already included in an OP and have 
secured the funding from the Commission’s relevant fund cannot start until the appeal has 
been discussed. Given the paramount delays from which the Greek judicial system suffers 
in general this results in significant setbacks for the projects involved. There are cases 
where an appeal is only discussed three or four years after being lodged.342 Therefore, in 
certain cases this process results in the cancellation of the project.  
 
A similar issue contributing to the delays is that of the archaeological sites.343  As Greece is 
a country with a rich archaeological inheritance, many excavations that take place as part of 
a project of a ‘hard’ action are very likely to lead to a find of this type. Because of this 
inheritance, and also because of the anachronistic nature of the Greek educational system, 
which has promoted a ‘shared’ national identity that revolves very much around the 
supposed miracles of Ancient Greece, the archaeological profession has acquired 
significant powers throughout the years. In particular, archaeologists retain considerable 
influence in the policy areas where any element of their jurisprudence is concerned. They 
are institutionally represented through the Archaeological Council in the process of the 
management of the EURP in the CSF MC.  
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They tend to be quite inflexible in their decision-making and to promote a view of Ancient 
Greece,344 which more often than not contradicts the needs of a modern developmental plan 
such as the third CSF. Consequently, they can delay the announcement of their decisions on 
a project, and since no other progress can be made the whole project is delayed. There are 
also cases in which the implementation of a project may even be postponed indefinitely 
because of such a situation. This is not to deny that the protection of the cultural inheritance 
of any country that benefits from the Structural and the Cohesion Funds is a priority for the 
Commission.  
 
A third issue that has created delays in the implementation of projects is that of the political 
interference of deputies in the selection of the projects. This problem is mainly identified at 
the regional and local levels where the deputies think that the funding that comes through 
the relevant OPs should be used in order to satisfy their regional clienteles.345 In chapter 3, I 
discussed the clientelistic political interference of the Government in bureaucratic and 
technocratic affairs as an endemic characteristic of the Greek political economy. What is 
important in this section is the fact that the local deputies interfere in the selection of the 
projects, in order to favour some ‘political friend’. Indeed, this practice is so prevalent that 
when an interviewee was asked if what he was describing was the traditional ‘rousfeti’ that 
has been a feature of this sort of interaction for years he simply presented it as ‘a distinct 
philosophy’346 in developmental issues; in other words, as something that one takes for 
granted when participating in the decision-making of the authorities. Another interviewee, 
who was employed at the MA of a regional OP, seemed to think that it was so embedded in 
the process that he referred to the interviewer, saying:  
there will always be interferences; we are always influenced by friends and 
relatives. If you were a Prefect of an area, and a member of the Cabinet who is a 
personal friend of yours asked something from you, would you not do it? I know 
that I would, it is logical and it makes sense to me to be loyal to your friends.347 
 
Similarly, another former employee who participated in the management institutions until 
2003 pointed out: 
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There is no doubt that the final beneficiaries are influenced by local clientelistic 
interchanges; each recipient country has a certain social environment in which it 
implements the policy and this does not change easily.348 
 
Moreover, a Greek Commission employee349 put the issue succinctly by drawing a sketch 
in order to illustrate his point. The sketch consisted of two overlapping cycles, one bigger 
than the other. The smaller one represented the EURP processes and Management and 
Implementation Systems (MIS) whilst the larger cycle represented the wider political and 
socioeconomic context of the country. Issues of clientelism, corruption, lack of trust and 
political interferences were included in the larger cycle which -as he said- ended up having 
much more significant effects than what was intended through the EURP and the MIS.  
Finally, another Commission employee350 spoke about a ‘comfortable’ relationship between 
the state and the business sector and that investment decisions were taken in Greece 
through the influence of ‘political’ pressures.  
 
Therefore, where a project has been decided and all the bureaucratic procedures have been 
concluded, a member of the Cabinet proposes a decree stipulating that the project needs to 
be implemented by a different final beneficiary than the one that had been decided. The 
member justifies this by identifying an irregularity – usually of formalistic and completely 
irrelevant nature – in the initial decision made by the relevant authorities. This member of 
Cabinet more often than not returns a favour to a local deputy by interfering in this way.351  
As a result, the project is delayed, since all the relevant procedures need to start again and 
the implementation cannot be initiated before they conclude.  To be sure, it is not only a 
member of the Cabinet that may interfere: 
Deputies, Mayors, Prefects, members of Cabinet who belong to other Ministries, the 
Regional Secretaries of regional OPs other than the one discussed, they all seem to 
have a say in these issues even though formally it is only the General Secretary of 
either the region or the Ministry responsible for the OP who should be involved.352  
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Certainly, the interventions by the central Government in the design and even the 
implementation stage of a developmental programme are not necessarily harmful for the 
final product of the programme. Any recipient country is required to present a national plan 
of economic and regional development to the Commission so the central Government is a 
priori responsible for participating in this process. It is natural that the decisions that relate 
to the priorities of a national industrial and/or regional policy are taken at the central level. 
Nevertheless, the interference that takes place does not seem to have any developmental 
needs in mind but is mainly done in order to promote the short term interests of those 
involved. As one interviewee put it:  
in the case of discrepancies between the technocratic and developmental priorities 
and the ‘‘political ones353’’ there is never any doubt in our minds that the latter take 
precedence over the former354 
 
These processes are not exactly illegal but they contradict the logic set out by the 
regulations concerning the transparent deployment of the funds. However, they are so 
widespread that none of the interviewees doubted their existence though they were equally 
reluctant to name them for what they were. Hence they would refer to them as ‘political’ 
interventions or employ other ‘indirect’ ways to describe them even though they were 
clearly referring to patronage and clientelistic practices.  
 
Another issue which is similar to the one discussed here is a mentality that exists at the 
regional and local levels about the entitlements of each area to the available funds. They 
relate to the fact that at that level there is a perception of ‘equality’ where each region 
‘should’ take some money regardless of its developmental needs and/or the progress that it 
makes in absorbing the funds given through the relevant ROP. Because of the lack of any 
devolution of powers for the collection of taxation at the regional and local levels, the sub-
national authorities are dependent on the central government to cover their basic 
expenditures.355 Since there are no other national funds available for the regional and local 
governments apart from the funds that come from the Structural Funds, the sub-national 
authorities can only be financially viable if they receive this money. Of course, the 
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principle of ‘equality’ mentioned above only applies in theory, since the distribution takes 
place according to the clientelistic interchanges between the local deputies and the 
members of the Cabinet. The more votes the former can offer to the governing party the 
more money they receive. Therefore, there is a pattern by which the central government 
firstly distributes the available finances to the beneficiaries and then examines their 
developmental needs. Furthermore, during the implementation of the project, if an area 
does not seem to be able to absorb the finances effectively and the Commission officials 
ask why the money is not transferred to another ROP, the answer is that no one can take 
this money from the area, the implication being that strong protestations from the local 
populace would follow such an action.356 Another Commission employee corroborated this 
issue by expressing his surprise at the strong protestations expressed by the regional 
authorities when enquired about the prospect of redistributing the funds available to ROPs 
according to their performance. 
 
As regards the mentality of the local population, who might react negatively to the effective 
implementation of the programmes, the issue of the social reactions often articulated 
against the construction of certain projects in a specific locality is an important one. It is 
similar to the ‘not in my back yard’ phenomenon identified in the UK, which entails 
particularly strong reactions on behalf of the local population to the prospect of building a 
project of physical infrastructure that is of benefit to the wider country, and is particularly 
pertinent in connection with projects financed through the Cohesion Fund, especially waste 
management proposals.357 For example, in the area of Kouroupitos, outside Chania in 
Crete, a site for waste management was installed in 1990 without following any rules or 
regulations of the EC environmental legislation. The Commission repeatedly asked the 
Greek government to close the site and build a new one in an area close by and in 
accordance with the EC environmental legislation. Because of the strong reactions on 
behalf of the population in the area of the proposed site, however, the project stalled, and as 
a result, in 2000 the Commission imposed a fine on the Greek government amounting to 
€20,000 per day. The new site was still not fully operational in 2005, whilst in the 
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intervening years the Commission referred Greece to the ECJ twice. The main obstacle was 
the continuing resistance to the relocation of the waste dump site by residents in the area of 
the proposed new site.358      
 
A fifth issue is the multiplicity of procedures that need to be followed by a final beneficiary 
in order to start implementing a project. The difficulties in communication and coordination 
between the many institutional authorities that manage the regional and sectoral OPs are 
discussed in detail in chapter 6. What I refer to in this part is a seemingly ‘Byzantine’ 
plethora of actions that a final beneficiary needs to follow in order to be able to submit a 
bid for a project. These are established by pre-existing legislation that had governed 
investment proposals in Greece in the past and were simply not updated after the 
introduction of the Structural and the Cohesion Funds. This is the result of the fact that the 
1260/1999 Council Regulation, which governed the activities of the EURP during the 
2000-2008 period, has only provided a general legislative framework for these activities. 
The domestic laws for the planning and assessment of planning proposals are the ones that 
are applicable in the final case and are intended to integrate the ‘spirit’ of the Community 
legislation. Similarly to the general patterns of the transposition of Community legislation 
in the domestic legislation, however, this has hardly been the case.359  
 
Therefore, for instance, a male who was interested in pursuing an investment relating to the 
agricultural sector in his local area was asked to submit a certificate that would ensure he 
had completed his military service.360 Apart from the obvious discrepancy between such a 
requirement and the need to promote equal opportunities for every citizen in every member 
state of the EU, it is also unclear how someone’s military service could affect his ability to 
proceed to the investment successfully, which is what the legislation is supposed to ensure. 
In other cases, migrants who had been legal residents in the country for more than ten years 
were discouraged from submitting a bid because they did not have Greek citizenship.  
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These are just two examples361 that may make clear the irrelevance of some of the 
documentation that a private investor would need to submit to the appropriate authority in 
order to submit a bid for the implementation of a project. It might be concluded therefore, 
that these issues could fall under the general problem of excessive ‘red tape’ that hinders 
the objectives of the plans. However, this is not the case, since these problems are not 
similar to the ones that are usually put under this category – for example, requirements for 
health and safety legislation. Rather, the issues mentioned here can substantiate the 
‘irrationality’ of the manner in which the Greek bureaucracy interacts with the surrounding 
socioeconomic environment and how the state unintentionally turns prospective investors 
away. Indeed, many individuals who do not enjoy the margins that larger companies do are 
disheartened and abandon their plans because of these requirements. Furthermore, this 
situation is reproduced amongst the local population, and prospective investors may not 
even bother to enquire about these issues.  
 
To be fair, these problems were exacerbated after the introduction by the Commission of 
additional bureaucratic procedures to ensure transparency and the sound management of the 
Structural and the Cohesion Funds in the third CSF. As mentioned above, the Commission 
strengthened these procedures without however taking into account the inflexible domestic 
administrative system in countries such as Greece. In particular, the intensification of 
expenditure management and financial control has failed in its aim to promote transparency 
and sound management in the funded programmes. Instead, it has resulted in an ‘audit 
explosion’ in the member states that exacerbated the existing managerial and administrative 
difficulties.362 This is the case because for each project to be approved there are three stages 
of financial control that need to be implemented, which provides asphyxiating constraints 
to the system. The legislative framework introduced and related with financial control was 
characterised as ‘anti developmentalist’ by an interviewee and as one that transformed the 
role of the Commission from an agent of economic and regional development to simply ‘an 
inspectional authority.’363 As he put it:  
                                                 
361
 Both mentioned by Interview E-2. 
362
 Bachtler and Mendez, 2011.  
363
 Interview A-8. 
  
 
140 
there is no doubt that the transparency and the avoidance of corruption are very 
important goals to which we should all contribute. However I cannot understand 
how adding three more technical procedures that a prospective final beneficiary 
needs to follow will promote these objectives. What I do know is that these 
requirements can make the prospect of investing almost unbearable.  
 
The multiplicity of procedures that the combination of the domestic with the EU legislation 
provides has resulted in some projects being rejected after inspection by the relevant 
auditing authorities. This is justified in the case of non-compliance with environmental 
and/or public procurement legislation. For example, decisions of this kind were taken 
concerning 3 final beneficiaries in 2006.364   
 
Another issue that needs to be mentioned in this context is one that is likely to discourage a 
prospective investor even if they do show an interest in overcoming the rigidities that the 
legislative framework is imposing on them. This is related to  an attitude that exists at the 
local level which postulates that in order for someone to benefit from any governmental 
investment they need to enjoy the ‘right’ connections that will ‘push’ their proposal. For 
example, someone who has worked all his life and is entitled to a state pension will, instead 
of following the relevant bureaucratic procedures, go to his local deputy in order to make 
sure that he will receive it. Similarly, in this context, the prospective investor is likely to try 
to influence the decision that is supposed to be made by the relevant MA through his 
deputy. If he does not think that he can do that or if he fails to establish ‘connections’ with 
the relevant authority in other ways, he is likely to refrain from any proposal.  
 
Moreover, during the IMPs and the first two CSFs there was a significant lack of 
information about the existence of this funding in many areas. Put simply, many people 
were not aware of the existence of these opportunities for the co-financing of investment 
proposals.365  This deficiency was identified in the third CSF and the Managing Authorities 
were endowed with more responsibilities for the deployment of modern methods of 
communications to publicise the projects. Despite these efforts, however, and an admittedly 
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impressive national campaign366 that started in 2005 for the dissemination of information 
about the third CSF, many people are still not aware of the existence of the funds.  
 
Furthermore, there is a profound difficulty when it comes to communication between the 
actors that could potentially become final beneficiaries of a project and the MAs and IBs. 
These difficulties are particularly prevalent at the local level. As an employee of a MA of a 
regional OP put it:  
 
There are cases in which the public sector is the pioneer and advances 
developmental initiatives but the private sector does not follow. There are other 
cases in which the representatives of the private sector manage to organise and 
present us with collective requests for financing projects that could develop our area 
and we do not respond. For example they might decide that the establishment of an 
industrial park in a particular area would be something for which they could provide 
finances but the public sector does not have the time to provide the infrastructure 
that is needed or any other support because at the time we have other priorities. On 
the other hand, we might come up with a proposal for the introduction of an 
industrial park at a different time but with little or no consultation from the local 
entrepreneurs who have already located their premises elsewhere and are now 
reluctant to move despite the incentives that we offer. Therefore, both the public 
and the private authorities are trying hard to absorb the funds and develop the area 
but there is definitely a lack of timing between the two efforts…. There are cases in 
which entrepreneurs from our area ask us ‘‘Do you have any programme for the 
support of the private sector?’’ and we reply ‘‘what proposals can you offer?’’; 
there is absolutely no coordination between our actions and those of the private 
sector.367    
  
This is the case even though occasionally individual entrepreneurs or companies come up -
and sometimes undertake- significant investment initiatives at the local level.368 However, 
these are seldom integrated into a coordinated plan for implementation of a programme for 
the development of an area. Thus, they remain either short term investments with limited 
long term effects on the area’s productive capabilities or simply plans that are never put 
into practice.369 This is mainly because these investments:  
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...are not supported socially, the local and regional societies do not support those 
entrepreneurs that want to move things forward but only those whose investments 
stand no chance of succeeding.370  
 
Moreover, government intervention rarely if ever plays any part in the formation or the 
nourishing of this entrepreneurial activity. This is so because: 
The business sector in Greece is very traditional...over the years it has become 
accustomed to a situation where the prosperity of a company depends on the 
handouts that it receives from the government and there is no sense of 
accountability about the methods used in order to disperse this money...also, there is 
enormous pressure for private companies to do things in a certain way and if they 
are seen to step out of line they will be ‘punished’ by their competitors...also there is 
no coordination, for example in the case of a programme for professional training 
the government would go to the business sector and ask them ‘what are your needs 
in terms of personnel’ and the business sector would reply ‘well you tell us what are 
our needs’, are the private companies willing to invest in working out what their 
future needs are likely to be? The answer is no, they can’t see an immediate benefit 
for themselves.371        
 
In the current subsection I discussed the six main groups of reasons identified by the 
interviewees as contributing to the delays in the implementation of the projects included in 
the third CSF in Greece. These undermined the absorption of the funds by the domestic 
authorities and hence jeopardised the developmental objectives of the programme. The 
problem that the domestic authorities had to deal with was how to redeploy the funds that 
were not absorbed in the OPs agreed at the stage of designing the programme and to avoid 
losing the funding. This quest became harder because of the introduction of the ‘n+2’ 
automatic de-commitment rule.372  
 
5.5.2 The implications of the ‘n+2’ automatic de-commitment rule 
The question of what would happen to funds not absorbed by the domestic authorities 
before the due date was the object of negotiations between the Greek national authorities 
and the Commission. The second CSF continued to finance works via ‘bridge projects’ at 
least until 2004. The method used was that the finances not absorbed by the closing of the 
programming period would be redeployed as part of the finances provided by the third 
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CSF. Therefore, they would be added to the financial resources that would be available for 
each objective and priority axis from the current CSF. An effort was made to integrate the 
residual funds into projects that were relevant to the initial objectives. In accordance with 
the regulations this would take place after consultations between the domestic authorities 
and the Commission officials. In the report on the implementation of the Structural Funds 
in 2004 the Commission admitted that these negotiations were ‘sometimes difficult’373 
since the demands made by the Greek officials were not always in accordance with the 
regulations.  
 
Nevertheless, although there were efforts to achieve synergy between the objectives and 
priorities of the two CSFs (second and third), in practice the CSF MA would again attempt 
to divert funding from priorities or objectives that had not absorbed the finances during the 
second CSF, to others where the absorption rates had been more satisfactory. Hence, 
although there was an effort to employ the residual funds in accordance with the stated 
objectives of the previous CSF, in reality the programmes that had been seen as more 
effective in absorbing the funds would be more likely to benefit from them as well. Despite 
these efforts, however, Greece was not able to avoid effectively forfeiting substantial 
funding from the second CSF as a result of the inability to absorb the funds in accordance 
with the Commission regulations. In particular, before the elections of 2004 it was 
announced by the then Commissioner for Regional Policy that the country would forfeit 
€550 million that could have benefited the country. These were not simply funds that were 
not absorbed via the OPs, but were funding requests initially accepted as part of projects 
included in regional and sectoral OPs but after the audit by the Commission officials they 
were found to be incompatible with the requirements and the funds were withheld. I will 
return to this issue later in the chapter.  
 
If the method of redeploying the funds that had not been absorbed by the arranged date was 
one that could be used with some degree of flexibility for the IMPs and the first two CSFs 
this is not the case following the Reform of the Structural Funds in 1999. The introduction 
of the ‘n+2’automatic de-commitment rule entails that the finances of any projects that 
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were not completed by the date stated in the Planning Supplement could only find 
alternative sources of use two years after that date. After these two years had passed the 
finances would be lost for the recipient country and they would be automatically diverted, 
either to more productive countries in terms of their absorption rates or to finance other EU 
policies. This rule was introduced as a financial control in order to ensure the sound 
management of the finances and avoid the problems identified in the previous programming 
periods especially with reference to incomplete projects.  
 
Furthermore, the financial scandals that contributed to the resignation of the Santer 
Commission in 1999 and the pressure exerted by the European Parliament and the 
European Council towards the strengthening of the procedures that would ensure the sound 
management of EU money resulted in the adoption of stringent processes at the domestic 
level.374 That had direct consequences for a country like Greece which had struggled to 
follow the EU regulations on programme implementation during the first three 
programming periods. As I mentioned above, in the third CSF implementation had entailed 
the introduction of a plethora of additional bureaucratic procedures that rendered the 
administration of the programme even more complicated. Because of the binding nature of 
the post 2000 rules the Commission was no longer willing to accept the ‘peculiarities’ of 
the Greek administrative system in the way that it had during the 1990s.  The room for 
informal agreements between the two parties with the Commission turning a blind eye to 
the irregularities was less possible in the third CSF. This of course does not mean that there 
was no room left for the Commission to lax the requirements entailed in the ‘n+2’ rule. As 
will be seen at the end of the chapter at the end of the programme the rule was practically 
not applied after all because of a series of fires that plagued Greece in the summer of 2007. 
In any case the Commission has never intended to be unconditionally strict in enforcing the 
rule and everyone ‘had it in the back of their minds that not all money would be lost 
because that would not reflect well to the Commission either.’375 However, the spirit of the 
regulation remained that the country would have to improve its rates of absorption at this 
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stage of the implementation of the CSF hence it would have to improve the patterns of 
project generation.   
 
During 2005 and 2006 there were intense negotiations between the CSF MA of the 
Ministry of Economy and the DG Regional Policy about these issues. The problem was 
caused by the fact that by the end of 2006 – the scheduled date for the completion of the 
third CSF – Greece had only absorbed 45% of the total finances awarded. Therefore, when 
according to the ‘n+2’ rule, by the end of the year Greece should have absorbed the greater 
part of the funds and use the remaining two years in order to finance any residual projects, 
the situation was different. It had actually absorbed less than half the funds available and 
would have to find ways to absorb not only the remaining 55% but also the funds that 
would flow during the fourth programming period. The Commission had expressed its 
reservations concerning the ability of the Greek authorities to avoid losing funds due to the 
‘n+2’ rule in its report on the implementation of the Structural Funds since 2004. In that it 
points out that:  
the rhythm of programme execution remains extremely uneven and…many find 
themselves at risk of application of the ‘n+2’ rule at the end of 2005.376   
 
Noticing the discrepancy between institutional objectives and action (discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 6) it points out that although:  
the Greek authorities established a powerful mechanism for monitoring ‘‘n+2’’ 
risks they are forced to note that delays observed often do not result in determined 
action to compensate the risks.377  
   
Similar problems with the application of the ‘n+2’ rule were identified in the evaluation 
undertaken by the Commission about the Management and Implementation Systems (MIS) 
of the ERDF in 2000-2006. Greece was placed in a group of countries facing significant 
difficulties in meeting the ‘n+2’ targets and the implementation of strategies and action 
plans was required in order to avoid automatic de-commitment.378  
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Furthermore, the principle of co-financing between the Commission and a member state 
entails that the Greek government had to find national resources in order to complete the 
projects. The Greek government had to contribute at least 40% for each project, which 
according to one estimate amounted to around €2.8 billion per year.379  Given the tight 
fiscal policies that had been adopted by the governments of the period 1996-2004 in order 
to participate in the common currency and to meet the new government’s commitment to 
‘tidy up’ the public finances, the scope for finding these resources was very limited. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the ‘n+2’ rule, even if the resources could be found, to 
incorporate the funds of the third CSF in the projects of the programming period that 
officially started at the beginning of 2007 – in other words following the same approach as 
in the previous periods – would only be an option for the years 2007 and 2008 and after that 
the finances would be lost.  
 
The domestic authorities’ problems in absorbing the EURP funding did not only concern 
the Structural Funds. Rather, they were even more significant when it came to the separate 
projects financed by the Cohesion fund. As mentioned above, the projects that were 
financed in Greece by the fund established in 1992 to assist the then four poorer member 
states were related to the environment and the infrastructure of transportation networks. 
However, by 2006 around one third of the environmental projects had not even been started 
and the average rates of absorption were below 31%.380  Overall, from the 82 
environmental projects submitted to the Commission 25 had not absorbed any funds and for 
32 the absorption rate was less than 50%. The regions of Northern Aegean, Attica, Western 
Greece, Peloponnese, Central Greece and Eastern Macedonia and Thrace had the smallest 
amounts of absorption with 3%, 20%, 21%, 24%, 27% and 27% respectively.  
 
More specifically, for the Region of Attica, of the 14 projects that were initially agreed on, 
nine had not even started in 2006. By contrast, in the Regions of Thessaly, Western 
Macedonia and Epirus the absorption rates were much better: 71%, 64% and 62% 
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respectively. In relation to the projects that were financed in order to improve the physical 
infrastructure it is worth mentioning the case of the railways. An integrated plan to improve 
the railways communications along the previously mentioned PATHE road was financed 
by the Cohesion and the Structural funds with €5 billion. In the period between 2004 and 
2006 no new contract was signed as part of the plan.381 As a result, the Commission 
withdrew funds that amounted to €350 million for that project.  
 
Apart from the losses from the Cohesion Fund, the Commission382 also decided to reduce 
ERDF assistance granted to the OP ‘Access and Road Axes’ from the second CSF 1994-99. 
Until 2008 there were ‘bridge projects’ that were still implemented from the largest OP of 
the second CSF and after granting extensions the Commission decided that it would be 
against the ‘n+2’ rule to continue funding these projects. The total amount was around 
€30.1 million and this was decommitted on 22 December 2008.    
 
5.5.3 The implications of the deployment of ‘constructive logistics’ 
On the whole, the change of the Commissioner for Regional Policy and the appointment of 
Ms. Danuta Hubner in place of Mr. Michel Barnier, coupled with the election of the new 
government of Nea Dimokratia (ND) in 2004, combined to provide an interesting picture in 
the relationships between the DG Regio and the CSF MA, and hence the implementation 
patterns of the third CSF. The CSF Managing Authority (MA), the central institutional 
actor in the management of the programme, was reorganised in its majority by the newly 
elected government and the personnel that were installed were not always familiar with the 
procedures of managing the structural funds. On the other hand, the new Commissioner has 
adopted a harder line in her dealings with the Greek authorities, demanding the strict 
enforcement of the rules that were stipulated by the 1260/1999 regulations.  
 
This strict position of the new Commissioner was explained by some senior officials of the 
Greek CSF MA with reference to her nationality.383 In particular, it was thought that the 
accession of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe intensified the 
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competition for the attainment of the resources that arrive from the Structural Funds. 
Therefore, it was assumed by the interviewees that countries such as Poland employed even 
their Commissioner in the fight to diminish the negotiating right of countries like Greece to 
obtain funds.  
 
In particular, the Commission officials were concerned about a series of financial ‘tricks’ 
that the Greek MAs had been using in order to redeploy the funds that had not been used as 
arranged in the Planning Supplement or in order to spend the budgets submitted.384 These 
practices became known as ‘constructive logistics’, by which the Greek authorities would 
attempt to present a picture of the planned completion of projects included in the OPs, but 
in reality the projects had been completed already. In general and although the actual 
logistics of the whole enterprise do not form part of the objectives of the chapter, the 
processes employed were not dissimilar to those used by private companies in order to 
present a picture of financial vibrancy even though in reality they are in a difficult financial 
position.385 Similar procedures had been adopted by the previous government during the 
implementation of the second CSF and had become the object of scrutiny by Commission 
monitoring officials. The initial agreement for the correction of these irregularities was 
taken when the PASOK government was still in power in 2003. Although the ND 
government had criticised these practices when in opposition, it adopted them when it 
understood the practicalities of implementing the Structural and the Cohesion funds.  
 
These procedures would border on legality and for example they would include the 
announcement to tender for specific projects that had already been completed, by giving a 
deadline of only a few days. During this time, beneficiaries who had already acquired 
knowledge of the imminent announcements would declare an interest and in collaboration 
with the MAs would seemingly participate in the implementation of projects especially 
those of physical infrastructure. The projects of course had already been completed and the 
final beneficiaries would enjoy the extra finances. By doing this the MAs of the sectoral 
and the regional OPs would present a picture of absorption rates that was far from the 
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reality. Additionally, the funds that the Greek government would receive from the 
Commission by following this practice could be used in order to cover expenses and 
deficits from the national budget.386 In that way the major problem of the Greek finances, 
which had been the excessive public deficit, could be at least partially addressed. That of 
course was not part of the objectives of the third CSF.  To be sure, there is little doubt that 
had it not been for these practices the third Greek CSF would probably have lost more 
funds than it did. At least the moneys stayed in the Greek economy and offered significant 
developmental boosts. It is questionable however whether these practices can have a lasting 
impact in terms of administrative performance and improvements in state capacity. These 
issues are discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.     
 
As a result, in late 2004 Ms Hubner sent an official letter to the Greek government 
threatening to take decisive action if these irregularities were not corrected immediately. 
This followed her speech in the college of Commissioners in which she spoke about 
‘irregular renegotiations of public contracts after they were signed’ and ‘operational 
procedures of discrimination and lack of transparency.’387 Indeed, the country was 
threatened with suspension of payments amounting to the remaining third CSF if it did not 
comply with the demands made by the Commission within two months.388 To be sure, this 
was not the first time that the Commission had warned the Greek government about 
possible forfeiting of funding due to identified operational irregularities which were in 
discrepancy with EU regulations of competition, the protection of the environment etc. In 
1998 the then Director General of Regional Policy in the Commission Mr. Landaburu had 
written to the then Greek minister of Finance warning him that his authorities will be 
monitoring very closely the issues relating with the irregularities in the operational 
procedures followed for the award of public works and that the Commission would decline 
to co-finance any projects that were to be funded with opaque financial procedures.389  
 
                                                 
386
 eleytherotypia, 6 November 2005. 
387
 Quoted in Mousouroulis, 2010.  
388
 Mousouroulis, 2010.  
389
 Quoted in Mousouroulis, 2010.  
  
 
150 
Moreover, early in the policy cycle of the third CSF, Commission officials had already 
started indicating their dissatisfaction with certain domestic operational practices. In 2003 
they made it clear that the weaknesses of the procedures for the award of public works in 
particular were significant and could result in the imposition of high fines by the 
Commission. In a letter sent to the Greek government the Commission had accused the 
Greek government of going back to its pledges offered late in the second CSF to improve 
the ‘weaknesses relating with the legal, organisational, and methodological practices 
followed in the country that do not benefit the public interest’.390 It characterised these 
problems as ‘systemic’ and embarked on a ‘zero tolerance’ policy towards the domestic 
authorities. Another Commission employee391 confirmed that by saying: 
Late in the second and early in the third CSF we were far from happy with the 
practices that the Greek government was following in order to award the 
construction of public works to private companies.  
 
As a result the Commission demanded the implementation of an action plan that would 
entail specific actions and timeframes for their execution that would improve the system of 
allocating public funds for projects of physical infrastructure. This action plan was signed 
between the Greek government and the Commission on March 2004, which was one day 
before the general elections were to take place. The overly ambitious nature of the plan –the 
country agreed to take measures that it had not taken for many years- and the election of a 
different government resulted in the action plan not being executed.392 Consequently, the 
Commission decided to de-commit a significant amount of funding arriving from the 
ERDF.    
 
In particular, the final agreement reached between the two parties in 2005 was a suspension 
of payments that amounted to around 518 million euro.393 That was imposed as a penalty 
following a formal infringement procedure on behalf of the Commission to the Greek 
government in order to reprimand the managing authorities for the use of such ‘financial 
tricks’, and also because of the identification of a series of irregularities found by the 
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Commission in the tendering and management of public contracts.394 The irregularities 
involved the period 2000-03 and the funds would be withdrawn from future payments made 
by the Commission as part of the third CSF. Also, the decision imposed a 10% financial 
correction to be applied by the Greek authorities on future expenditure to be declared for 
public contracts that had already been tendered.395 This decision was seen as a success on 
behalf of the Greek government since the Commission’s initial aim was to de-commit all 
the EU funding that had been used for the construction of projects of physical infrastructure 
through the ERDF in the third CSF.396  
 
Apart from the financial implications of the deployment of such tactics – which are far 
from insignificant – the already partially strained relationship between the officials of the 
DG Regio and the Greek CSF MA deteriorated further. The former could not cease to be 
taken aback by the consistent inability of the Greek governments throughout all the 
programming periods to employ the funds in a developmental way and produce even a few 
pecuniary results that they could claim to have accrued from the EURP.397 The quest for 
‘success stories’, which is one of the strategies of the DG in order to ‘sell’ the policy to 
those who are not always convinced about its need, became even more difficult in Greece. 
It is a fact that not all projects that were implemented in Greece resulted in the lack of 
tangible benefits. Indeed, some cases are mentioned in the publications of the DG as 
‘success stories’ that could be emulated by countries that would become recipients of 
Structural Funds in the future; in other words, the countries that entered the EU after the 
enlargements of 2004 and 2006. Nevertheless, the low rates of absorption and the 
irregularities noticed by the monitoring authorities of the Commission regarding the 
qualitative deployment of the funds created problems. The domestic authorities responded 
in a quite reactionary manner to the threats posed by the Commission and the whole affair 
was initially at least presented as an unwanted intrusion by the Commission into the 
domestic policy making processes.  
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In any case the communication between the domestic authorities and the Commission 
officials during these negotiations was characterised by the Greek authorities' difficulties in 
presenting their case effectively. The Greek authorities adopted a defensive398 attitude 
towards the Commission officials. Instead of making the case that the irregularities were 
the result of the idiosyncratic nature of the Greek political and administrative system rather 
than a deliberate attempt to deceive the Commission, the Greek officials were more 
defensive than needed.  
 
5.5.4 The revision of the public finances  
When the ND government came to power in 2004 it thought that instigating a wide-ranging 
audit of the public finances would be of benefit to the country. Under the supervision of the 
new Minister of Economics and Finance, Prof. Alogoskoufis, it submitted to EUROSTAT a 
significant adjustment of all the public finance indicators that the PASOK government had 
used in order to justify the admission of Greece to the euro-zone. The newly elected 
government justified this technical change by including the defence expenditure in the 
budget. Greece devotes a more than substantial part of her public finances to defence 
expenditure, which has certain implications when it comes to the public finances. In 
particular, certain expenditure of this type only benefits the country five to ten years after 
the procurement has taken place. For instance, if the Greek government signs an agreement 
with an arms company to acquire certain armaments after a certain number of years, the 
question is, when does the expenditure become included in the national statistics:  in the 
year of purchase or in the year when the commodities actually enter the country? In short, 
the PASOK government had followed the second option, whilst the revision stipulated that 
the former should have happened and recalculated the relevant data in accordance with that 
rule.  
 
Despite the technical justification, there is little doubt that this was a politically motivated 
strategy with the new government pursuing its agenda of discrediting the achievements of 
the PASOK government. In particular, having projected the image of the good householder 
before the elections, the government of ND was keen to show to the electorate that PASOK 
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had not lawfully achieved the reduction of the public deficit and debt levels, but instead had 
deceived the Commission by bending the rules. Additionally, throughout the last two years 
of the Simitis government, ND pursued a wide-ranging anticorruption initiative through 
which it accused most of the leading members of the Cabinet of being implicated in corrupt 
practices. Certainly, the element that has been lost in this strategy is that if the revised data 
was correct, the country’s adoption of the common currency was miscalculated and would 
be declared invalid. Finally, after a lengthy process of negotiations between the 
Commission and the Greek government,399 the former accepted the revised public deficit 
and debt information. 
 
The issue of the revision of the public finances would not have mattered for the current 
discussion if it were not for another repercussion that came after the change in the data that 
involve the convergence criteria. Specifically, as a result of this revision the country 
became subject to the ‘excessive deficit procedure’ for the years 2004-2006, since the 
governmental deficit would now breach the rules set out by the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). Therefore, in 2006 Greece had breached the rules of the SGP for three consecutive 
years, which meant that it was put under scrutiny by the ECOFIN, which had the authority  
to impose fines if the same were to happen for a fourth year. When the Greek government 
realised the repercussions of the ‘excessive deficit procedure’ in 2006 it decided to revise 
the national GDP rates by including in the official measurement of the country’s GDP the 
black market or ‘shadow’ economy which, as shown in chapter 3, forms a substantial part 
of the undocumented economic activity. In fact, it was back in 2004 that the head of the 
National Statistical Service of Greece had conducted a review and required amendments to 
the relevant data. These efforts were intensified, however, because it became clear that, 
according to the rules of the SGP, by increasing the rates of GDP the government deficit 
and the public debt would be reduced; hence Greece would not have to face any fines by 
the ECOFIN.  Indeed, in 2007 the Commission accepted that the average rates of GDP 
would be increased by 9.5%, instead of the 25% that the Greek National Service had asked 
for, which was done in order to remove the country from the surveillance of the Council.400  
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However, as an unintended consequence of the reorganisation of the public finances and 
especially the upward revision of the GDP rates the country would cease to be eligible for 
substantial amounts of funds directed not only through the Structural funds but especially 
through the Cohesion fund. This is because of the rules that govern the EURP, which 
employ the national and regional GNP rates as the main indicator for the allocation of the 
funding. The Cohesion Fund in particular uses the national rates of GNP as a threshold in 
order to decide which countries should benefit from its funding, the threshold being 90% of 
the EU average. Therefore, in 2006 the DG Regio announced that Greece was in danger of 
losing substantial amounts from the Cohesion fund after 2010 if the correction in the 
macroeconomic data was substantiated.401  In addition, Greece’s contribution to the EU 
budget would have to increase substantially because according to the new rates of GDP it 
was now considered closer to the rich member states than before. That was the case 
especially after the two most recent waves of enlargement, which dropped the average rates 
of GDP substantially. 
 
Furthermore, the timing of the decision, which coincided with the developments relating to 
the EURP and in particular the fourth programming period of 2007-13, did not benefit 
Greece.  In particular, the Commission officials seemed ‘disappointed’402 by the decision of 
the Greek government to increase the national rates of GDP after the negotiations for the 
fourth round of coordinated EU assistance had been completed. It did not seem appropriate 
that during the negotiations, Greece represented itself as a poor country that needed 
additional financial assistance from the first CSF that would encompass the countries of the 
Central and Eastern Europe, and yet two years later decided that it was actually much richer 
than that.  As is usually the case during these negotiations, the supranational executive 
authority of the EU had actively supported the Greek demands for the continuation of the 
funding for the period 2007-2013. Indeed, at the end of the negotiations the country secured 
around €20.4 billion, which is significantly more than what the initial predictions had 
assumed. Therefore, when Greece announced the new statistical details of her average GDP 
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rates, the Commission’s stance in the negotiations for the fourth programming period 
seemed futile.  
 
This has contributed to the Commission adopting a harder line in its dealings with the 
Greek officials. When for example in 2006 members of the CSF MA visited Brussels in 
order to require an extension of at least a year for the implementation of the programme, 
their demands were rejected by the Commission.403 The Greek officials then asked for the 
implementation of the ‘n+2’ rule to become ‘n+3’; in other words, they tried to achieve the 
same objective by increasing the length of the time frame in which individual projects 
would have to be completed. In addition, they requested an increase in the rates of 
Community participation in the projects to be implemented as stipulated by the principle of 
additionality. Specifically, the Greek authorities asked for an increase of around 30% in the 
total Community contribution. The reason for this was that it was very difficult to find 
private finances in order to complete the projects; hence the only way seemed to be an 
increase in the finances provided by the Commission. The stance adopted by the latter was 
again that the rules stipulated by the 1260/1999 are there to be enforced for all recipient 
countries and that no special provisions could be offered for individual member states. 
 
Therefore, the difficult relationship that developed between the Commission and the Greek 
government in relation to the implementation of the third CSF has deteriorated further due 
to the untimely decision by the Greek government to increase the rates of GDP so as to 
avoid the surveillance by the ECOFIN a few years after it had secured the continuation of 
the structural funding for the period 2007-13.  In addition to this, however, legislation 
introduced by the Greek government in 2004 in order to combat corruption became a 
source of friction.  
 
5.5.5 The implications of the attempted introduction of the ‘Main Shareholder’ legislation  
There is a historical tradition in Greece of co-ownership between the entrepreneurs who 
own media outlets and those who become beneficiaries of state support in order to build 
infrastructural projects. Ever since the 19th century the owners of the local press in 
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particular but later also the proprietors of national outlets such as newspapers with a 
national circulation would employ their power in order to acquire state financing. Because 
Greece had been at the stage of pre-industrial development for long periods and would 
employ government assistance in order to promote industrialisation, the state operated in a 
developmental manner without, however, the institutional preconditions that would make 
this intervention successful.404 As a result, the state money would be ‘ca ptured’ by 
entrepreneurs who owned media outlets and who would pressurize each government or 
even local deputies with the threat of withdrawal of their support if they did not receive the 
funding. Certainly the politicians involved were more than content to enjoy their support, 
and so the situation became embedded in the domestic political culture.  
 
This situation remained more or less unchanged in recent times and even now the owners of 
large publishing companies simultaneously own large construction companies.405 That 
situation can potentially promote corrupt practices since the public funds become part of 
the clientelistic interchanges between entrepreneurs and the government. In short, funds 
that should be used for developmental purposes and are in theory included in such 
programmes – in this case the third CSF – are given to media entrepreneurs in return for 
political favours.  
 
After 2004 the ND government attempted to change this situation by legislating against the 
likelihood of an entrepreneur being able to own simultaneously any means of 
communication and a construction company that manages publicly funded projects. Since it 
could not directly intervene in the ways in which shares in either media or construction 
companies could be distributed, it designed the law of the ‘Main Shareholder’ as one of its 
earliest initiatives in 2004. This basically banned any individual who had shares in a media 
outlet to simultaneously enjoy ownership rights in a construction company that would 
manage projects of physical infrastructure. Ownership in both these types of companies 
was, however, allowed as long as the individual involved was not the ‘Main Shareholder’ 
but just owned parts of the respective companies.    
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The political motivation behind the urgency with which the ND Government promoted the 
legislation is explained by its pre-election promises that it would combat the corruption of 
the Simitis period. Throughout the last two years of its government the previous 
administration was portrayed as a regime that was sustained by the most influential media 
establishments in the country.406 Therefore, breaking this dubious interplay became one of 
the ND government’s legislative priorities. Through this law it attempted to break the link 
between media entrepreneurs and beneficiaries of public money for the implementation of 
projects of physical infrastructures. As expected, the ND Government made this initiative 
part of its general fight against corruption, which was one of the most important pledges 
that the party had made before the elections. This pledge was widely supported not only by 
its electoral base but by the Greek society in general since scandals that involve misuse of 
public finances407 are widely published in the Greek press.  
 
Nevertheless, the Commission interpreted the law as a direct infringement of the EU 
competition laws and demanded its immediate withdrawal. Under the EU competition 
legislation no person can be banned from owning shares in as many companies as they 
wish, as long as they do not break any legislation concerning the creation of cartels or price 
fixing.  If the Greek government refused to withdraw the law, the Commission once again 
would threaten the suspension of payments from the Structural and the Cohesion funds and 
also committal to trial in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This time the authority of the 
Commission was strengthened by the fact that according to EU law, competition legislation 
has been the cornerstone of all the EU treaties and this policy area is one in which the 
Commission has shown considerable activity. Indeed it is the only legislation that is 
binding on all the member states participating in the common market and supersedes any 
domestic constitutional arrangements. This was the case even more so because the 
Commission viewed certain articles of the legislation as unworkable. For example, it 
contained an article prohibiting not only the entrepreneurs who owned media outlets from 
participating in proposals for the implementation of works of physical infrastructure, but 
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also their first degree relatives. This was interpreted as legislating at the most minimal level 
– that of the family – which is clearly not acceptable in a liberal democratic framework.  
 
Furthermore, and most importantly for the current discussion, if the ‘Main Shareholder’ 
legislation were implemented it would have direct implications not only for the general 
system of assigning projects of physical infrastructure to private companies but also would 
directly influence the management of the OP ‘Road Axes, Ports and Urban Development’ 
and individual projects for the upgrading of physical infrastructure operating through each 
of the 13 regional OPs and the Cohesion Fund. Indeed, Commission officials by the DG 
Regio indicated to Greek officials from the Ministry of Economy that if the legislation were 
used for the implementation of projects through any of the OPs it would be declared illegal 
according to EU law.408 That would mean that the funds provided via the Structural and the 
Cohesion funds would have to be reimbursed by the Greek government.  
 
Therefore, the issue became a potential source of further problems for the patterns of the 
implementation of the specific OPs that entailed projects of physical infrastructure, which 
as mentioned above formed the major part of the total finances of the third CSF, as well as 
projects financed through the Cohesion Fund. In relation to the latter, the inspections 
carried out by the Commission in 2007 as part of its audits revealed irregularities in the 
process of the award of the public works, with the formula used being seen as in breach of 
European directives.409 These irregularities involved a total sum of around €68 million and 
mainly related to infringements of public procurement rules and ineligible expenditure.410  
 
It must be noted, however, that there is a broader issue concerning the discrepancy between 
the national practices of awarding public works and the requirements that the Commission 
thinks are appropriate, which played an important role in the previously discussed de 
commitment of 2005.411 These problems are reflected in the audits which the Greek 
authorities perform and which the Commission publishes in its Annual Reports. For 
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example, in the report for the implementation of the Cohesion Fund in 2005, 152 such cases 
are mentioned,412 then 103 for 2006413 and 12 for 2008.414 Some of these cases resulted in a 
withdrawal of funds whilst others led to a suspension of payments for the period until the 
irregularities were resolved. Similarly, in the report about the implementation of the 
structural funds for 2004, the Commission noted that: 
particular attention was given to the definition of control systems and to compliance 
with Community legislation as regards the awards for contracts of public works as 
these areas have posed problems on a number of occasions.415 
 
Also, in 2006 it noted that after the revision of the CSF that took place in 2005 a significant 
amount of funding was diverted from the OP for railways, as it was unable to absorb the 
funds due to ‘continuing tendering problems.’416 
 
Despite the fact that the Greek government attempted to solve these discrepancies, its 
reaction to the problems identified by the introduction of the legislation of ‘Main 
Shareholder’ was once again reactionary. In particular, it complained about the 
unacceptable intrusion of the EU in domestic political affairs. This time the complaints 
were more serious, since it was claimed that the EU was actually putting into doubt the 
Constitution of the country and that no supranational entity should have the right to 
interfere in the domestic politics of the member states. The Greek government, through its 
official spokesman, called the Director General of Commission’s DG Market Internal 
Market and Services a ‘low ranking civil servant’ who had no right to interfere in such 
serious issues of national importance.417  
 
Other opposition parties on the left agreed with this position and only the main opposition 
party PASOK claimed that the law was indeed in contradiction to the EU competition 
legislation and had to be withdrawn.  A new populist patriotism emerged from this bizarre 
political coalition between the conservative governing party and the parties of the far left 
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that entailed significant elements of anti Europeanism. The EU was portrayed as stubborn, 
inflexible and ignorant of the national conditions of Greece. The morally and politically 
justified objective of combating corruption by not allowing ‘press barons’ to take part in the 
implementation of projects of physical infrastructure was being hindered by the 
Commission officials. The latter only cared about sustaining the open borders of the free 
market and were portrayed as ‘neo-liberal hawks’ that only cared about the economic 
aspects of European integration. The potential for the formation of a new type of 
Euroscepticism, which –despite the high percentages of public opinion that support the 
process of European integration is never far-off in Greece-,418was created.     
 
Finally, after five months of negotiations, in April 2005 the ‘Main Shareholder’ legislation 
was withdrawn. The danger of Greece losing substantial funds from the total of around €3.4 
million that would be diverted by the ERDF for the OP ‘Road Axes, Ports and Urban 
Development’ as well as significant finances for these actions that were included in each of 
the 13 regional OPs, resulted in the government finally adopting the Commission’s stance. 
To be sure, the issue continued to be a source of disagreement between the two parts after 
the decision to withdraw the legislation. On the one hand, the Greek government continued 
to try to find ways to deal with corrupt practices in the area of the tenders for participation 
in the implementation of physical infrastructure projects. The Commission, on the other 
hand, did not disagree with the basics of the law but was adamant that as it was presented it 
would contravene the basic principles of the legislation that deals with competition issues 
in the EU. This is why in the earlier mentioned decision that resulted in the forfeiting of 
€518 million, the Commission added the explicit requirement that the Greek government 
should introduce new legislation for the tendering of public contracts that would comply 
with Community law.419     
 
To summarise, the previous five subsections have attempted to discuss the main issues that 
provided the context under which each of the 13 regional and 11 sectoral OPs of the third 
CSF were implemented in Greece after 2004. The issues identified in these subsections, 
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only served to exacerbate and reinforce the difficulties over the low rates of absorption that 
had been present in all the previous programming periods. Faced with these difficulties, the 
MAs resorted to constant revisions of the third CSF. In particular, the third CSF was 
revised four times between 2001 and 2007, the last revision being submitted to the 
Commission in the autumn of 2007. This latest revision represented a last minute attempt 
on behalf of the Greek government to absorb around €12 billion which were available in 
the summer of 2007. The officials of the Commission who were present in the CSF MC 
that took place in June 2007 once again stressed the need to hasten the rates of 
absorption.420 At this time the possibility of Greece losing all the remaining funds was 
evident. The revision would once again divert funds from projects that did not ‘run’ to 
those whose absorption rates were better. The OPs with the worst rates of absorption were 
those of the environment (50%), culture (55%), transportation networks (55%), health and 
social welfare (56%), information society and fisheries (57.7%). Those priority areas would 
lose to other more easily executable projects. That would mean that the developmental 
objectives set out in the first version of the CSF would once again be sacrificed in order to 
achieve the requirement of the absorption.  
 
Indeed, according to the latest revision of the third CSF, a significant part of the funds left 
over by the summer of 2007 would be diverted to small enterprises that could absorb the 
funds easily. These were flower shops, coffee shops, gyms and other enterprises that could 
be financed effectively and could absorb the funds before the end of the two year period.421 
Overall, around €500 million that should have been absorbed by the above-mentioned OPs 
would be provided to those small and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, several 
individual projects that have been operating since the early phases of the third CSF had to 
be abandoned. As they would not cover the criterion of absorbing large sums of funds at the 
specified time, projects such as the psychiatric units that operated under the programme 
‘Psyxargos’ were facing closure in late 2007.422  As a result, around 405 units that aimed at 
the rehabilitation of patients with mental health problems were left without any investment 
and had to let go their employees who were receiving their salaries essentially through the 
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third CSF. Essentially, this is just one example of the difficulty that the Greek authorities 
faced in implementing with some degree of success the programmes of ‘soft’ actions that 
were designed as part of the third CSF. This is a reflection of a broader structural weakness 
on the part of the Greek state, concerning the problems that the Greek economy is facing 
when it comes to the provision of social and educational infrastructures.  
 
Furthermore, the wildfires that plagued Greece during the summer of 2007 and the 
elections that took place in the autumn of this year were used by the government in order to 
find ways to absorb the remaining funds from the third CSF. The Secretary General 
responsible for the management of the third CSF elaborated the concept of ‘force majeure’ 
that was included at the Appendix of the regulations governing the EURP. Thus, he 
managed to convince the Commission that the planned deadlines for the closure of the 
programme should be extended423. Domestically, this was presented as a major success on 
behalf of the Greek government. Characteristically, in the aftermath of the fires the Prime 
Minister, Costas Karamanlis, announced a series of ‘special programmes’ for the assistance 
of those who were heavily affected by the fires. He triumphantly announced plans for the 
reconstruction of the areas caught in the fires in the region of the Peloponnese. In reality, 
what he was promising was the implementation of projects that were to be financed by the 
third CSF in the area and so in theory would have been done in any case. The changes 
would be incorporated in the reorganised CSF that was submitted to the Commission in the 
autumn of 2007.  
 
In the final stages of the fieldwork – in the summer of 2008 – the Commission agreed to 
extend the implementation of some of the sectoral and the regional OPs that were to be 
implemented in Greece until the end of 2009 in accordance with Articles 14(2) and 30(2) of 
the 1260/1999 Council Regulation.424 Because of the fires of 2007, it practically cancelled 
the ‘n+2’ rule for four regional OPs (Western Greece, Peloponnese, Continental Greece and 
Attica) as well as certain sectoral OPs provided that the national authorities could indicate 
that some of the interventions that they covered had been directly and significantly affected 
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by the wildfire. The Greek government announced this development with a press release on 
30th June 2008. This extension would involve around €1,374 billion so it would in practice 
extend the date of the completion of the majority of the projects until the end of 2009.  
 
To be sure, there is little doubt that all these efforts on behalf of the Greek government to 
achieve the extension of the third CSF resulted in the prevention of losing significant 
funding that benefited the national economy substantially. In any case, the revision of the 
CSF as a whole and of specific OPs does not go against the regulations that govern the 
operation of the structural funds. According to those, the revision of a programme is 
acceptable if the socioeconomic context requires so.425 Nonetheless, the extensive 
deployment of this part of the regulations has done little to allow the other operational 
principles –programming, monitoring, evaluation, etc- to affect the manner in which the 
domestic authorities administered the plans. Instead, the overriding principle that has 
guided the third CSF was the same as with the others; the absorption of the available 
funding at a time that would not allow the Commission to de-commit funds and with little 
consideration for any of the principles or the management tools that would be able to alter 
the administrative practices of the relevant institutions and/or provide significant spillovers 
to the wider public administration.    
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Chapter 5 attempted an overview of the practical problems that the domestic authorities 
faced during the process of the implementation of the EURP in Greece. It started with an 
elucidation of the main parameters of the problems that the EURP was meant to solve, 
described as the country’s ‘regional problem.’ In the next section, I provided a description 
of the operational frameworks as designed in the country, followed by a discussion of the 
problems identified in the first three programming periods. These have constituted the 
legacy that was left for the third CSF, the main operational parameters of which were 
described in the section after that. The main issues that hindered the implementation of the 
third CSF in an effective way were discussed in the penultimate section. This was further 
                                                 
425
 Mousouroulis, 2010.  
  
 
164 
divided into five subsections focusing on five different issues that provided the context in 
which the sectoral and the regional OPs were implemented in Greece.   
 
The overall conclusion that can be reached from this chapter is that there has been 
continuity in all rounds of coordinated structural assistance in Greece. The financial 
priorities decided at the stage of the design of the policy remained more or less unchanged 
throughout the three CSFs, and the problems identified at the stage of the implementation 
of the policy also remained similar. In the third CSF these do not seem to have improved 
with a series of domestic administrative and political issues hindering the execution of the 
programme in a developmental manner. The next chapter attempts to provide a more 
thorough answer to the research question posed in the thesis by focusing on the institutional 
relationships that have developed in the framework of the EURP in Greece. 
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Chapter 6. The interaction between the coordinating and interactive 
capacities of the Greek state and the institutional requirements of the 
EURP 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The current chapter focuses on the institutional issues that affected the implementation of 
the EURP in Greece. The main empirical aim is to illustrate the fact that the principles 
governing the operation of the structural funds and the management tools implicit in them 
became integrated in previously existing institutional arrangements for the implementation 
of similar policies. Hence, although there were important changes in the field of policy 
orientation, the regulatory framework that accompanied the execution of the programmes 
did not substantially alter previously established patterns of state-society interaction in this 
particular policy field.  
 
In order to illustrate these arguments the discussion in the remaining sections revolves 
around two topics. On the one hand I discuss the institutional changes that took place as a 
direct result of the introduction of the principles governing the operation of the structural 
funds. Simultaneously I also discuss the institutional changes which took place at the 
domestic level after reforms that altered the territorial geography of the country and 
influenced the implementation patterns of the programmes funded through the EURP. 
Although the regulatory framework imposed by the principles is common to all the member 
states, the implementation patterns of the policy are very much affected by the domestic 
institutional arrangements. This is because:  
In each member state, national governments and sub-national actors have different 
degrees of participation in decision-making and power. This reflects factors such as 
the distribution of competencies between national, regional and local level, political 
interests and linkages; the amount and scope of co-funding available, the number 
and scope of programmes to be dealt with at that level and administrative 
experience of managing economic development. It follows that practical 
arrangements for programming also vary, including the approaches to programme 
developments, project generation, appraisal, selection and monitoring and the extent 
to which these tasks are subsumed within the existing administrative structure or 
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whether parts of the implementation are carried out by dedicated administrative 
structures and how these are organised. 426  
 
The next section provides a discussion of the institutional arrangements that were in place 
for the implementation of regional development policies before and immediately after the 
introduction of the first IMPs in 1986. The section following it focuses on the institutional 
changes that took place as a result of the consolidation of the four principles governing the 
operation of the structural funds after the reform of 1988 and the implementation of the first 
two rounds of CSFs. Then, in the section after that, the substantial administrative changes 
that were incorporated into the rules that govern the operation of the third CSF for the case 
of Greece are discussed. The penultimate section attempts to link the issues identified in the 
previous sections with the conceptual framework that I employ in the thesis. The last 
section concludes.  
 
6.2. Regional development policies and institutions before and after the IMPs  
The Greek state has been involved in managing socioeconomic activity throughout the post 
World War II period.427  Since 1960 there have been at least six five-year development 
plans,428 which aimed to provide a blueprint for the economic development priorities of the 
country. However, the focus was largely on national objectives, and any elements of a 
regional nature would end up becoming incorporated into the national developmental 
policy.429 In addition, no institutional changes took place in relation to the authorities 
responsible for the management of the regional development resources.430 For example, the 
nine development agencies established in 1977 were endowed with responsibility for 
administering the implementation of a system of incentives, but only for small scale 
projects. In addition, they were never consulted nor did they participate in decisions 
concerning developmental issues, even if these affected their areas.431 Therefore, the 
formulation and administration of public investment programmes with a regional 
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dimension remained under the control of the centre.432 These programmes mainly consisted 
of individual projects of public works and politically they were pursued through the 
clientelistic interchange of local politicians with the central government.433 The regional 
development authorities could only request public works projects and hope that what they 
had to offer to the central state in clientelistic terms – that is, votes and favours – could 
guarantee them being considered.434   
 
In terms of the territorial distribution of competences, after the restoration of democracy in 
1974 there were two levels of sub-national government: firstly, at the level of the 
prefecture, which was an extension of decision making of the central state; and secondly, at 
the first level of local self government.435 The latter were very small communes and 
municipalities which enjoyed high levels of local political legitimisation436 but were so 
fragmented that any coordination between them was very difficult. Overall, at the time:  
the pressing political priority was to restore constitutional legitimacy; no serious 
attempts were made to reform the spatial model of public administration. 437     
 
On the whole, the Greek state has traditionally been centralised in the way that it has 
managed its territorial capacities;438 indeed for some commentators it is the most 
centralised state in Europe,439 and it has been so since its establishment in 1830.440 
Reflecting the general difficulty of the Greek state to allow the articulation of interests 
emanating from civil society but also the lack of bottom-up demands of the kind discussed 
in chapter 3, regional interests have traditionally struggled to obtain governmental 
resources in order to achieve their objectives. As a result, Greece has traditionally had ‘a 
maximum national and a minimum sub-national apparatus.’441 
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The election of the first PASOK government in 1981 was followed by the first substantive 
steps towards the decentralisation of the regional authorities. At the time the main 
authorities at the sub-national level were the 55 prefectures, with the prefect being 
appointed directly by the central government and in particular by the Ministry of the 
Interior. Therefore, although in theory there was regional autonomy in the form of the 
prefectures, in practice it was constrained by the fact that the representatives were not 
democratically elected by the local population. At the same time there were around 6,000 
Local Government Authorities (LGAs) labelled as municipalities and communes, of which 
56% had fewer than 500 inhabitants and 83% had fewer than 1,000 inhabitants.442 This was 
the result of the Greek central state’s need to satisfy local parochial interests.443 Thus, the 
design of the local authorities was anti-developmental since the coordination of the actions 
of such a large number of LGAs was particularly difficult. The situation was exacerbated 
by the lack of skilled personnel in the LGAs, which have traditionally been used for the 
appointment of a local labour force via clientelistic interchanges and without any 
considerations for their training or organisational position.444As far as the regional 
classification was concerned, there was no official regional territorial distribution. To be 
sure, each central government Ministry would unofficially devise its services in regional 
terms. Nonetheless, there was no constitutional authorisation of this distribution and each 
Ministry would devise its own regional classifications. Furthermore, the classifications 
employed were mostly different with each other depending on the individual administrative 
needs of each government ministry.445 
 
PASOK embarked on a programme of extensive decentralisation, providing the sub-
national authorities with significant responsibilities. In the years that followed, the powers 
of the LGAs were enhanced, though to a much lesser extent than expected.446 More 
significant were the changes that took place at the level of the prefectures. Responsibilities 
for issues like town planning, health and education were transferred to those with a Law 
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that specified these changes in 1982.447 The prefecture councils were introduced with this 
Law and endowed with responsibilities for issues of local economic development. They 
would have the right to propose public works programmes to be built in their prefecture as 
well as to decide on budgetary matters. They were comprised of members of local civil 
societies such as agricultural cooperatives, trade unions and chambers of commerce. 
Nonetheless these were not democratically elected authorities but were appointed by the 
central government. Furthermore, the decentralisation was not accompanied by any transfer 
of fiscal and administrative resources that would endow the prefectures with the 
infrastructure necessary for their effective operation.448Also, through the introduction of 
these sub-national institutions PASOK mainly aimed at establishing a sufficient power base 
at the local and regional levels that would mainly cater for the clientelistic needs of the 
respective electorates.449 Overall, these changes in the territorial relations of the Greek state 
were entirely inspired by domestic considerations.450 The participation in the EC did not 
feature at all as a justification for these developments. If anything, as Andrikopoulou and 
Kafkalas451 put it:  
the shift was based on the anti-European rhetoric, which emphasised national pride 
and national autonomy against the so-called European Economic Community (EEC) 
directorate. 
 
This is not the case, however, when it comes to the institutional developments that 
influenced the implementation of national regional development policies after 1986. The 
introduction of the IMPs in 1986 required the establishment of the regions as a precondition 
for the absorption of the funding; hence it was a direct result of the participation in the 
EURP. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, no regional classification of the type that the 
Commission required existed in Greece; hence the country was initially divided into six 
areas. Finally, after the submission of the first IMP the country was divided into the 13 
administrative NUTS II regions, which became the territorial basis for the formulation and 
implementation of the CSFs in all subsequent programming periods. Each region would be 
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headed by a Government appointed regional secretary and would be staffed by civil 
servants on secondment from the national administrative structures.  
 
The regional secretary was an employee of the Ministry of the Interior, usually a member of 
the party political personnel who are used in order to staff the wider echelons of the 
administration every time there is a change of government.452 All the competences that 
were transferred to the region would be controlled by the regional secretary, who therefore 
had significant decision making authority. These competences were transferred to the new 
regional authorities from the previously existing and separate ministerial regional 
authorities.453 In terms of the financial resources that the newly created regions had at their 
disposal, the regional secretary would be responsible for the drawing-up of the regional 
budget. However, they did not have any authority to collect funds from local taxation or 
other measures that would indicate a decentralisation of the fiscal system.454 Instead, they 
had to submit the proposals to the Ministry of Economy, which would allocate the funding 
through the Public Investment Programme (PIP).455 The new regions would essentially 
amalgamate the existing prefectures into larger geographical entities, which would be 
entitled to receive funding in accordance with the population criteria set out by the 
Commission and the principle of concentration. Essentially, in the new NUTS II regions the 
centrally appointed regional secretary would play the role of representative of the central 
government.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that even though the legislation for the creation of the 
NUTS II regions was introduced in 1986 it was not fully implemented until 1997.456 
Therefore, during the first three programming periods – the IMPs and the first two CSFs – 
the regional authorities had no responsibility other than the management of the regional 
OPs.457 Even these, however, were halted by the fact that the introduction of the NUTS II 
regions as a requirement for the implementation of the first IMP’s was not accompanied by 
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any transfer of administrative or financial resources to the regions. Moreover, another 
interesting aspect of the whole process is that despite the institutionalisation of the regional 
authorities, the central governmental ministries continued to operate decentralised agencies 
at the regional levels albeit fewer than before 1986.458 Thus, apart from the difficulties that 
the regions faced because of the lack of decentralisation of resources, the central 
government refused to cede its authority on a series of issues; hence further undermining 
the regions.   
 
Overall, the creation of the 13 NUTS II regions cannot be explained in organisational 
terms.459  Out of the 13 newly established regions, 11 did not even satisfy the population 
criteria set out by the Commission. It was particularly convenient though for the governing 
party as a way of retaining its power base at the sub-national level.460 Therefore, the 
motivation behind the creation of the regional authorities as they were structured has been 
similar to that behind the creation of the above-mentioned prefectures, the structure of 
which the government chose to replicate.461 A further proof for the last point is provided by 
the fact that together with the regional authorities, the Government introduced centrally 
appointed regional councils, which consisted of representatives of the central and the local 
governments. In addition to elected officials these were comprised of representatives of 
civil society institutions such as trade unions, chambers of commerce, industry and 
professional organisations. Nevertheless, as in the case of the staff of the regional 
authorities, the members of the regional council were appointed by the central 
government.462 This fact made them susceptible to the influence of the party in power, 
which has been the main motivation behind the formulation of these institutions without 
any regional and local democratic legitimacy.463 The distribution of the functions of the 
four levels of government that were created by the legislation of the time is presented in 
Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.1. Distribution of functions by level of government in Greece 
 
Policy Areas 
 
National 
Government 
Regional Council Prefectural 
Council 
Local 
Government 
TRADITIONAL  
 
    
Law and Order, 
Public Admin. 
 
XXXXX    
Foreign Affairs, 
Defence 
 
XXXXX    
Monetary Policy XXXXX    
Foreign Trade, 
Fiscal Policy 
XXXXX    
Statistics, Media, 
Communications 
XXXXX    
ECONOMY-
SECTORS 
    
Agriculture, 
Fisheries 
XX X XX  
SMEs XXX   XX 
Commerce, Trade, 
Markets 
XXX  XX  
Tourism XX  XX X 
Banking, 
Insurance 
XXXXX    
Employment, 
Industrial 
Relations 
XXX  XX  
Economic 
Planning 
XXXXX    
SOCIETY     
Education XX  X XX 
Health-Welfare XX  XX X 
Social Services X  XXX X 
Social Insurance XXXXX    
Culture, Leisure X  XX XX 
TERRITORY     
Regional Planning X XXX X X 
Urban Planning-
Housing 
X  XX XX 
Public Works X  XXX X 
Public Transport XX  XX X 
Roads XX  XX X 
Water and Sewage    XXXXX 
Energy XXXXX    
Environment X  XX XX 
Note: X’s denote the responsibilities that each territorial level enjoys. Source: Paraskevopoulos, 
2001 
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What becomes obvious from this Table is that the regional councils were not endowed with 
significant functions. Actually, most of the functions remained a prerogative of the central 
state whilst the ones that were decentralised would be shared by the other two tiers of local 
governance, the municipalities and the prefectures. Furthermore, the limited responsibility 
of the local councils is clear, as it does not have sole responsibility for any area apart from 
‘water and sewage’.  
 
The introduction of the IMPs was followed by the introduction of the four principles after 
the Reform of the Structural Funds in 1988. This provided an extra impetus to create the 
regional authorities, since it became clear that the Commission – through the introduction 
of the principle of partnership – viewed the issues of local and regional development 
interchangeably with those of political and administrative decentralisation. The rationale 
was that by devolving responsibilities to local political actors, the endogenous 
socioeconomic forces would become involved and this would promote local 
development.464 Judging from the above, it emerges that the Greek government adopted the 
measures that would convince the Commission that it viewed these pressures as reasonable. 
Nevertheless in reality through the retaining of the control of the regional councils it 
created an additional layer of administration that would be staffed by local representatives 
of PASOK and would stifle any bottom-up democratic practices that would give real 
meaning to the principles of subsidiarity and partnership.  
 
Finally, as far as the institutional changes that took place after the introduction of the IMPs 
are concerned, the Monitoring Committees (MCs) were introduced. There would be one 
MC for each regional authority and they would be staffed by civil servants on secondment 
who would have no management role during the implementation process.465 They did not 
have any authority to impose sanctions on the final beneficiaries that were not performing 
according to the expectations and they could only suggest changes in the projects 
implemented to the central MC in Athens.  
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Overall, as discussed in chapter 5, the IMPs were worked out in a slow manner and the 
main aim became the absorption of the funds at a time that would allow the collection of 
the funding by the Commission.466 In institutional terms, what the regional policy 
department of the Ministry of National Economy essentially did was to take over the 
responsibility entrusted to the regional authorities. It formulated and submitted the 
proposals to the Commission and had the first and last word during the implementation 
process.467 This happened also because the administrative capacity of the regional 
authorities was weak to the extent that the proposals that the regional secretaries submitted 
in order to draw up a regional plan were of unacceptably low quality in technocratic 
terms.468 Similar issues were identified with regard to the prefectures. Moreover, the MCs 
were not endowed with sufficient resources and expertise to support their functions.469 
Thus, the Ministry of National Economy employed this as an argument in order to seize the 
initiative and centralise the authority for the execution of the IMPs.  
 
As a result of these factors, no endogenous socioeconomic actors were included in the 
process of both the design and the implementation of the regional IMPs, and the central 
state reaffirmed its predominant role in the selection of the projects that would alleviate the 
regional inequalities.470 This was the case despite the seemingly important institutional 
innovations introduced through the above-mentioned territorial reforms and aimed 
precisely at the inclusion of the local socioeconomic forces at all stages of the IMPs. The 
new regions that were introduced became administrative and planning regions that would 
satisfy the requirements set out by the Commission in order to start disbursing the funds of 
the IMPs. Despite their seemingly democratic nature that would be achieved through the 
institutionalisation of the inclusion of the local civil societies, in reality the establishment of 
the regions was a top-down affair. The local populations had little or no input in the whole 
process, thus making the efforts to promote successful state-society synergies untenable.   
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In terms of the relationships of the empirical material presented thus far for the conceptual 
framework, it becomes apparent that there was little scope for the development of ‘state-
society synergies’ before the introduction of the IMPs. The central authorities did not allow 
any scope for participation by sub-national actors, whilst simultaneously the latter did not 
articulate relevant demands. The Greek regions in particular had very little input in the 
decision-making processes and the system of managing the meagre regional policies was 
highly centralised. The Europeanisation influences became particularly evident after the 
introduction of the IMPs and especially after the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988. 
However, the first evidence identified in the current section shows that the manner in which 
the preconditions established by the Commission were incorporated into the domestic 
administrative and political system did not alter the previously established patterns. The 
next section examines whether the initiation of the first and the second CSFs resulted in any 
changes in these patterns.   
 
6.3. EURP and institutional changes in the first two CSFs  
The institutional framework supporting the implementation of the IMPs did not change 
during the implementation of the first CSF between 1989 and 1993.471 The election of the 
ND government in 1990 signalled a halt to the previous government’s modest attempts to 
restructure the territorial relations of the Greek state.472 The new government cancelled the 
local government elections scheduled for 1990 – for both the prefectures and the LGAs – 
and did not take any other steps to enhance the role of independent regional and local 
authorities. As was seen in chapter 4, as far as the external influences exerted through the 
EURP were concerned, the principles of multi-annual programming, geographical 
concentration, additionality and partnership as well as a series of novel management tools, 
were consolidated with the reform of the Structural Funds, which took place in 1988, and 
they were put in practice with the first CSF. Therefore, the external stimuli of 
Europeanisation became even more important in this period.473  
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As a result of these principles, the government had to submit to the Commission a Regional 
Development Plan (RDP) that would entail the developmental priorities of the first CSF. 
This had to be drawn up in consultation with the regional and local actors involved in each 
regional and sectoral OP. After the CSF had been adopted, the national and regional 
authorities were required to revise the general developmental plans into specific 
Operational Programmes (OPs). The regional policy department of the Ministry of 
Economy and the Commission became involved in negotiations regarding the sharing of 
competencies and the institutional mechanisms that would support the programmes.474 
Additionally, the projects that would become eligible to be included in the separate OP’s 
and their conformity with the stated developmental objectives of the CSF became a source 
of disagreement.475 Supposedly, these issues were resolved during the negotiations for the 
first CSF. However, the new ND government wanted to assert itself with the Commission 
and renegotiated many issues that had been decided by the previous PASOK 
government.476     
 
As was the case with the IMPs, the first CSF would be managed in collaboration between 
the Monitoring Committees (MC) of the Ministry of Economy and those of the regional 
and the sectoral OPs. The 13 regional and 12 sectoral OPs each had one MC, the size of 
which would be determined in accordance with the financial significance of each 
programme. Again, the sectoral monitoring committees would be staffed by civil servants 
on secondment from positions in the central bureaucracy. The regional monitoring 
committees would be staffed by civil servants from the prefectures and the local councils. 
In addition, representatives of the Commission and of specific interest groups representing 
the regional and national civil societies were included. The committee would meet twice a 
year in order to assess the progress and provide guidelines for the future of the 
implementation of the programmes. It also included a permanent secretariat which was 
responsible for the day to day matters relating to the OPs.  
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The chairs of the sectoral and regional MCs, who were the secretaries of the regions or the 
ministries and hence appointed by the central Government, would report to the central MC 
of the CSF, which was based in the Ministry of Economy. This consisted of the highest 
officials of the three levels of government. In other words, the national level was 
represented by the secretaries of the sectoral OPs, the regional by the secretaries of the 
regional OPs and the European level by representatives of the Commission. Also, 
representatives of organisations from the national civil society participated. The MC that 
would oversee the implementation of the CSF was chaired by the alternate Minister of 
Economy.  
 
The Ministry of Economy’s regional policy department became the principal institutional 
actor implementing the CSF.477 The imperative of absorbing the funds at the stated time 
overrode any processes of collaboration between the central institutional actor and the 
regional and local stakeholders.478 As a result, there has been continuity between the 
previous efforts to address the regional inequalities in the country – including the IMPs – 
and the first CSF.479 This is corroborated by Leonardi who, as was discussed in chapter 3, 
distinguishes between three possible responses by the domestic administrative systems to 
the regulations postulated by the EURP:  negation, adaptation and learning. He discusses 
the response of the Greek authorities in the first CSF as a characteristic case of negation.480  
 
The second programming period signifies some important changes in connection with the 
previous programming periods and the other meagre attempts to combat the ‘regional 
problem’ of the country. The RDP was negotiated between the regional policy department 
of the Ministry of Economy and the Commission during 1992 and 1993 but as with the 
previous programmes its implementation was delayed, and in this case it did not begin until 
1996. By this time the modernising wing of the PASOK government had established an 
adequate power base to control the socialist party. In addition, in 1997 the country was 
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given the responsibility for hosting the 2004 Olympic Games. These two issues signalled a 
turn towards the adoption of a different style of management of the second CSF. 
 
In particular, the modernising wing of the socialist party was admittedly less interested in 
the implementation of the EURP programmes in a manner that would promote local 
democracy and would thus give real meaning to the requirement of partnership. Instead, it 
was preoccupied with achieving the convergence criteria so that the country would enter 
the EMU. As discussed in chapter 3, the country's entry into the final stages of monetary 
unification acquired a special status in the Greek polity. It became associated not only with 
the economic advantages that would accrue but also with the broader forces of 
Europeanisation and modernisation and the need to establish the country at the heart of 
Europe. Consequently, the new PASOK government imposed a style of management more 
attuned to efficiency as measured in quantitative terms than to the qualitative impact that 
the projects could have through the sectoral and regional OPs.481 
 
In terms of observable domestic institutional changes, there have been some significant 
developments during the period of the second CSF which emanated directly from the 
EURP. After the previous programming periods the Commission had identified a series of 
problems related to the domestic political landscape. In particular, the funding coming from 
the structural funds had become politicised, with the two main parties bidding for the title 
of the best protector of regional interests in the public discourse.482 The clientelistic 
interchanges amongst the three levels of government were identified, as was the low 
capacity of the regional authorities – and to a lesser degree the central as well – in terms of 
human capital.483 
 
As a solution, the creation of administrative structures with as much independence from the 
central bureaucracy as possible was promoted by the Commission.484 As a Commission 
employee485 put it: 
                                                 
481
 Paraskevopoulos, 2008. 
482
 Andreou, 2006. 
483
 ibid. 
484
 Interview E-4, Interview E-5. 
  
 
179 
At the time we understood that the Greek public administration was more or less not 
‘reformable’ and we had to create a parallel administration alongside the core civil 
service that would run the structural funds.   
 
These agencies would operate as semi private organisations with the ability to attract 
personnel from the private sector. Their main contribution would be the promotion of 
transparent practices that would assist the speeding of the absorption rates and the 
minimising of complex bureaucratic procedures at the selection stages of the projects. This 
process became a central component of the strategy developed by the Commission in order 
to improve the institutional performance and hence the implementation outcomes of the 
Greek CSF and there was considerable insistence on the part of the Commission for the 
new authorities to be as independent by the core civil service as possible.486 The short term 
objective was to bypass the rigidities and problems of the core public administration in the 
implementation of the projects funded through the structural funds so as to hasten the rates 
of absorption and improve the qualitative impact of the policy. By doing that it was hoped 
that in the long run, sufficient spillovers would be generated from the implementing 
institutions of the EURP that would have a positive impact on the core public 
administration of the country.487   
 
Thus, four independent management and monitoring organisations were established, all 
based in Athens: the Management Organisation Unit (MOU), the Hellenic Centre for 
Investment (ELKE), the Joint Steering Committee for Public Works (MEK) and the Expert 
Agent for the Sampled Quality of Infrastructure Projects (ESPEL).488 The first organisation 
was established with the aim of providing advice, administrative tools and expertise to the 
regional and the sectoral managing authorities and implementation agencies.489 ELKE 
aimed to improve the attraction of private capital in the projects to be implemented so as to 
advance the rates of national participation, which had been one of the main problems 
identified in the two previous programming periods. MEK and ESPEL were endowed with 
the task of overseeing the procedures that were followed during the construction of projects 
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related to the improvement of the physical infrastructure. MEK in particular was created as 
a sub-committee of the central monitoring committee of the CSF in the Ministry of 
Economy with the jurisdiction of overseeing the system that was employed in order to 
produce the public works.490 As identified in chapter 5, this system has suffered as a result 
of chronic insufficiencies that more often than not led to corrupt practices. The introduction 
of the innovative methods of co-financing of public works and the improvement of the 
regulatory framework that governed the process of selection of projects of physical 
infrastructure improved the physical outcomes of the OPs for public works as was shown in 
chapter 5. This has left a significant endowment of first class projects like Attiko Metro and 
the ring road of Attiki Odos which significantly changed the capabilities of the capital. 
These improvements can largely be attributed to MEK and ESPEL although the problems 
were far from extinct. ESPEL had an auditing role and was endowed with the responsibility 
to examine the quality of the public works for physical infrastructure. 
 
The creation of these four organisations was the result of the Commission’s 
‘stranglehold’491 which was adamant that this was the right strategy for the improvement of 
the domestic capabilities. However, as was discussed in chapter 3, similarly to most cases 
of EU induced reforms, these new institutions were met with considerable resistance from 
the existing civil service of the country. Particularly, the employees of the Ministry of 
Economy felt threatened that their hegemonic position in the EURP would be challenged 
through MOU and were amongst the first to react.492Also, ESPEL’s operation was met with 
considerable resistance both from the part of the civil service that implements projects of 
physical infrastructure and the professionals who did not accept that their physical output 
should be evaluated in such detail.493Overall, this strategy was deemed as a ‘failure’ from 
the abovementioned Commission employee who admitted that the reactions of the core 
civil service to the operation of these agencies was so strong that in the third CSF they had 
to admit that the MIS should be incorporated in the established administration. I return to 
this issue later.    
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In addition to the introduction of these agencies a number of special bodies were set up in 
order to improve the effectiveness of EURP management. These organisations would 
operate in parallel to the central public administration sometimes as private companies.494 
Again the objective of the Commission was to sidetrack the rigidities of the Greek civil 
service and to promote the more effective and transparent implementation of major projects 
of infrastructure495 which as was shown in chapter 5 has taken the lion’s share of the 
funding in all the programming periods. Thus a number of Sociétés Anonymes (SA) was 
established –Egnatia SA, Attiko Metro SA and others- with the exclusive responsibility to 
organise and build the major projects that were part of the second CSF.  
    
Moreover, a series of reforms promoted by the Greek government after 1994 further 
contributed to the territorial reorganisation of the Greek state, hence the patterns of 
implementation of the second CSF. In 1997, Law 2503/97 on the ‘Organisation and 
Management of the Regions’ provided further responsibilities to the NUTS II regions in the 
areas of planning, preparation and execution of programmes of economic development, and 
social and cultural affairs. Essentially, this was putting into practice the 1986 Law that had 
introduced the regions and as was mentioned above had not been fully implemented.496 
Again these reforms sought to establish regional and local authorities which were insulated 
from central political interference.  
 
Furthermore, in 1994 a new law established local elections for the leaders of the prefectures 
and the prefecture councils. The re-elected government of PASOK reinstated the reforms 
that it had introduced in the 1980s to reorganise the territorial balance of power between the 
levels of Government. Therefore, for the first time in modern Greek political history the 
local populations would have the opportunity to choose their representatives at the local 
level democratically. The prefecture councils were comprised by members of the civil 
societies representing each prefect and were also elected. Nevertheless, this movement 
towards decentralisation was accompanied by the transfer of resources to the non-elected 
regions whilst the elected prefectures would continue to be financially dependent upon the 
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central state.497 Additionally, there was confusion about the responsibilities that the 
prefectures actually had. As is shown in Table 6.1, they shared many responsibilities with 
the central government, which created administrative overlapping and problems.498   
 
Finally, at the lowest territorial level, that of the LGAs, the government attempted to 
modernise the system of local government by amalgamating municipalities and communes. 
As mentioned above, there were 6,000 independent LGAs, which in financial and 
administrative terms were unsustainable. Therefore, with Law 2539/97 on the ‘Reform of 
the First Level of Local Authority’ the number of the municipalities was reduced to around 
1,000 and some competences were transferred from the central state to the newly created 
LGAs. This was the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan, which provided for the obligatory mergers of the 
local communes. The plan came under extensive opposition in certain localities that did not 
wish to lose any components of what they considered to be their local identity.499 However, 
the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan was supported by the two associations that represent the elected 
local authorities – the Central and Local Associations of Municipal and Communal 
Authorities, KEDKE and TEDK respectively.500 Therefore, it was put into practice even 
though it did not cater for the main problem that the local authorities face, which was the 
lack of power to collect financial revenue through taxation.  
 
To be sure, in a later stage of the reforms introduced through the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan, the 
amended Constitution of 2001 for the first time allowed the LGAs to collect local taxation 
that would finance their activities.501 However, this ended up covering a very small 
percentage of the LGAs’ total expenses with the majority of the funding still arriving 
through the central state.502 The changes in the territorial distribution of powers in the 
Greek state are summarised in Table 6.2, which provides an outline of the institutional 
developments that took place at the governmental level concerned with the administration 
of the CSFs.  
                                                 
497
 Psycharis and Simatou, 2003. 
498
 ibid. 
499
 Koutalakis, 2003. 
500
 ibid. 
501
 Psycharis and Simatou, 2003. 
502
 ibid. 
  
 
183 
Table 6.2. Tiers of Local Government and decentralised structures in Greece  
Municipality and Communes  
First tier of self government (Local NUTS V 
tier). 1033  
• Fully elected 
• Underwent drastic amalgamation in 1999 
through the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan. 5825 
municipalities and communes (438 and 5387 
respectively) became 1033 municipalities and 
communes (900 and 133 respectively) 
Prefecture  
Second tier of self government (prefectural 
NUTS III tier) 
51 prefectures grouped into 50 self government 
organizations   
• Led by a single Prefect appointed by the central 
government until 1982 
• Increased participation with appointed 
members in the Prefectural Council established 
in 1982. The Prefect remains appointed by the 
central government. 
• Since 1994 fully elected tier of self 
government.  
Region  
Third tier of decentralization (regional NUTS II 
tier)  
13 Regions 
• Non- existent until 1986 
• Legislated in 1986 but did not fully function 
until 1997 
• Fully functional since 1997 with a Secretary 
General appointed by the central government 
and appointed members of the Regional 
Council  
    Source: Petrakos and Psycharis (2006)  
 
On the whole, the ways in which the implementation of the second CSF influenced the 
Greek state reveal a contradictory picture. On the one hand there were indisputable 
institutional innovations that took place, promoting decentralisation and improving the 
effectiveness of the management of the programmes. The new governmental structures 
could provide effective and high quality support to the official management and monitoring 
structures of the regional and sectoral OPs. Moreover, the fact that the NUTS II regions 
were finally consolidated with the competences and financial resources decided in the 1986 
legislation was a step towards the inclusion of the regional populations in the 
implementation processes of the CSF.  
 
  
 
184 
Additionally, the election of the prefectures and the amalgamation of the LGAs could 
provide channels for local actors to participate in all stages of the regional OPs and hence 
significantly improve the input provided by the Intermediate Bodies and the final 
beneficiaries. Moreover, the creation of methods of public private participation in the 
public works, which were discussed in chapter 5, have improved considerably the final 
beneficiaries’ participation in the field of projects of large scale infrastructure by improving 
the incentive structures in which they could operate. The successful implementation of 
these projects has been directly if not wholly the outcome of this innovative method of 
coordinating the actions of the public and private sector.  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that it took the central government ten years to endow the regions 
with the responsibilities established by the structural funds regulations provides an example 
of the central state’s reluctance to lose any of its powers and successfully move towards the 
direction indicated by the EURP regulations. Furthermore, even this process of 
consolidating the region’s competences can be seen as an attempt on the part of the Greek 
central government to replace the power that it enjoyed at the local level through the 
prefectures with the regions.503 As a study initiated by the Commission for the 
implementation of the principle of partnership in the member states shows:  
There is in Greece an emerging deconcentrated structure which, however, co-exists 
alongside a more centralised system of control and centralised operational service 
delivery…the regional secretaries exercise the regional element of the central 
government.504 
 
As far as the implementation of the principles for improving the administrative 
performance of the relevant authorities is concerned, the impression given by those 
interviewees505 who participated in the management of the programme was that there was 
hardly any discernible impact on the administrative capacities of the Greek state as a result 
of the second CSF. As one of them put it: 
Basically there was no second Community Support Framework [in terms of 
administrative compliance with the Structural Funds regulations] in Greece. Not 
only did the CSF finish late but the implementation timetables of the OPs as they 
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were initially agreed were not enforced, whilst the developmental objectives were 
not achieved even to the slightest degree.506 
 
Moreover, the above-mentioned general turn towards managerial efficiency is indicated by 
the participation of private consultancies in the implementation processes of the projects, 
which took place during this period for the first time. Even at the stage of the formulation 
of the RDP, around 36 consultancies participated in the process.507 It is clear that 
incorporating the private sector into the process of the implementation of the CSF is 
conducive to improving the manner in which the principle of partnership would be 
implemented. That is to say, it did provide a channel for the inclusion of the private sector 
at every stage of the CSF. Nevertheless, the fact that these private companies were 
essentially undertaking work which was the responsibility of the central civil service, as 
well as the fact that they were chosen in order to assist the central bureaucracy rather than 
the sub-national authorities provides an indication of the turn towards managerial 
efficiency. Most importantly, however, it shows the limited effect that the introduction of 
the funds had in administrative terms since the state has devolved the responsibility to 
improve its capacities by outsourcing the challenges that it was facing. As an interviewee 
who participated in the management of the second CSF from a senior position in the then 
Ministry of National Economy pointed out: 
The public sector was simply unable to carry out the organisational and institutional 
changes needed in order to implement the programs. The solution they found was to 
outsource to private consultancies almost all the technical duties and the preparation 
of studies that they themselves were supposed to carry out. This is the main reason 
behind the unprecedented expansion of the consultancies sector in Greece during 
the 1990s. Certainly, that was not something allowed by the Regulations of the 
Structural Funds, which explicitly stated the strong role that the national and sub-
national authorities were supposed to play in implementing the programmes. The 
solution that they found, however, was to use the funds that became available after 
1994 through the Operational Programme for Technical Assistance in order to 
employ private consultancies. Hence, the private consultancies were bringing to the 
public sector the know-how that it should have had but it did not and of course 
assisted tremendously in the execution of the programmes. This situation more or 
less stopped after 2000, but what happened was that the consultants who worked in 
this capacity during the first and second CSFs are now employed by the Managing 
Authorities of the third CSF, the Prefectures and the Local Councils.508   
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Furthermore, the inclusion of the private sector through the consultancies reinforced the 
importance of the central government in the management of the funds. This is so because 
the private companies would mainly deal with the Ministry of Economy, which once again 
strengthened its position. Most importantly, however, the prevailing attitude of 
‘contempt’509 on the part of the Ministry of Economy towards the abilities of the sub-
national authorities to participate in the implementation of the second CSF in equal terms 
hardly changed during this period. Even at the formulation stage of the programme the 
central government had decided on the amount of funds that would be directed to each 
region. Despite this, it invited the input of the regional authorities, which in the end was 
completely disregarded since around 60% of the proposals that the regional authorities 
submitted were either rejected or significantly modified.510 The above-mentioned study 
initiated by the Commission admits that the instigation of the principle of partnership had 
limited effects on the regional structures. As the study points out:  
the most important aspect of partnership in Greece has been the partnership between 
the Commission and the member states.511  
 
Similar results are drawn from a former employee of the DG Regio who became the 
General Secretary for Investment and Development in the Greek Ministry of Finance in 
2004. He points out that there was hardly any discernible impact in the operational 
procedures followed in the Greek CSFs until 2004 and that the domestic authorities’ 
attention was focused on only one aspect of policy implementation. Absorbing the funds at 
the time that would not allow the Commission to de-commit any money became the 
overriding operational objective of the three programming periods.512   
 
Nonetheless, the importance of institution building that took place during this period cannot 
be disregarded. Given the insignificant institutional changes that had occurred in the area of 
regional development policies until the mid 1980s, the introduction of the autonomous 
agencies for the provision of bureaucratic backup as well as the territorial reorganisation of 
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the country is very important.513 Indeed, the embedded sclerosis of the Greek state would 
mean that it would be difficult for the next government to reverse these institutional 
changes.  
 
In terms of the relationships between the institutional developments of the first two 
programming periods and the conceptual framework, elements of both change and 
continuity can be identified. There is little doubt that certain important institutional 
innovations took place in the second CSF, which indicates the significant effects of 
Europeanisation as a result of the reinforcement of the principles of the EURP. Institutions 
that would be independent from the central administrative structures were established and 
the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan promoted the establishment of democratically elected local 
authorities. Both these forces signify a move towards the establishment of institutional 
structures that would strengthen the internal and the interactive capacities of the Greek 
state. The former institutional changes would insulate the bureaucratic authorities that 
would participate in the implementation of the programmes from the central political 
developments and the latter would promote better ‘state-society synergies’. Nonetheless, 
these changes were accompanied by continuity as far as the hegemonic role of the central 
state authorities was concerned. The regional policy department of the Ministry of 
Economy continued to be condescending towards the sub-national authorities, this time by 
stressing the perceived inefficiencies and incompetence of the latter.  
 
Certainly, the latter did not take advantage of the opportunities presented by the 
establishment of the decentralised structures and the reinforcement of the principle of 
partnership.514 Finally, the apparent sabotaging of the MIS’s operation from the established 
public administration also confirmed the problems that the Greek state has faced in 
internalising EU induced reforms that would improve its operational impact. As was seen 
above, the Commission’s intention was to bypass the rigidities of the established public 
administration through creating the MIS. However, the core civil service did not accept this 
situation and was far from helpful in the initial steps taken by the MIS.  
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6.4. EURP and institutional changes in the third CSF  
In this section I aim at identifying the extent to which the initiation of the third CSF 
signalled the continuation of the previously established patterns of institutional 
relationships. During this period there were no further domestic reforms in the 
reformulation of the political geography of the country. Hence, the territorial and political 
context in which the programmes of the third CSF were implemented remained the same as 
described in Table 6.2. Nevertheless, this is not the case with the institutional developments 
that emanated from the EURP. The reform of the Structural Funds in 1999 and the increase 
in financial resources that became available from the EURP for Greece provided a further 
impetus towards the Europeanisation of the domestic administrative system in this 
particular policy area. In particular, in institutional terms the reforms initiated with the 
1260/1999 regulations entailed the creation of the organisational scheme described in 
subsection 4.4 and applied to all the recipient countries. For Greece this entailed managing 
and paying authorities and the strengthening of the processes of monitoring, evaluation and 
control. In practice, the reforms initiated through this legislation entailed either the 
strengthening of the arrangements made in the previous three programming periods or the 
creating of new institutional structures.  
 
Broadly, the institutional network created in order to support the design and 
implementation of the Greek third CSF comprised five interrelated organisations: the 
Managing Authorities (MA), the Monitoring Committees (MC), the Payment Authority 
(PA), the Committee for Fiscal Control and the Management and Organisation Unit 
(MOU), which was discussed above. The institutional authorities involved in all the stages 
of the third CSF and their interrelationships are described in the Figure 6.1 at page 227. 
MOU is not included in the figure since its operation was outside the everyday 
implementation of the programme.  
 
It must be noted that the Commission’s intention was for the administrative network that 
would support the management of the third CSF to have been established before the 
initiation of the programme. The then Commissioner for Regional Policy Mr. Barnier had 
sent a letter to the Greek government six months after the adoption of the new regulations 
  
 
189 
by the Council, urging them to comply with the regulations as soon as possible. In 
accordance to the principle of subsidiarity, he asked for the introduction of the new MAs 
and the strengthening of the operation of MOU, which as will be shown next was supposed 
to have started working with the second CSF but at this point had not started operating yet. 
The Greek government introduced the legislation for the creation of the administrative 
network 18 months after the letter by the Commissioner and the legislation began to be 
implemented at the end of 2001, in other words two years after the initiation of the third 
CSF. In particular the CSF MA was introduced 22 months after the formal start of the third 
CSF and the sectoral and regional OPs two years after that.515  
 
Moreover, as mentioned above, there was an understanding by the Commission at the time 
that the intended independence of the MIS and their parallel character in relation with the 
core civil service was not realistically enforceable. This was the case because the MIS:  
became locked-in a conflict with the established administration about the 
competences and operations that they would perform.516 
 
The core civil service reacted to the MIS’s establishment with ‘pathological envy’ and it 
became a central objective of the core ministries to undermine the MIS’s operation.517Thus 
the decision was taken in the third CSF to establish the MIS very much firmly inside the 
core public administration rather than put them outside.’518 
  
The CSF MA was given responsibility for the general running and coordination of the 
programme.519 Essentially, this was the Ministry of Economy’s regional policy department 
which had been in charge during the three previous programming periods. Under the third 
CSF it was endowed with significant administrative and financial resources in order to 
carry out its operation.520 Broadly, the tasks it had to follow during the third CSF were the 
supervision of the actions of each MA, the everyday contact with the Commission, the 
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evaluation of the programme and the approval of any extensions or alterations that a 
sectoral or regional OP would recommend. Around 60 employees worked in the CSF 
MA521 and the Service was divided into three Units; the Special Unit for Strategy, Design 
and Evaluation of the Developmental Programmes, the Special Unit for the Coordination of 
the implementation of the OPs and the Special Unit responsible for the management of the 
Integrated Information System (OPS). Furthermore, in the CSF MA there was a separate 
Unit responsible for the management of the Cohesion Fund and another which would 
manage the Community Initiative ‘Interreg III’.522 
   
The CSF MA was undoubtedly the most important institutional actor in the network 
responsible for the design and implementation of the programme. Its employees were 
highly experienced and some had been involved in the EURP since the start of the IMPs.523 
It issued directives to all the individual MAs which provided the general guidelines about 
the execution of the sectoral and regional OPs. It was responsible for the conduct of the 
mid-term evaluation in collaboration with the sectoral and regional OPs. It was also 
responsible for ensuring that the actions of each MA were consistent with both the national 
and Community legal frameworks, particularly in the areas of competition, state aid and the 
environment. Apart from the daily communication with the Commission officials 
concerning different aspects of the CSF, representatives from the CSF MA met annually 
with Commission officials in order to account for the overall progress of the programme. 
Besides this, the CSF MA was responsible for the administration of the partnership and 
additionality principles. Moreover, it participated in the MCs of all the sectoral and regional 
OPs and was supervised by and accountable to the CSF MC. 
 
In addition to the CSF MA, a new MA was established in the relevant regions or the 
ministries for each OP. It was headed by a Director General who was appointed by the 
central government and its personnel arrived from either the organizations established in 
the previous programming periods or through competitive exams and interviews held 
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during the period 1997-2005.524 Therefore, a mixture of already serving civil servants on 
secondment and newly recruited employees mainly from the private sector and the 
abovementioned consultancies were employed in the MAs. 
 
Moving to the second important institutional actor of the institutional network set up in 
order to design and implement the third CSF in Greece, the MCs were also reorganised and 
their role became more clearly identified. As in the previous programming periods, the aim 
of creating the MCs was the institutionalisation of the principle of partnership and the 
improvement of the inclusion of representatives from civil society in the design and 
implementation of the CSF. In accordance with the developments related to the 
strengthening of the principle of partnership525 there was an extension of the participating 
bodies. Furthermore, the tasks to be performed by the MCs were clearly identified for the 
first time.   
 
Each OP was assigned a separate MC which would monitor the implementation of the 
respective programme. The progress of the third CSF as a whole was monitored by the CSF 
MC, which encompassed the Director General of the CSF MA, the presidents of the MCs 
of each sectoral and regional OP, representatives from the PA and the Committee for Fiscal 
Control and representatives of economic and social interests. Finally, a delegate from the 
Commission attended the meetings of the CSF MC but did not have a right to vote. This 
was the institutionalisation of the decision taken by the Commission to withdraw from the 
everyday patterns of the implementation of the programme. The regional or sectoral MCs 
worked in a similar way as the CSF MC with the representatives coming from the regions 
and the MAs where the OP is implemented in the first case or national delegates in the 
latter. In all cases a representative from the Ministry of Economy participated. The 
president of the regional or sectoral MC was appointed by the central government general 
or regional secretary.  
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Therefore, the two main pillars of the institutional network that was created to support the 
operation of the third CSF were the MAs – one for the CSF and one for each OP – and the 
MCs – also one for the CSF and one for each OP. In addition to these, however, the PA and 
the Committee for Fiscal Control were introduced as secondary supporting organisations. 
Both these institutions were established in order to improve the transparency of the 
programme and avert any corrupt practices. They seem to have been the result of specific 
demands by the Commission in order to promote the objectives related to the ‘sound 
management’ of the programme as discussed in chapter 5.  
 
Finally, an important institutional change, aimed at creating a supporting mechanism, was 
the introduction of the Management Organisation Unit (MOU). This was decided in the 
second CSF but as with the rest of the administrative network, it started its operation 
towards the end of the second programming period and the start of third CSF.526 The aim of 
creating MOU was to strengthen the administrative and management capacities of the 
authorities created as part of the third CSF. The creation of MOU was directly related to the 
identification of the weaknesses and rigidities of the Greek civil service.527 Although 
intended to complement and not substitute the already existing civil service, it was clear 
that the public sector bodies that existed at the end of the second CSF were unable to 
perform the tasks required by the programme.528 Hence, it was hoped that MOU would 
provide training and generally enhance the capabilities of the relevant administrative bodies 
through the introduction of innovative systems of public management. Moreover, it was 
hoped that ultimately, it would create sufficient spillovers that would have a positive 
administrative impact to the wider civil service of the country.  
 
Up to this point in the current section I have described the organisational elements of each 
institution that was exclusively set up for the third CSF in Greece. Each of these 
organisations would interact with one another, in accordance with the regulatory framework 
of the EURP and also with the Intermediate Bodies (IBs) and the final beneficiaries, as 
described in chapter 5. In the remainder of the section I discuss the issues that hindered the 
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operation of this institutional network, and hence the third CSF, in a developmental 
manner.   
 
6.4.1 Centralisation vs. Decentralisation  
The establishment of both managing and paying authorities were undoubtedly positive 
steps towards the improvement of the performance of the regional and sectoral OPs. 
However, the fact that the MAs were placed under the direct control of the ministries and 
the regions responsible for the implementation of the sectoral and regional OPs signalled 
the reinforcement of the centralising tendencies of the Greek state. As mentioned above, the 
Secretary General of each MA was appointed by the central government and at the same 
time would also serve as the head of each MC. Moreover, the civil servants that worked in 
the MAs on secondment could be transferred back to their previous positions by a simple 
decision taken by the secretary of the MA, whilst the ones that arrived from the private 
sector were employed on the basis of two year contracts.529 As discussed in chapter 3, the 
Greek civil service is built on the theoretical basis of the Napoleonic system, which has the 
permanent positioning of its employees as one of its basic cornerstones. Hence, the 
employees of the regional and sectoral MAs worked under circumstances of flexibility 
which were unusual for the civil service in the country. This fact in itself provides 
constraints on their ability to act autonomously from the central state.  
 
The centralised ways in which the managing authorities operated were revealed during the 
fieldwork carried out by the author with the aim of conducting semi-structured interviews 
with the employees of the MAs. During that process, the apprehension of the civil servants 
to give such interviews was revealed. Most of them would send the author to their line 
manager who in turn would send him to the Head of the Managing Authority. In some 
cases the explicit authorisation of the Secretary General of the MA was sought in order to 
conduct the research interview. It is understandable that a certain degree of apprehension by 
the civil servants to reveal information that might be considered confidential is an integral 
problem that accompanies this sort of fieldwork. Nonetheless, the tendency of almost all 
the potential interviewees to look for permission from their line manager is indicative of a 
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reluctance to take autonomous decisions. This issue was also revealed by interviewees in 
Brussels who admitted their difficulties in dealing with the MAs during the monitoring of 
the programmes because no decision would be taken unless the highest official would 
agree.530 Sometimes that would involve the minister or the secretary of a regional authority, 
whilst in other cases, and especially in issues that affected political decisions related to the 
national economy, the permission of the Greek Prime Minister (PM) was required.531    
 
A similar impression was given by all the interviewees employed in the MA of the regional 
OP of Western Macedonia532 and another employee who had worked in the regional OP for 
the region of Attica.533 They all agreed that the Ministry of Economy would constantly 
interfere in their operations through the CSF MA but also through the regional MC. As far 
as the CSF MA in particular was concerned, it was clear that the central managing authority 
tended to intervene in the everyday activities much more than the regional MA would have 
wanted.  
 
Interestingly enough however, this was not seen as necessarily negative or indeed as 
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the system. This is because the employees of the 
regional MA recognised the severe difficulties they were facing in terms of properly trained 
personnel. The issue of the lack of specialised knowledge by the regional MAs, as well as 
in general by the sub-national authorities involved in the implementation of the regional 
OPs, was raised by an interviewee employed in the CSF MA thus: 
It is all very well for the regional and local representatives to be asking for more 
responsibilities to implement programmes... However, I cannot understand how 
they will be able to manage a large scale infrastructure project such as an airport... 
Whether we like it or not our administrative structure is such that the people who 
know how to build an airport work at the centre. Whenever we have attempted to 
move those people to the regions, either the know-how was not transferred with 
them or they did not want to move since they had already organised their lives in 
Athens.534     
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Another interviewee535 who had worked in a regional MA claimed that the strong role that 
the Ministry of Economy retains through the CSF MA is justified, given the small size of 
the country and the traditional strong role that the central state has had in the Greek 
political history. As he claims: 
We need to understand that the Greek regions are not like the German or French 
regional authorities [in terms of their administrative capacity]…also since 50% of 
the country’s population resides in Athens it is logical that this is reflected in the 
administrative distribution of powers. 
 
When asked if the central state should take the initiative and devolve responsibilities to the 
regions in order to alter these centralised patterns he replied: 
…in theory this is an attractive prospect. In practice, though, I do not think that it 
will ever work… the regional authorities would find it very difficult to collaborate 
with each other without the contribution of the Ministry of Economy…also some 
decisions that need to be taken in order to ensure the transparency of the 
programmes would not have been taken at the local level because of clientelistic 
interferences…I do not think that the country is ready for any devolution of powers.  
 
An employee of the European Commission’s DG Agriculture536 with extensive experience 
in dealing with the MAs of the regional OPs corroborated the argument that the CSF MA 
tends to involve itself in the management of the programmes much more often than it 
should have done. As he pointed out:  
Institutionally, our interlocutor is the MA of the regional OP. For example, if we 
have a problem with a project in the regional OP of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 
we will call the employee of this MA. When, however, a few days later we receive a 
phone call from an employee of the CSF MA who tells us: ‘‘about the problem that 
you had with this project in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, here is the answer’’ we 
begin wondering what is going on. 
 
Furthermore, he points out that the CSF MA’s interference takes place not only through the 
everyday communication with the Commission but also through the regional MCs. 
Specifically, he puts it thus: 
Sometimes it feels as if the Ministry of Economy has assigned a commissioner to 
each of the MCs of the 13 regional OPs who is basically dictating to the regional 
MC and MA what they should and should not do. This of course is completely 
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contradictory to any claims about the promotion of bottom-up regional development 
which is what the structural funds are trying to achieve. 
 
Also, another Greek Commission employee537 points out that: 
The Greek regions do not have the capacities to take autonomous decisions without 
the constant need for the approval of the central authorities. What we see in other 
recipient countries is that their regional authorities can design and implement a 
programme for innovation, a technological park or a University in their area and 
they do it independently without needing the authorisation of their centre. In 
Greece, each action by the regional authorities needs to take approval through a 
plethora of authorisations by different ministries all located in Athens... what we 
wanted to happen is that the central authorities would provide the coordination of 
the programmes through designing the relevant OPs but during their 
implementation the regional OPs would be left to run their own projects with the 
centre of course providing technical or other assistance whenever it is needed... in 
that way the better performing regional OPs would move forward and promote 
regional economic development faster than the others... these issues are not 
happening as even the design of the CSFs are centred around Athens, look at what 
happened with the Olympic Games for example...this is unfortunate because some 
Greek regions like Thessaloniki have huge potential especially after the accession of 
Bulgaria.  
 
Nevertheless, the above mentioned Commission employee538 also confirmed the impression 
that the excessive interference of the CSF MA was not necessarily negative for the 
implementation patterns of the third CSF. This is so because the regional MAs were often 
unable to deal with the problems that arose. As he points out: 
There is an issue related to the capacity of the regional MAs to administer these 
programmes. The management of the programmes financed through the structural 
funds is really complicated and there is a need for specialised personnel who will be 
able to communicate with the Commission on an equal basis and that is not always 
the case with the regional MAs. Therefore, the control that the CSF MA delivers is 
needed as long as it does not become asphyxiating.  
 
Three more employees of the CSF MA539 pointed out that the biggest problems in terms of 
the quality of the available personnel are identified at the lowest territorial level, that of the 
LGAs. As one of them put it: 
the local government in Greece is miles away from what it should have been in 
organisational terms, in terms of proper auditing controls, management of the 
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expenses etc… the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan made some first steps but there is much more 
that needs to be done by further reforms if extensive corruption at that level is to be 
combated.  
  
The issue of corruption of the LGAs in Greece is usually cited as a further element that 
contributes to the negative organisational functions of the lowest territorial administrative 
units. In a report,540 the Greek Ombudsman reached the conclusion that the local authorities 
are more often than not unable to perform even the meagre responsibilities that they have 
been assigned. As primary reasons for this, excessive corruption and the particularly low 
educational level of the personnel employed in the LGAs are cited. The report identifies 
that this impression is shared by a large part of public opinion in Greece which identifies 
these authorities with excessive corruption, patronage and incompetence. Nevertheless, the 
Ombudsman's report concludes that the LGAs should not be researched in isolation from 
the general political, administrative and social structures of the country. Instead they should 
be seen as constructions of the Greek central state and also as representatives of the local 
populations.  
 
Thus, it points to the direction of both top-down and bottom-up forces that created and 
sustained these issues, with the central state being reluctant to devolve significant 
responsibilities and the LGAs being unable to formulate coherent demands in that direction. 
Reflecting the low level of civil society in Greece as a whole, the regional and local people 
did not articulate their interests in a horizontal way at that level. Therefore, the local 
authorities have been ‘captured’ by clientelistic interests from the regional populations 
rather than as ways of representing collective needs. As an interviewee employed in the 
MA of the regional OP put it: 
The biggest problem that we are facing is a lack of collective identity in all the 
programming and implementing bodies that represent regional and local populations 
of the region. In other words, the representatives of the regional council only serve 
the interests of their constituents, as do those of the prefecture and the local 
councils. The delegates of each of these organisations are only interested in serving 
their own clientele and none of them seems to care about the development of the 
area as a whole. The situation is similar when it comes to the delegates representing 
a professional organisation, who seem to only bring to the council the demands of 
the relevant profession. This creates disagreements and a lack of trust amongst the 
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delegates. If all the representatives knew that the decisions taken by the MC, for 
example, are for the benefit of the whole area there would not be any obstacles in 
the decision making process. Because this is not the case, however, reaching a 
decision that would be of benefit to the whole region becomes particularly difficult. 
If that had happened we would have been able to bypass the problems related to the 
limited funds that we have at our disposal as well as the conflicting priorities that 
each delegate brings to the council. Nonetheless, understanding that the individual 
benefit only results from taking into account the common good is related to cultural 
issues that are very difficult to change.541  
 
The cultural aspects of interaction that contribute to the patterns of working in the MC were 
also stressed by a Commission employee542 who pointed out in relation with the principle 
of partnership: 
There is in Greece a profound lack of civic culture, consensus building and 
dialogue. People find it very difficult to talk about conflictual issues in a way that 
leads to an outcome that anyone can accept...of course this is not a problem only in 
Greece but is particularly acute in Greece... it is seen at both local levels- for 
example the relationships of bosses with their employees in a private company- and 
the national level- the relationship between the government and the trade unions- in 
every communication of this type I would get the impression that there was a 
dialogue of deaf.  
Moreover, the head of the Payment Authority543 pointed out that when it comes to the 
auditing that they implement, most of the problems that the PA is facing come from the 
LGAs and the prefectures. As he says: 
…sometimes we receive official documents written by hand – not only do they not 
use a computer but they do not even use a typewriter… the ‘‘Kapodistrias’’ plan has 
undoubtedly improved many things but still the administrative capacities at that 
level sometimes resemble those of the 1950s. 
 
Finally, a former employee of the Commission’s DG Regio who in the mid 2000’s moved 
to the General Secretariat for Investment and Development in the Greek Ministry of 
Finance put it:  
When I moved to my new position in 2004 I understood -with considerable anger- 
that 25 years after the country’s accession in the EU, the sub-national authorities did 
not have any knowledge at all about the laws and regulations coming from the EU.   
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To summarise, the low administrative capacities of the sub-national authorities were cited 
by most interviewees and were highlighted by the Ombudsman report as having an impact 
in the implementation of the EURP funded projects. In the case of the interviewees, there 
seemed to be a consensus that this was the primary reason why the centralised tendencies of 
the CSF MA were needed in order to ensure the minimum effectiveness of the programmes. 
This state of affairs, however, creates a chicken and egg situation; it is not clear whether the 
reduced responsibilities of the sub-national authorities or the centralising attitude of the 
central state were responsible for its reproduction. Therefore, on the one hand, those who 
distrusted the sub-national authorities seemed to have been justified in not wanting to allow 
them more scope for autonomous action in the context of the CSF. This was so especially 
since there were fears – not always unjustified – that the regional programmes would be 
used in order to satisfy local clientelistic interests rather than for developmental 
purposes.544 On the other hand, however, the representatives of the lower tiers inquired how 
the reforms of the sub-national government can proceed if they were not allowed any room 
for policy learning.     
 
The dominant role of the Ministry of Economy and the CSF MA in particular did not only 
impact on the scope for autonomous action to the sub-national authorities. If anything, the 
Greek civil service’s centralism was clearest in the administration of the MOU. As 
discussed above, it was created as an independent organisation to provide administrative 
know-how to the MAs. When it started its operation this involved training seminars and 
other interventions that it would decide autonomously. Nevertheless, during the course of 
its operation the Unit was stripped of many responsibilities by the CSF MA. As the 
Director General of MOU545 put it: 
The initial plans for the creation of MOU were that we would have much more 
responsibility not only in quantitative but also in qualitative terms since we would 
be involved in the programme in a more systematic way.  However, the Ministry of 
Economy has gradually taken back our responsibilities either by presidential decrees 
that institutionalised this process or by issuing directives that had the same impact 
in an unofficial way. 
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Besides, as mentioned above, even when the discussions for the creation of MOU had 
started in the mid 1990s the whole project had attracted considerable resistance from the 
core civil service, which feared that MOU would act in an antagonistic manner towards 
it.546  There were fears that the employees of the Ministry of Economy would lose their 
prerogatives – they are amongst the best paid civil servants in Greece, and since the 
employees of the CSF MA are employed by the Ministry of Economy this is reflected in 
their salaries547 – or that the new authority would override the already existing civil service 
organisations. Interestingly, this resistance was echoed by the ND party, which was then the 
main opposition party.548  
 
The fear of the conservative party was that the creation of an autonomous agency would 
lead to unsupervised political actions by the central government and that the latter would 
lose its control over the process of the management of the CSF. As a result of both the 
actions of the CSF MA and the resistance towards its operation, MOU’s role was 
downgraded during the third CSF from that of a major provider of organisational support to 
being a back up mechanism.549 Indeed, at the end of the third CSF, the only substantive 
responsibility left to MOU was the organisation of the entry examinations for employees 
that worked in the MAs. It was still in theory required to offer training and other support to 
the employees but this was hardly the case anymore.550 
 
Therefore, the new regional MAs and MOU, which were created in order to provide the 
autonomous administrative scheme for the third CSF, continued to suffer from interference 
from the central CSF MA. As a result, the reformulation of the role of the MAs lost its 
substance, since the central ministry reaffirmed its own role. In essence, the CSF MA 
issued directives about all the major issues that needed to be decided. The regional and 
sectoral MAs were intended to follow these directives almost literally and the only room for 
manoeuvre that they enjoyed was in everyday issues of secondary importance for the 
programmes. This was the case even though the directives that the CSF MA would issue 
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would at times be contradictory and non-comprehensible to the sub-national authorities 
whilst constitutionally they were against the aim of the introduction of the MAs as 
autonomous organisations for the implementation of the EURP.551 Essentially, the regional 
and sectoral OPs were not legally obliged to enforce the directives issued by the CSF MA 
but political and administrative practices of the past did not allow them otherwise.552  
 
As was seen by the interviews above, this situation seemed to have been accepted even by 
employees of the regional MAs as more or less inevitable for the sake of the effectiveness 
of the programme. Furthermore, there was little or no evidence that the CSF MA intended 
to alter this situation by devolving responsibilities to the sub-national and sectoral MAs. If 
anything, certain interviewees553 pointed out that in the programming period which 
officially started in 2007 the CSF MA has centralised even more powers. However, if the 
interviewees of the MAs of the regional OP were less likely to express frustration about the 
stifling interference of the CSF MA it was a different case when it came to the MAs of the 
sectoral OPs.  
 
6.4.2 Antagonisms, lack of co-ordination between the CSF MA and the sectoral MAs 
As discussed in chapter 5, the bulk of the funds of the third CSF were diverted to the 
sectoral OPs, which had a horizontal character and covered the territory of the whole 
country. To be sure, these interventions had significant developmental implications for the 
regional and local economies where the regional OPs are implemented. Nonetheless, the 
MAs that managed the sectoral OPs were all located in Athens. This was a factor that 
differentiated the patterns of the sectoral OPs’ interaction with the CSF MA in comparison 
with the interaction between the central managing authority and the regional MAs. In 
particular, the MAs of the OPs that were managed by the Ministry of Planning, 
Environment and Public Works (YPEXODE) and the three separate Ministries of Labour, 
Education and Development seemed to have been unwilling to accept the dominant position 
of the Ministry of Economy as expressed through the CSF MA. Competition, rivalry and 
mutual suspicion characterised inter-ministerial relationships throughout the previous 
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programming periods and have resulted in a lack of cooperation and coordination.554 As an 
interviewee put it: 
For years now, there is an unfortunate situation in Greece where each ministry 
designs and implements projects for the area of their responsibility without 
consulting other ministries...there is no co-ordinated plan for example for the 
enhancement of private enterprises and each ministry takes its own actions. 
 
These problems seem to have continued or even become exacerbated during the third CSF.  
Three OPs were managed from the YPEXODE, and one each from the Ministries of 
Education, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Development. Furthermore, there 
was a Special Service for the co-ordination of the programmes financed by the European 
Social Fund (ESF) which coordinated the actions of the Ministries of Labour and 
Education. Also, a series of not-for profit, semi-public organisations that belonged to the 
YPEXODE managed projects of physical infrastructure and participated in the process of 
implementation as Intermediate Bodies (IBs).  
 
The YPEXODE seemed to have a distinctly different approach to the third CSF than that of 
the Ministry of Economy. However, the problems were not confined to those between the 
YPEXODE and the Ministry of Economy. Similar problems were identified when it come 
to the relationships between the YPEXODE and the OPs managed by the Ministry of 
Labour and the Ministry of Education.  
 
Because the largest part of the third CSF was devoted to the upgrading of the physical 
infrastructure but also as a result of the problems that were created by the ‘Main 
Shareholder’ legislation, the interaction between the YPEXODE and the CSF MA was very 
frequent. The efforts made by the civil servants of the relevant managing authorities to 
minimise these rivalries were not always successful.555 The long-established disagreements 
led to conflicts and discrepancies which hindered the cooperation and coordination of the 
actions between the MAs. These were mainly caused by a distinctively different approach 
on issues of development between the civil servants of the two Ministries. 
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The different approaches need to be explained with reference to the fact that on the one 
hand YPEXODE favoured an approach based on physical and spatial planning whilst on 
the other the Ministry of Economy and the other Ministries had the responsibility for 
economic and social development and were more favourably inclined towards the 
qualitative elements of economic and social development. The technical approach of the 
former frequently contradicted the qualitative approach adopted not only by the Ministry of 
Economy but also by other Ministries responsible for the implementation of actions in 
relation to employment and education. Furthermore, the fact that the results of the actions 
undertaken by YPEXODE were easier to evaluate than those of the Ministry of Economy or 
the Ministries of Education or Employment – one can quantify the end result of roads and 
bridges more easily than that of an action that aims at the diversification of the employment 
population in a poor area – provided a further source of misunderstanding.556  
 
YPEXODE tended to present a thorough picture when evaluating its OPs, projecting clear 
and measurable outputs as evidence of the success of the programmes. This would tend to 
annoy the authorities that managed the other sectoral OPs, especially since the rates of 
absorption were employed by the Commission in order to evaluate the programmes. This 
further exacerbated the lack of coordination and created fragmentation and inconsistencies 
between the developmental objectives of the relevant OPs.  An interviewee who is 
responsible for the coordination of the sectoral OPs at the CSF MA summarised the whole 
affair thus: 
There is nothing new about the disagreements between the Ministry of Economy 
and the YPEXODE, or about the fact that they have an impact on the progress of the 
programme. Nevertheless, they are not a contemporary affair; all the Ministries that 
were the predecessors of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry for Public 
Works had difficulties in their communication. It is probably a problem of different 
philosophies in the issue of economic development… Therefore, it is not necessarily 
an issue of clashes of personalities but something related to the developmental 
model that the country has followed and the lack of economic programming. Ever 
since the Marshall Plan there has not been a corresponding programming that would 
assign specific responsibilities to each institutional authority involved, which is of 
course related to the administrative problems that the country has been facing.557  
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Furthermore, the same interviewee pointed out that these difficulties also related to the 
cooperation amongst the CSF MA and the IBs which belonged to the YPEXODE and 
implemented physical infrastructure projects. Although the latter were in theory 
independent from the Ministry responsible for public works, in practice they would follow 
the guidelines issued by it. This interaction involved a significant percentage of the funds, 
since for example the funds diverted through the OP ‘Rail, Airports and Urban Transport’ 
benefited such organisations exclusively.558 As the interviewee put it, the main issue of 
contention in these interactions is:  
who will play the developmental role during the implementation of the plans: the 
authorities who spend the funds and belong to the YPEXODE or those who design 
the plan, i.e. the Ministry of Economy.559   
 
Apart from the problems of differences in the developmental ‘philosophy’ amongst the 
MAs of the two main Ministries there were problems of a lack of co-ordination amongst the 
MAs responsible for the implementation of qualitative actions. These tended to exacerbate 
the antagonisms that characterised the relationships between the MAs of the sectoral OPs.  
As discussed in chapter 5, one of the characteristics of the patterns of the implementation of 
the third CSF in Greece was the constant reorganisation of the finances that were assigned 
for each OP. Specifically there was a trend to transfer funds that did not ‘run’ to those with 
better rates of absorption. Because of their nature, the physical infrastructure projects were 
more likely to benefit from financial reallocations, to the detriment of OPs that supported 
qualitative actions. This issue was identified in the Report on the implementation of the 
Structural Funds, published annually by the Commission about the execution of the 
programmes in 2004. The report pointed out that: 
While work on infrastructure is advancing, substantial delays were registered in the 
measures aiming at participation of the private sector, research and new 
technologies including the information society, the promotion of business spirit and 
innovation in the regions and actions for integrated rural and urban development.560   
 
An employee of the Special Service for the co-ordination of the actions of the ESF has a 
direct view on this issue. The main function of the Service in which she worked was to co-
                                                 
558
 Interview A-2. 
559
 Interview C-9. 
560
 CEC, 2005. 
  
 
205 
ordinate the policy actions of the MAs of the Ministries of Economy, Labour and Education 
as well as specific actions in regional OPs and to link these with the Commission’s actions. 
In this regard she was keen to point out that the co-ordination between the MAs of different 
sectoral OPs faces many difficulties. As she put it: 
There is a clear lack of coordination between the MAs, especially in those cases 
where two or more MAs share responsibilities…There is a mentality and an 
administrative culture that does not allow employees of different MAs to work 
together and I am not very hopeful that this will ever change… sporadically we do 
encounter examples of good coordination between individuals in different MAs, be 
it of sectoral and/or regional OPs. 
 
The unofficial relationships that were established between middle ranking civil servants 
were an important factor, as they seemed to have provided the motivation for certain 
individuals employed in the MAs of different OPs to collaborate. Essentially, through this 
process the programme as a whole would move forwards despite the difficulties and the 
frequent antagonisms between the ministries. As the above-mentioned interviewee put it: 
…these collaborations [between employees of different MAs] are almost never 
institutionalised and how could they be if the ministers and the secretary general of 
the regions where each OP is situated do not speak to each other in order to find 
shared solutions to the problems that they are facing?...the communication that is 
established is always dependent on the ‘chemistry’ that develops between 
employees. If certain employees get on well with each other the relevant actions 
will move forward, otherwise they will not…Unfortunately there still is a culture in 
Greece that says that the individuals do not examine the institutional position where 
their fellow employee works but whether they get on well with him or her.  
 
It is true that the individual relationships that develop in any organisation have an impact 
on the latter’s performance. However, when asked specifically about the issue of the 
relationships that develop between the MAs, almost all the interviewees replied that the 
personal ‘chemistry’ between the employees is the most important factor in determining the 
patterns of communication between themselves and their colleagues, and far more 
important than the institutional position of each individual.  
A Greek Commission employee561 went further and suggested that: 
Any positive impact that the CSFs have had in Greece has been the result of ad-hoc 
coordination between specific individuals working in different MAs, who for their 
own reasons wanted to ‘move things forward’. There has not been any 
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institutionalised cooperation...individuals who were most of the times doing more 
than they should be doing according to their job description, delivered certain 
results through this process. MOU was created like that as were some big 
construction projects like the El. Venizelos airport. There has not been any long 
term coordination. We have always done things with the method of ‘yourousia’562 
this is how the Olympic Games happened...of course we take these significant steps 
in that way and then we return back to the place where we were before.  
 
To summarise, the current section identified two issues that hindered the coordination and 
cooperation of the authorities involved in the implementation process of the third CSF. 
Firstly, the different approaches of the MAs that participated in the management of the 
programme – the CSF MA on the one hand and those belonging to the YPEXODE on the 
other – impacted directly on the internal communication between the relevant authorities. 
Secondly, there seemed to be a distinct lack of coordination between the MAs that managed 
sectoral OPs of qualitative actions, and this frequently created antagonisms and 
inconsistencies between the policy actions of the MAs. As one interviewee563 put it, the 
CSF MA tended to operate with a certain degree of ‘narcissism’ and rarely if ever consulted 
the MAs of the sectoral OPs.  He qualified this by pointing out that the CSF MA would ask 
for the input of the sectoral OPs when, for example, it would work on large scale projects 
such as the design of the National Development Programme for the period 2007-2013. 
Nevertheless, when it would come to everyday issues the CSF MA tended to issue 
directives which the sectoral MAs often found ‘unrealistic’ even though they were expected 
to put such measures into practice. Another issue that created difficulties in the 
relationships between the MAs was that of the politicisation of the programmes financed 
through the sectoral and the regional OPs.  
 
6.4.3 Politicisation of the actions of the MAs 
The relationships between the MAs, especially those of the sectoral OPs, also suffered 
because of the politicisation of the programmes, which was caused by the higher echelons 
of the ministries and trickled down to the administrations of the ministries.564 The ministers 
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responsible for each OP were very likely to use the projects funded through the EURP in 
order to advance their public profiles. The projects financed through the sectoral OPs and 
managed by the YPEXODE were widely known in public. They included – amongst others 
– large scale interventions, such as the Egnatia Odos or the Athens Metro, which attracted a 
great deal of publicity. Therefore, the minister of YPEXODE was likely to issue press 
campaigns, announcing projects that had already been announced before or were in 
advanced stages of implementation, in order to be seen as ‘taking care’ of the voters. Given 
that, as an interviewee put it, ‘we Greek peoples love the cement’565 the advantages that 
could accrue to the public image of a politician if they were seen as facilitating these 
projects were considerable.  
 
As a result, there tended to be a ‘tit for tat’ exchange, since the minister of Economy, for 
example, could not understand why it was his counterpart at the YPEXODE who benefited 
in terms of his public image and possible electoral advances by programmes which by 
definition were the responsibility of the whole government. Similar instances took place in 
ministries that housed the OPs with responsibility for qualitative programmes such as 
employment, education or competitiveness. Again the relevant minister unilaterally decided 
to publicise the programmes that were financed through the sectoral OP as if they were that 
person's responsibility. As before, the result of these instances was the exacerbation of the 
problems in the relationships between ministers.   
 
The politicisation of the programmes financed through the third CSF could happen in other 
ways as well. First amongst them was that every time there was a change of government in 
the country the newly elected administration attempted to lay the blame for the failures in 
the implementation of the programmes on their outgoing counterparts. For example, the ND 
government attempted to lay the blame for the forfeiting of the €550 million by the second 
CSF, as discussed in chapter 5, on the previous PASOK government. The Ministry of 
Economy and Economics, Prof. Alogoskoufis, issued a press release through the official 
site of the third CSF, 566 openly declaring:  
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since 2004, we have been making constant efforts to combat the problems and 
irregularities that accompanied the execution of the CSF before 2004. 
 
The fact that, as was discussed in chapter 5, the programme had effectively actually started 
at the time, as well as the impact that the revision of the public finances had on the 
forfeiting of the funds, was skilfully omitted by the Minister’s press release.  
 
Most importantly, another way in which the central government attempted to politicise 
what in theory were independently drawn up and managed developmental programmes was 
by constantly interfering in the process of the selection of the personnel employed in the 
MAs. In this context, the description of the different types of interference by the Director 
General567 in the organisation responsible for the undertaking of the relevant examinations 
– MOU – was pertinent. He pointed out that: 
Generally speaking, the relevant minister views the civil service [of their ministry] 
as his ‘‘fief’’’. As soon as he is put in such a position he will attempt to control the 
civil service and that includes the staff of the relevant MA… about the process of 
the selection for the personnel in the MAs I can only describe the situation as 
tragic… we encounter pressures from ministers, deputies, and all sorts of people 
who think they can have some power in the process…there are telephone calls from 
which I try to hide, pressures exercised by ‘‘friends of friends’’…we live under 
constant pressure and it is impossible to convince those people that it is not only 
wrong but also inefficient to try to interfere in the process in such ways… 
 
Certainly, this problem is not only encountered with new employees; as was discussed in 
chapter 3 it is an endemic characteristic of the Greek civil service that every time there is a 
change of government, the newly installed minister changes the personnel of the ministry 
where they are put. As the civil servants in Greece are constitutionally guaranteed life 
employment there is no option for the minister to dismiss the civil servant; hence what 
usually happens is that the bureaucrat who is seen as belonging to the previous government 
is ‘frozen’. Thus, the state continues paying their salaries but they are implicitly ignored or 
sent to a position with no substantial responsibilities. I have provided my personal 
experiences with the MA of the region of Western Macedonia in the introduction where 
before and after the elections of 2004 the organisational chart of the MA was completely 
different. The rumours circulating amongst the civil servants that I spoke to was that this 
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was because they were seen as being very close to the previously governing party of 
PASOK.  
 
Similar practices are followed in every government department where the central state 
appoints its director, hence the regional authorities where the regional MAs belong. 
Certainly, this is the case in the case of the sectoral MAs that belong to government 
ministries. The creation of the MIS was supposed to combat such phenomena by 
introducing competitive exams and constant appraisals of the job descriptions of its 
employees. Nonetheless, as an interviewee put it: 
Unfortunately we encounter the phenomenon that when the government changes the 
new Secretary General of a region simply disposes of those whom he does not like 
and brings in those that he does like. When an employee from a regional MA is 
considered as being very close to the previous governing party they are being sent 
back to the central offices of MOU. However, MOU’s main responsibility is to train 
the employees of the MAs hence this civil servant sits around at the central offices 
of MOU doing nothing.  
 
He also added that this is an endemic phenomenon that sometimes affects very able and 
efficient civil servants whose removal in that way has a direct impact on the progress of the 
OP. Moreover, he pointed out that this was not a party political issue in terms of one of the 
two major parties resorting to such practices more than the other. If anything, his 
experience had showed him that both main parties had been employing such tactics in order 
to control the civil service.     
 
Besides this, as mentioned above, not all the employees of the institutional network created 
in order to provide administrative backing to the third CSF have come through competitive 
exams. Some of them were on secondment from the civil service of the core ministries. The 
salaries in the MAs were by and large better than those of the core civil service; hence 
some employees who already enjoyed the permanence that the Greek civil service 
guaranteed were keen to spend some time in the MAs and earn more money. The process 
through which this could be achieved was completely opaque and it seemed that the only 
way through which it could be achieved was through the exercise of political pressure by 
deputies, ministers, and so on.  
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As a result of these two issues that politicised the process through which the personnel 
employed in the MAs were hired, some interviewees568 identified a negative trend in the 
organisational culture of the MAs. In particular, they expressed a fear that the positive 
aspects of the new MAs were being reversed and the bad aspects of the Greek civil service 
were being transferred to the MAs, rather than the other way around. The creation of the 
MAs was intended to provide sufficient spillovers for the creation of an administrative 
culture that would be immune from the internal difficulties of the Greek bureaucracy 
discussed in chapter 3. As can be seen from the above, however, there was a reverse trend 
through which the core civil service passes on its negative characteristics to the supposedly 
independent MAs.  
 
Finally, the politicisation of the programmes of EURP in Greece happens in another way 
which is also an endemic characteristic of the domestic political economy. This has to do 
with the manipulation of the public budget for electoral purposes with the aim being that 
the governing party can influence the results of national elections in its favour. In 
particular, it has been shown569 that before each election the Greek governments have been 
increasing their spending. This increase may take direct forms –increase of public sector 
employees from the pool of the governing party’s supporters- and/or indirect. The latter has 
to do with significant increases of public works programmes before each election. These 
patterns have also been identified at the sub-national level with prefectures which have 
supported the governing party receiving substantial funds for public works before each 
election.570  
 
This issue has impacted on the implementation of the EURP with some interviewees571 
suggesting that the central government would become very interested in spending the 
money arriving from the structural funds before each election572 or as treating the funds 
arriving though the EURP as ‘party money’573 that can be spent for short term electoral 
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reasons. This is also related with the difficulties in coordinating and programming long 
term policy actions between governmental departments and the short-termism of the Greek 
bureaucracy which were discussed above. As a result, the projects implemented through the 
structural funds end up being politicised and the MAs are losing their independence from 
the central state.   
 
6.4.4 Relationships with European authorities / Europeanisation  
In chapter 5, the two issues of the revision of public finances – and in particular the upward 
revisions of the GDP rates – and the difficulties that arose with the legislation of the ‘Main 
Shareholder’ were discussed. There, it was made clear that these seem to have created 
significant problems in the relationship between the Greek government and the 
Commission. These problems seem to have trickled down to the relationships between the 
relevant authorities of the Commission and the CSF MA.574 They had a direct impact on the 
patterns of the implementation of the EURP in Greece, by creating misunderstandings that 
could have been avoided.  
 
Nonetheless, these two issues were not isolated but seemed to be symptomatic of a certain 
malaise in the relationships between the Greek government – and in particular the CSF MA 
– and the Commission. This was caused by the fact that even though the Commission did 
not participate actively in the process of the implementation of the third CSF, through its 
authority in the design of the programme and also it’s monitoring through the MCs, it 
promoted certain common policies that did not necessarily correspond to domestic 
developmental needs.575 For example, an unofficial tendency, even in the third CSF, which 
became institutionalised in the fourth programming period, was the so-called 
‘Lisbonisation’576 of the EURP. This required all the relevant authorities to indicate to the 
Commission how they intended to promote the objectives of the Strategy that was decided 
at the Lisbon European Council of March 2000. Nonetheless, this was not always feasible, 
since the developmental priorities of Greece, in this case, might differ significantly from 
the general parameters set out by the Lisbon Strategy.  
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Admittedly, some of the core objectives pursued through the Lisbon Strategy, such as the 
amelioration of employment levels, or the increase in Research and Development funding, 
seem similar to the developmental objectives set out in the Greek CSF. However, the 
overall parameters of the Lisbon strategy577 relate to the increase in the competitiveness of 
the member states, and as Allen578 puts it, for the member states that entered the EU in 
2004 and 2007: 
The ‘’Lisbonisation’’ of cohesion policy is likely to prove premature for the new 
members who need basic assistance before they move on to focus on becoming 
competitive. 
 
The spirit of the objection that some of the interviewees expressed about this issue was not 
dissimilar to the point expressed by Allen. In particular, they thought that the improvement 
in institutional capacity should be the focus of the EURP before any other objective 
promoting the competitiveness was pursued.   
 
Going back to the issue of the difficulties that existed in the cooperation between the 
domestic authorities and their Commission counterparts, there seemed to be a tendency on 
the part of the Commission to justify any disagreements it had about specific actions 
proposed by the domestic authorities, on the basis of incompatibility with Community 
legislation.579 As it does not have jurisprudence for direct intervention in the 
implementation of a project at the domestic level, it tends to employ indirect methods of 
‘steering’ the relevant authorities towards patterns they think should be followed. For 
example, during the MC it could express reservations about the compatibility of a decision 
suggested by the MA with legislation on public procurement or state aid. This reservation 
would not be converted into direct action but the intention was to indicate to the domestic 
authorities that ‘they were not happy’580 with a specific issue because they thought that it 
may be in contravention with Community legislation. Thus, they would leave the initiative 
to the domestic authorities who ‘may or may not take the gamble to ignore our 
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suggestion’581 since they know that at the end of the day we always have to give the ‘green 
light.’582  
 
This discrepancy was not always obvious to the CSF MA officials and could sometimes 
cause frictions. As they were more preoccupied with hastening the absorption they would 
see the suggestions that the Commission put forward as holding back a project. Similar 
argumentation was employed by other interviewees about the competition legislation, 
which was discussed in the context of the developments of the ‘Main Shareholder’.  Almost 
all the interviewees that participated in the administrative scheme that managed physical 
infrastructure projects expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the Commission on that 
front. The actions taken by the Commission seemed disproportionate and seemed to imply 
that there was some form of intent by the Greek officials to deceive their Commission 
counterparts, which they all insisted was not the case. The Commission on the other hand 
was disappointed by the initial hard line taken by the Greek government and the insulting 
words that it used in order to describe the Commission employee who was primarily 
responsible for the issue. The whole affair was described as ‘dramatic’583 and ‘tragic’584 by 
two Commission interviewees and the Greek government’s reaction was seen as wholly 
inappropriate. The only justification was seen to be the inexperience of the then newly 
installed government of ND.  
 
To be sure, the above should not be seen as indicative of irrevocable difficulties between 
the institutions of the Commission and the domestic authorities in the context of the EURP 
in Greece. All the interviewees who were asked about this issue expressed their willingness 
to engage in constructive discussions with their Commission counterparts. Besides, the 
employees of the CSF MA and also the MAs of the regional and sectoral OPs have 
extensive experience in the field of the management of these particular programmes. As 
mentioned above, some participated in the scheme before it was institutionalised in 1999, 
either with the predecessors of the managing authorities or the private consultancies. This 
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has equipped them with sufficient knowledge about the requirements of working with the 
Commission and they all expressed their desire to perform the programme in collaboration 
with the Commission during the interviews.  
 
However, this does not imply that there were no problems in these interactions. For 
example, the Commission’s decision to withdraw from the implementation patterns of the 
third CSF and just retain the auditing and monitoring roles did not go down well with 
certain Greek officials of the CSF MA in particular. Especially since this change of 
approach was not followed thoroughly from the Commission, which was more inclined to 
be actively involved in the implementation of the third CSF than what it was initially 
assumed. As an employee of the Greek CSF585 put it: 
Even though the Director General of the DG Regio said in the early stages of the 
third CSF that if the programme failed that would reflect on the Commission as well 
as on Greece…there is no doubt that the new roles which the Commission adopted 
after 2000 significantly changed our relationships. Up until that time the 
Commission was deciding in partnership with us…they should have understood, 
though, that since this changed we understood that we take all the major decisions… 
we are open to any auditing or monitoring by the Commission but we are not open 
to detailed recommendations about how the programmes should be run… at the end 
of the day we are the ones who are accountable, according to Law 1260/1999. 
 
The misunderstanding about the exact roles that the Commission would play in the policy 
cycle of the third CSF was the result of the reinterpretation of the principles of partnership 
and additionality that the Commission promoted in the third CSF and was discussed in 
chapter 5. Although the supranational executive actively wanted to devolve greater 
responsibility to the member states especially in the stage of drawing of the CSF, a 
Commission employee586 admitted that they finally had to be more ‘interventionist’ in the 
Greek case. He justified that with reference to the fact that ‘the Commission was not very 
impressed’ with the first draft of the third Greek CSF, which was not ‘ambitious enough in 
its aims to tackle the structural difficulties of the Greek economy and combat the problems 
of competitiveness.’ Moreover, he pointed out that the Commission was encouraging the 
Greek authorities to adopt policy measures that did not always correspond with established 
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domestic practices. For example, the Commission kept pushing towards the adoption of 
changes in connection with the participation of the private sector in the implementation of 
projects of social infrastructure, which was resisted by the Greek authorities. When asked 
about the extent in which the Commission takes into account national circumstances in 
Greece he replied that they do not want to do so since that would be seen as an excuse. 
However, this insistence of the supranational executive to ‘steer’ the Greek authorities to 
certain directions despite the regulatory changes instituted through the introduction of 
1260/1999 would leave some Greek officials unsure about the policy actions that they 
needed to follow. Particularly, the interviewees in the Greek CSF MA were not always 
certain as to whether what the Commission was asking was binding, a recommendation or 
guidance.587 Hence, this ambivalence about the roles and the responsibilities between the 
Commission and themselves was not helpful. This was corroborated by the Commission 
interviewee who accepted that this situation was ‘a source of some tension between the 
Commission and the Greek CSF MA.’      
 
Moreover, these difficulties of communication between the domestic authorities and the 
Commission seemed to extend to aspects relating with the previously discussed lack of 
coordination of the MAs and the CSF MA. I discussed above the tendency of the CSF MA 
to interfere in the regional OPs’ communication with the Commission. Similar practices 
were taking place in the communication of the sectoral OPs with the Commission, which 
leave the supranational executive unsure as to what is the official position of the Greek 
administration on a specific issue. This is the case because it was not infrequent for a 
sectoral OP to have a view on a policy issue and the CSF MA to have another. Sometimes 
these conflicting views would even be expressed during the meetings of the Commission 
with representatives from the Greek CSF MA and sectoral OPs588 which showed a lack of 
preparation and coordination between the relevant authorities.  
 
Relating with this issue is an anecdote shared by a Commission interviewee about his 
experiences with meeting Greek officials that provide an indication about broader 
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differences of administrative culture between the Greek authorities and the Commission. In 
particular, he recited several meetings with officials of the CSF MA with the Commission 
in which the representatives of the former were discussing issues relating with the progress 
of the third CSF without using any documents or indicators through which to substantiate 
their arguments. As he put it:  
They seemed to be more interested in discussing in very abstract terms whereas the 
Commission only works with concrete information.   
 
The previous four subsections identified specific patterns of interaction amongst the 
separate institutions participating in the management of the third CSF, which seem to have 
hindered the implementation of the programme in a developmental manner. The next 
section attempts to link these two issues – the institutional difficulties and their implications 
in terms of implementation – more explicitly by incorporating them in the conceptual 
framework that I employ in the thesis. 
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Figure 6.1. Community Support Framework III Operation Agencies 
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6.5. The interaction between the EURP and the internal and interactive state capacities  
In this section I attempt to elucidate the consequences which the introduction of the 
principles governing the operation of the EURP and the management tools implicit in those 
had for the internal and interactive capacities of the Greek state. In chapter 2, I introduced 
the elements of the conceptual framework that I employ in the thesis. In particular, I 
discussed the distinction that Evans589 makes between the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ states. He 
points towards the interaction between the internal and the interactive capacities of the 
states in order to classify their developmental interventions in these categories. The internal 
capacities of the state relate mainly to its corporate coherence, its ability to make its 
activities as autonomous as possible from the broader political workings of the country in 
which it operates the extent of the support that it enjoys from the judiciary and the 
coordinative abilities of the individual departmental agencies.  
 
As was made clear from the above sections, the Greek state had never developed any 
coherent approach in the field of regional development policies before the introduction of 
the EURP. The meagre attempts to tackle the ‘regional problem’ were not accompanied by 
any institutional changes and the central state played the predominant role in the process of 
managing the relevant programmes. After the introduction of the first IMPs and with the 
initiation of the first two CSFs the central authority, in the form of the regional policy 
department of the Ministry of Economy, remained the main actor participating in every 
stage of the programmes. Moreover, despite the introduction of the principles of 
programming and concentration, the authorities that managed the programmes did not 
succeed in adhering to the initially agreed developmental priorities and objectives. The 
regional and sectoral OPs were constantly reorganised in accordance with the progress of 
the absorption rates of each programme. Hence, the initially agreed developmental 
objectives were not followed during the implementation stage. Therefore, the internal 
coordinating capacities of the Greek state changed very little as a result of the IMPs and the 
first two CSFs and the influence of the EURP was limited.  
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The evidence presented in section 6.4 corroborates the view that the situation remained 
more or less unchanged with the third CSF. Certainly, the introduction of a network of 
administrative authorities that would participate in the management of the programme 
significantly altered the policy orientation of the Greek state. It was practically the first 
time in the history of the country that a developmental programme was accompanied by 
such decentralised institutional structures, each of them assigned to manage and monitor 
specific policy areas – both in sectoral and geographical terms. The MAs of the sectoral and 
regional OPs undoubtedly represented significant steps towards an improvement in the 
coordinating capacities of the country’s administrative structures. Nevertheless, the 
endemic patterns of inter-institutional rivalries and lack of cooperation prevailed.  
 
In particular, the predominance of the central authority in the form of the CSF MA, which 
replaced the regional policy department of the Ministry of Economy, was established 
during the implementation stage of the third CSF. The sectoral OPs were not allowed much 
space for autonomous action and would see funds that were initially appropriated to them 
diverted to regional OPs. Especially the OPs that aimed to improve the qualitative elements 
of the Greek economy seem to have been allowed little scope to act autonomously. Most 
importantly, the rivalries between the CSF MA and the Ministry of Public Works 
significantly impeded the progress of the third CSF. Furthermore, the auditing methods 
introduced in the third CSF have hardly improved the capacities of the Greek 
administrative system, with the ‘n+2’ rule being more or less ignored for the period of the 
third CSF. Furthermore, the requirements of evaluation of the regional and sectoral OPs 
was hardly justified with the produced evaluations being of very low quality, produced by 
bodies with limited independence from the MAs and with insignificant perceived utility.590   
 
Finally, the politicisation of the programmes became an endemic characteristic of the 
programme, with the ministries where the MAs were located constantly interfering in their 
operation. Thus, the independence of the developmental institutional authorities from the 
wider political workings of the country was not achieved. This interference was primarily 
manifested in the process of recruitment of personnel for the sectoral MAs. The ministers 
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and the Director Generals of the regional authorities influenced the process of the transfer 
of employees from the central ministries to the sectoral and the regional MAs even though 
according to the regulations of the EURP the latter were independent. Moreover, after each 
election, the ‘freezing’ of civil servants who were seen as very close to the previously 
governing political party affected even core MOU employees.  
 
Similar results for the Greek case can be drawn in relation with the limited impact that the 
EURP had in terms of improving the domestic administrative and absorption capacities. As 
Mousouroulis591 points out when evaluating the impact of the introduction of the MIS in 
the third CSF: 
The new [administrative] system was a good first attempt to introduce at the 
domestic level some strict rules relating with the implementation of the structural 
funds but their overall impact in terms of improving the productivity of public 
administration was not satisfactory. In most cases the operational rules were thought 
as an additional and unwanted intrusion in the activities of the civil service and left 
very little lasting impact.   
 
Certainly, this was related with the processes followed when the MIS were designed in the 
mid 1990s. As an interviewee592 who had inside knowledge of the processes followed at the 
time pointed out, because of the tight deadlines in which the available funds had to be 
absorbed, the Commission officials that were responsible to work with Greece chose to 
effectively bypass the country’s public administration. As he put it: 
At the time, we thought that there was simply not enough time to reorganise the 
whole civil service...so we just worked from scratch, creating new organisations, 
attracting personnel from the private sector which was more accustomed to working 
with these requirements...whoever from the core civil service wanted to participate 
in that effort was welcome but they would have to be retrained, reappraised etc, 
whoever wished to remain in their position and not collaborate we would simply 
move on and not pay much attention. There was no time to waste... this practice 
worked in the short run but in terms of leaving a legacy to the wider civil service I 
don’t think it did.  
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The limited impact of the policy in that respect is corroborated by the Commission 
evaluation of the effects that the introduction of the Management and Implementation 
Systems (MIS) had for the member states.593 In particular, Greece is seen as a case of 
resistance in the changes intended through the introduction of the MIS. This resistance is 
mostly relevant when it comes to the application of the principle of partnership where the 
domestic traditions of limited interaction between state and socioeconomic actors is the 
main characteristic that explain the limited changes achieved. However, the influence of the 
domestic traditions in cancelling out any significant impact by the MIS is not only 
identified in relation with the principle of partnership. The principle of programming has 
been enforced in a patchy manner and there was no effort to incorporate the logic that 
accrues from this principle to the wider domestic institutional system. Thus, apart from the 
programming introduced through the EURP regulations there was no national domestic 
system of strategic planning processes for domestic resources. Overall, as the study puts it: 
There are persistent deficiencies in Greece in the management and implementation 
of policy, as indicated by: the late implementation of IT tools for financial 
management under the national programme (due not least to the lack of familiarity 
of staff with IT); an apparently widespread scepticism among public administrators 
on the utility of some cohesion policy practices (especially evaluation); and a 
perception of the implementation support bodies (particularly MOU) as being 
‘foreign’ to the mainstream public administration. Furthermore, fieldwork evidence 
suggests that the complexity of the 2000-2006 CSF procedures, combined with the 
administrative costs and the inherent weaknesses of some Final Beneficiaries have 
created a ‘two speed’ public administration. Notwithstanding clear institutional 
influences, the degree of cultural (and operational) spillovers of the lessons learnt 
with the implementation of cohesion policy onto management and implementation 
of domestic policy has therefore been limited.     
 
This is not to say that the impact of the EURP in the Greek domestic political and 
administrative system has been negligible. Indeed, the aforementioned study by the 
Commission identifies significant positive effects driven by the introduction of the MIS. 
For example, the introduction of MOU has helped attract personnel from the private sector 
that contributed to the generation of new skills. As an interviewee put it: 
Establishing an organisation like MOU but also all the MIS would have been 
unthinkable and a fantasy scenario for the country had it not been for the EURP and 
the pressure exerted by the Commission in that direction. Even in the early 1990’s, 
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when the final decisions for the precise form that the MIS would take, people 
familiar with the Greek reality were adamant that the new administrative schemes 
would not have been accepted by the country...however, MOU was established and 
its employees developed a level of technocratic capacity which has never existed in 
the country...I am confident that a distinct administrative culture established through 
the constant training, evaluation and appraisal of all its employees was created as a 
result.  
 
Also, in terms of the operational impact it was more than substantial for the case of the 
major projects that were financed through the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF). As was shown in chapter 5 these have been completed more or less successfully 
and significantly enhanced the country’s stock of physical infrastructure. In this particular 
policy area ‘there has been significant transfer of know-how that will definitely be used in 
the future construction of projects of physical infrastructure, an issue that has always been a 
cause of difficulties for Greece’.594 Also, the introduction and –partial at least- application 
of the principle of multi-annual programming was important given that Greece has always 
designed short term budgets without any consideration about future outcomes.595   
 
However, there was less of a discernible operational effect in other areas of intervention as 
well as in the patterns of institutional interaction. Thus, it could be said that overall, the 
changes that accrued from the introduction of the MIS had mainly to do with the 
establishment of new institutional bodies rather than the operational procedures followed 
through their operation; hence the prospects for them being permanent are far from 
significant. As the study concludes: 
The slow, partial and perhaps non-lasting nature of some of the changes found in 
Greece [can be explained because] the objectives of an efficiency-driven agenda of 
a technocratic elite do not coincide with the desires of a majority of civil servants 
(and even civil society) more inclined to maintain the status quo.  
 
Similarly to the evaluation report about the introduction of the MIS, the synthesis 
evaluation report prepared by the Commission, also expressed reservations as to how 
lasting the effects of the EURP can be in the domestic administrative and political systems. 
In this context it suggests  
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a fundamental change in the attitudes towards evidence based policy making which 
was unsympathetic throughout the period 2000-2006 and an acceptance of its 
critical importance.   
 
Having discussed the impact of the introduction of the institutional network that managed 
the EURP on the internal administrative and absorption capacities of the Greek state, I now 
turn to its impact on the state’s interactive capacities. According to the conceptual 
framework that I developed in chapter 2, the interactive capacities relate to the existence of 
successful and mutually reinforcing ties between governmental officials, representatives of 
the private sector, and civil society. The concept of ‘Governed Interdependence’ proposed 
by Weiss596 is an appropriate one in order to capture the dynamics of these interactions. In 
addition, Evans597 offers the concept of ‘state-society synergies’ in order to describe similar 
processes. He distinguishes between complementarity and embeddedness as the two 
constitutive forces in the creation and sustaining of such interactions. Complementarity 
entails clearly defined roles for the bureaucratic and the non-governmental actors through 
which the developmental programmes are implemented. Embeddedness describes the 
interactions that develop between the two spheres, with trust and the existence of adequate 
levels of social capital being the mediating factors that determine the quality of these 
interactions. The most important aspect of these conceptual discussions is that at no point 
are the state actions theorised in isolation from the external governmental actions. The 
internal and the interactive capacities are mutually reinforcing and complementary.  
 
The introduction of the four principles governing the operation of the EURP, as well as the 
management tools that accompany them, were intended to improve these capacities for the 
member states and hence for the case of Greece. Moreover, the reorganisation of the 
political geography of the country – implemented through its domestic reforms – also 
aimed at decentralising the heavily centralised state apparatus of the country. Nonetheless, 
the evidence in chapter 6 suggests that the predominance of the Ministry of Economy –this 
time in relation to the sub-national authorities – was not challenged significantly during the 
IMPs and the first two CSFs. Especially after the territorial reforms that took place after the 
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mid 1990s, the scope for the institutionalisation of increased participation by the regional 
and local authorities increased significantly. This would promote the objectives -
particularly of the principle of partnership- which aims at improving the efficiency of the 
programmes by simultaneously opening up avenues for democratic participation of sub-
national stakeholders. This process would create ‘state-society synergies’ through which 
the bureaucratic authorities and representatives of socioeconomic interests would act in 
complementarity in order to achieve the developmental goals set out in the programmes. 
Nonetheless, this has hardly been the casewith the partnership between the central 
authorities and the Commission being the most significant outcome in that respect. 
Characteristically, a Commission employee confirmed that in the case of Greece the 
principle of partnership was only adopted by the Greek authorities because it ‘was asked to 
do so’ by the Commission and it did not produce any significant changes in the quality of 
bottom up participation.  
 
The situation changed very little during the third CSF despite the consolidation of the 
operation of the regional MAs and MCs that provided specific channels for the 
improvement of the capacities of the regional authorities. The MCs were captured by 
clientelistic interchanges, and the promotion of short term vested interests replaced any 
space for democratic participation. The low levels of social capital seem to have cancelled 
the effects that were intended by the introduction of the principle of partnership. The 
method of assigning the projects to the final beneficiaries was often opaque and the patterns 
of corruption and patronage seem to have prevailed in the process. 
 
Furthermore, the operation of the regional MAs was not accompanied by any transfer of 
fiscal competences, whilst the administrative personnel arrived in the MAs from other sub-
national authorities following opaque practices. As in the case of the processes followed in 
the sectoral MAs, the personnel of the regional MAs was comprised of  employees who 
came though competitive exams organised by MOU as well as employees of local 
authorities and prefectures who were transferred to the regional MAs. The methods that 
were followed in order to complete the latter process seem to have been at least partially 
based on clientelism and patronage. Therefore, the Europeanising influences exerted by the 
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incorporation of the principle of partnership into the Greek political and administrative 
system did not significantly alter the patterns of the reduced participation by sub-national 
actors.  
 
It is worth pointing out that the evidence presented in subsection 6.4.1  suggests that top-
down as well as bottom-up factors seem to have contributed to this situation. This is to say, 
the centralised state did not allow for greater participation by sub-national actors. 
Simultaneously though, the regional and local actors did not take advantage of the 
opportunities presented to them by the incorporation of the principle of partnership. If 
anything, the traditional patterns of state-society interaction based on clientelism and 
patronage and also linkages based on party politics have hindered the creation of 
autonomous interests at the sub-national levels. Thus, the sub-national authorities were not 
able to engage on equal terms with the centralised Greek state and partnership remained 
largely confined to a consultative role.598   
 
It can be said that the principle of partnership was not intended to influence the domestic 
administrative and political system in isolation from the other principles and management 
tools. It was meant to operate in a vertical manner and to affect the execution of the 
programmes at both sectoral and regional levels. However, a similar picture emerges in the 
assessment of the impact that the rest of the principles had on the prospects for the creation 
of networks of ‘Governed Interdependence’ and ‘state-society synergies’ in the Greek case. 
Specifically, the capacity of the regional MAs to coordinate their actions with each other 
and also the socioeconomic actors that would become final beneficiaries was constrained 
by the limited autonomy that they enjoyed throughout the IMPs and the first two CSFs as a 
result of the lack of constitutional decentralisation. Even after the process of 
decentralisation of the 1990s, however, the situation did not alter significantly.  
 
Thus, in the third CSF the application of the management tool of project selection that 
would be conducted in accordance with the principles of programming, concentration and 
partnership was hardly justified. As was seen in chapter 5, the process of identifying the 
                                                 
598
 EPRC, 2009.  
  
 
226 
final beneficiaries, especially at the regional level, became one of the main reasons behind 
the significant delays that the programme faced. Similarly, the tools of financial control and 
monitoring seem to have been applied in a patchy manner, since the sub-national authorities 
and especially the local authorities did not have the administrative capability to perform 
their roles.  
 
Overall, the established patterns of limited scope for interaction between the Greek state 
and the surrounding socioeconomic environment changed very little as a result of the 
instigation of the third CSF. Although the funds that became available were in the end 
absorbed, the institutional impact planned by the introduction of the principles and the 
management tools was limited. The establishment of the regional and sectoral MAs 
presented significant opportunities to the domestic socioeconomic actors for the creation of 
synergistic networks of complementarity and embeddedness. Nonetheless, neither the 
established low levels of institutional capacity nor the limited scope for the development of 
horizontal networks in the civil society were altered significantly.   
 
In terms of the conceptual description regarding the Europeanisation of the domestic 
institutional structures in the field of the EURP, in accordance to the possible responses 
proposed by Leonardi,599 the response has been one of adaptation. At the structural level, 
the relevant authorities seem to have adapted the requirements that emanated from the 
EURP in a selective and formalistic manner. The new rules were adapted in such a way as 
to convince the Commission that there was an effort to conform to the regulatory 
framework. Most importantly, the objective of absorbing the funding and avoiding the 
forfeiture of any of it took precedence over any other organisational consideration. Hence, 
issues of planning and coordination were selectively incorporated into the regional and 
sectoral OPs, whilst any cultural changes in administrative terms have been minimal.  
 
However, that does not mean that the creation of the decentralised systems of governance 
in the field of regional development policy cannot become the catalyst for the continuation 
of further reforms that would strengthen the institutional capacity and improve the levels of 
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participation of the administrative actors. These issues are discussed in greater length in the 
concluding chapter.  
 
6.6. Conclusion  
Chapter 6 attempted to provide further empirical evidence in order to answer the research 
question that I pose in the thesis. Specifically, it focused on the institutional issues that 
affected the implementation of the EURP in Greece. The discussion was twofold with the 
institutional issues that emanated directly from the EURP being addressed in conjunction 
with those that took place as a result of domestic considerations. Thus, the second section 
started with an overview of the institutions that existed in the country in order to support 
the meagre attempts for regional development policy before the initiation of the EURP. It 
then discussed the institutional changes that occurred in this policy field immediately after 
the introduction of the IMPs in 1986. The introduction of the regions in 1986 was basically 
the only discernible effect that the instigation of the policy had in institutional terms. The 
third section addressed the issues of the institutional support that was available for the 
implementation of the EURP in the 1990s. A series of reforms that would promote 
decentralisation of the competences of the sub-national authorities were pursued with 
greater vigour at the time. The section after that focused on the institutional changes that 
occurred during the third CSF. The reform of the Structural Funds in 1999 entailed the 
creation of a separate administrative network that would manage and monitor the 
implementation of the third CSF.  
 
This section was further divided into four subsections, with each one attempting to capture 
the patterns of the interactions between the constitutive elements of this administrative 
network and the domestic institutional authorities. Then, the section that followed 
attempted to link the changes discussed in the previous parts with the conceptual 
framework that I elaborated in chapter 2 and opperationalised for the case of Greece in 
chapter 3. The main conclusion drawn from this section is that the endemic patterns of 
state-society interaction discussed in chapter 3 changed very little with the introduction of 
the EURP. Although there has been undoubted progress in terms of policy orientation, the 
administrative network created as part of the third CSF, as well as the domestic attempts at 
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decentralisation and improvement of the participation of the sub-national authorities, 
became embedded in previously existing organisational structures. The next chapter 
concludes the thesis by discussing the main themes that emerged throughout the thesis and 
their policy implications, as well as prospects for future research along this line of enquiry.    
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Chapter 7. Conclusion  
 
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter provides the conclusion to the thesis by summarising the main issues that were 
addressed in the previous chapters and by discussing the policy implications of the results 
that I have presented. Moreover, it points towards the direction of future research in the 
area of the EURP that could complement the results of the thesis and the areas in which the 
thesis contributes to addressing the limitations of this literature. In particular, in the next 
section I provide a synopsis of the research as well as the main results that were presented 
in the chapters. In the penultimate section I address the limitations of the literature that 
examine the patterns of implementation of the EURP in the recipient countries and of the 
studies that discuss the configurations of the Greek political economy. Also, I discuss the 
ways in which the research presented in the thesis addresses these limitations and 
contributes to the fields of comparative political economy and EU studies. The final section 
examines the policy implications that the theoretical and empirical materials presented in 
the thesis entail.  
 
7.2. Overview of the Research  
The main research aim of the thesis was the elucidation of the reasons behind the 
ineffective deployment of the EURP in Greece. In order to provide an answer I developed a 
conceptual framework based on the theories of state and administrative capacities on the 
one hand and the theories of Europeanisation and implementation on the other. I postulated 
the argument that the institutional capacities of the Greek state – both internal and 
interactive – did not allow the implementation of the programmes financed through the 
EURP to be influenced by the tangible effects of Europeanisation. 
 
In particular, I put forward the argument that the adoption of the four principles governing 
the operation of the structural funds, and also the management tools implicit in those, 
provided the empirical filters through which the pressures of Europeanisation came into the 
country. These influences involved all three spheres of socioeconomic activity: the public 
sector, through the creation of the Managing Authorities (MAs) and the Intermediate 
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Bodies (IBs); the private sector, through the participation of the final beneficiaries and the 
IBs; and the third sector, through the participation of actors representing civil society 
organisations in the Monitoring Committees (MCs). Despite the important opportunities 
offered by the introduction of the principles, the evidence that I presented in chapters 5 and 
6 confirmed the initial hypothesis that their administrative and political effects were 
limited.  
 
Specifically, after discussing the elements of the conceptual framework in chapter 2, I 
discussed in chapter 3 the characteristics of the Greek political economy related to the state-
society interactions. In that chapter I discussed the specific elements that contributed to the 
weakness of the internal and the interactive capacities of the Greek state. These do not seem 
to have altered significantly despite the participation in the EU and the Europeanisation of 
the country’s polity that became evident during that period. Chapter 4 put forward the 
concept of the ‘added value’ of the EURP in order to capture the specific elements that the 
policy offers apart from its impact on macroeconomic terms. After a brief discussion of the 
theoretical issues as well as the major turning points of the policy, the chapter focused on 
the principles that govern the operation of the EURP. These provide the tangible effects of 
Europeanisation for the recipient countries and aim at stimulating local and regional 
economies through institutional and administrative changes. The penultimate section of 
chapter 4 made a first attempt to link the conceptual framework that I presented in chapter 2 
with the ‘added value’ that the EURP offers.   
 
Chapter 5 attempted to provide empirical substantiation for the hypothesis that I presented 
in the introduction regarding the implementation difficulties that the EURP has faced in 
Greece. It stated that these difficulties were clearly apparent even at the time of the 
introduction of the IMPs in 1986. Although the rates of absorption at the end of each 
programme have been satisfactory, the application of the principles was hardly justified. 
Especially after the introduction of the first CSF, the Commission attached a series of 
requirements that would accompany the implementation of the programmes. Nevertheless, 
the Greek authorities seem to have ignored these requirements, with constant modifications 
of the initially agreed plans becoming an integral part of the programmes. The initially 
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allocated funds were constantly reorganised amongst the regional and sectoral OPs with the 
sole objective of achieving better rates of absorption.  
 
The problems of the absorbing capacity of the regional OPs in particular were evident in 
the first CSF and led to funds being redirected to the sectoral OPs. This has left the regional 
authorities ill equipped to face the challenges of subsequent programming periods. 
Furthermore, the first CSF was almost exclusively employed as a national developmental 
policy in obvious contravention of the principles of partnership and programming. In terms 
of the physical output produced, the evidence that I provided in chapter 5 suggested that 
many of the physical infrastructure projects that had taken the lion’s share of the 
programmes were left incomplete. Some of them continued through ‘bridge projects’ in the 
second CSF with little synergy between the developmental priorities of the programming 
periods being achieved.   
 
Similar problems with the implementation of the programmes were identified in the second 
CSF. It is true that in terms of the physical outputs produced, certain large scale physical 
infrastructure projects were initiated in that period. These were, though, mainly built in the 
capital Athens, which did little to alter the previously established patterns of assigning more 
importance to the national section of the CSF at the expense of the regional part. These 
forces were also facilitated by the undertaking of the Olympic Games as well as by the 
austerity measures that were required to achieve the convergence criteria. The principle of 
additionality could not be enforced for the regional OPs since identifying proper final 
beneficiaries was particularly difficult. Thus, the sectoral OPs enjoyed significantly 
improved appropriations compared to the initially agreed distribution of the funds.  
 
Chapter 6 discussed the issues of the impact that the EURP had in institutional terms and 
reached the conclusion that as far as the first three programming periods were concerned, 
the implementation patterns discussed above significantly restrained the capacity of the 
regional authorities to participate effectively in the programmes. There were limited 
changes in the internal capacities of the relevant administrative authorities whilst they also 
faced considerable difficulties when it came to their attempts to embed themselves within 
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the surrounding civil societies. The institutional response at the sub-national level has been 
one of multiplication, with the regional and local authorities retaining the endemic 
characteristics of patronage and clientelism in the management of the projects. A 
combination of top-down as well as bottom-up processes resulted in the limited 
effectiveness of the programmes in administrative and political terms. The regional policy 
department of the Ministry of Economy retained its strong role in the process, involving 
itself in almost every stage of the programmes.  
 
In the second CSF, certain important institutional changes took place which seem to have 
slightly improved the internal and the interactive capacities of the administrative network 
that participated in the implementation of the programme. Apart from the exogenous 
pressures emanating through the ‘added value’ of the EURP, there were also some 
important institutional reforms initiated at the domestic level aimed at decentralising 
competences at the prefectural and local levels. However, the reforms undertaken were 
limited and there was concern expressed by interviewees who had participated in the 
management of the second CSF as to how few of the requirements set out by the four 
principles were put into practice. For example, the outsourcing to private consultancies of 
work that was supposed to be completed by the civil service was used as a method of 
countenancing these problems of institutional capacity.  
 
Both the problems of implementation that characterised the first three programming periods 
and the institutional issues that affected the execution of the programmes provided the 
legacy on which the third CSF built. After three programming periods, both the domestic 
and the Commission officials have been better prepared to face the challenges that the 
introduction of the programme entailed. In relation to the patterns of the implementation the 
empirical evidence suggested that the picture did not change significantly. Projects from 
both the Cohesion and the Structural Funds faced significant delays until 2004 whilst 
projects from the second CSF had yet to be completed. Again, the regional OPs faced the 
most considerable difficulties and had significant resources redirected to their sectoral 
counterparts as a result. A series of reasons for the delays were identified, the clientelistic 
interchanges based on patronage being one of them. These were identified at both the 
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national and the regional levels where both political officials and stakeholders attempted to 
influence the project selection. The multiplicity provided by the national legislation that 
governed developmental plans, the difficulty of the judiciary system in intervening in cases 
of legal disputes and the lack of information about the existence of the funds were the other 
reasons.  
 
The introduction of stricter rules concerning the financial management of the projects was 
intended to assist in overcoming these problems. The ‘n+2’ rule in particular aimed at 
hastening the rates of absorption by limiting the time frame between the initiation of a 
project and the provision of the Commission’s funding. However, the evidence presented in 
chapter 5 suggested that they probably had an adverse effect, since they interacted with a 
series of political issues of national significance that did not contribute to any improvement 
in the implementation of the programmes. The deployment of constructive logistics, the 
revision of the public finances and the attempted introduction of the ‘Main Shareholder’ 
legislation seem to have made a negative contribution towards the implementation of the 
third CSF. These issues seem to have caused a general unease in the Commission about the 
administrative methods followed in the country, and there is little doubt that the impact of 
these issues was felt by the authorities involved in the regional and sectoral OPs.  
 
With regard to the institutional impact of the introduction of the third CSF, the evidence 
provided in chapter 6 distinguished between two forces that provided the stimuli for 
institutional change. Firstly, there were the earlier mentioned domestic reforms that 
changed the territorial distribution of power which provided for significant decentralisation 
of competences and improvements in the inclusion of the civil society. Secondly, there was 
the consolidation of the functions of the institutional network that was set up directly as a 
result of the EURP providing the exogenous pressures that would influence the 
administrative capacity of the country. Both these forces aimed at creating better ‘state-
society synergies’ that would improve the impact of the partnership principle. Moreover, 
they would improve the coordinating capacities of the implementing authorities, thus 
improving the impact of the principles of programming, concentration and additionality. As 
a result, the combination of top-down and bottom-up elements that resulted in the 
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predominance of the regional policy department of the Ministry of Economy would be 
challenged.  
 
The evidence that I presented in the penultimate section of chapter 6 suggested that the 
changes instigated did indeed improve the institutional capacities of the implementing 
bodies in terms of policy orientation and administrative planning. For example, it is highly 
unlikely that the Greek state would have ever directed resources to policy issues that are 
covered by the thematic and sectoral priorities of the regional and sectoral OPs had it not 
been compelled to do so through the EURP. For instance, the fact that policy issues such as 
gender equality, environmental infrastructure, urban development or even the structural 
determinants of the domestic economy have received attention and separate policies were 
introduced in order to address them is a direct result of the EURP.600 Similarly, given the 
history of strong centralisation that has characterised the Greek political geography, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the central state would have accepted any transfer of powers 
to the sub-national levels had it not been for the EURP. Finally, as was made clear in 
chapters 3 and 6 the difficulties in connection with the co-ordination, planning and 
programming capabilities of the Greek governmental departments is hardly characteristic of 
the period under examination. The state has never been able to develop the institutional 
preconditions needed in order to guide the domestic socioeconomic environment in a 
programme of transformation. Thus, the establishment of mechanisms that explicitly 
introduced these policy operations through the EURP is undoubtedly very important.  
 
However, when it comes to the stage of the implementation of the programmes, the 
previously established patterns seem to have changed very little. A series of issues 
identified through the fieldwork contributed to that, with the continued predominance of the 
Ministry of Economy this time in the form of the CSF MA being the first such issue. None 
of the interviewees doubted the predominance of the CSF MA and most confirmed that its 
role extended far beyond its role as the coordinating institution. Interestingly however, even 
employees of the regional OP suggested that if this had not been the case, the third CSF 
would have faced further difficulties. Similar issues were identified in the relationship 
                                                 
600
 CEC, 2010.  
  
 
235 
between the CSF MA and the organisations that were responsible for the management of 
the sectoral OPs. The latter however were less likely to accept the predominance of the CSF 
MA, and antagonisms and a lack of coordination – which were already apparent in the 
previous periods – ensued.  
 
As a result of these factors, the introduction of the EURP does not seem to have altered the 
previously established patterns of state-society interaction. The internal and coordinative 
capacities of the Greek state did not change significantly and the Europeanising influences 
exerted through the incorporation of the principles that governed the operation of the EURP 
produced limited outcomes. In addition, the capacity of the state to embed its activities in 
the surrounding socioeconomic environment as well as the ability of actors representing 
civil society to participate in the programmes on an equal basis remained limited. 
Therefore, the influence of the EURP in the domestic political and administrative systems 
was limited. The relevant authorities incorporated the rules stipulated by the principles and 
the management tools in a selective and formalistic manner. There was limited change in 
the culture of the civil service in Greece, with the individuals applying the rules in such a 
way as to convince the monitoring authorities that they were fully complying with them.  
 
This is not to say of course that such changes will not be forthcoming in future 
programming periods, should the EURP continue to finance coordinated programmes of 
regional economic development in Greece. The ‘policy environment’ that was created in 
the form of the administrative network that supports the implementation of the EURP is an 
undoubted innovation. It created a system that influences all spheres of socioeconomic 
activity and can be employed in the future as a basis for the reversal of the problems that I 
identified in the thesis. The question is to what extent this administrative network will 
retain the autonomy that, according to the EURP regulations, it should enjoy, or whether 
the administrative practices of the wider civil service will become apparent in this context. 
In that respect, the explosion of the fiscal situation in the country in 2009-10 and the 
requirement to reduce the civil service as a condition for the receipt of the low interest rates 
loan may result to the destruction of this administrative network -the MIS- altogether. In 
particular, in its admittedly understandable zeal to reduce the remunerations of the civil 
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service so as to reduce the public debts, the core executive apparently think that the MIS 
should be seen as quangos that need to be scrapped.601 Hence, the sectoral MAs would be 
incorporated to the core ministries and the regional MAs to the regional authorities that 
were created in 2010. Thus, the spillovers that the MIS could have provided to the wider 
institutional practices of the country are inadvertently linked to domestic political 
developments. Therefore, it becomes obvious that in order for the participation in the EU to 
exert more influence, it needs to be accompanied by domestic reforms that will improve the 
administrative and political systems.  
 
For example, the domestic reforms that altered the Greek political geography have created 
the preconditions for further changes that need to be undertaken in this field. There is little 
doubt that despite the problems that these reforms have encountered, they have improved 
the patterns of state-society interaction. It is important however to learn from past mistakes 
and try to diminish their impact in the future. For example, the number of the LGAs is big 
even after the amalgamation that the Kapodistrias plan introduced hence they need to be 
reduced. Finally, the number of the regional authorities needs to be reduced in order to 
improve the coordinating capacities between them. These changes however need to be 
accompanied by reforms that will substantively decentralise administrative and -most 
importantly- fiscal competences.  
 
7.3. Limitations of and contributions to the existing literature. Avenues for future research 
As was stated in the introduction, the thesis aims to contribute and advance the limitations 
of two branches of literature. Firstly, it aims at addressing the limitations of the literature 
that examines the patterns of the implementation of the EURP in the recipient countries. It 
does so by contributing to the elaboration of a conceptual framework that is sensitive to the 
impact that domestic mediating factors play in determining the outcomes of the policy. 
Secondly, it attempts to address the limitations of the research that examines the 
configurations of the Greek political economy. This was achieved through the elaboration 
of a theoretical framework that stressed aspects of embedded characteristics of social and 
political action that determine the outcomes of state-society interactions. What both these 
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research contributions share of course is an interest in the domestic levels of the member 
states as primary determining factors of the influences exerted by the external forces of 
Europeanisation. Thus, they are interested in a research orientation that is comparative in 
nature, takes national histories and cultures seriously and avoids generalisations about the 
impact of the forces of globalisation and/or internationalisation in the EU countries.  
 
To elaborate on the first issue, the thesis identified a need for the study of the impact of the 
EURP in the recipient countries to complement their results with the study of the 
institutional impact that the policy produces. Many studies have attempted to discuss the 
impact of the EURP in the recipient countries or the EU as a whole. The results of these 
studies identified the impact that the policy has produced in terms of growth, job creation, 
increases in productivity etc. These results either support or dismiss the importance of 
EURP depending on the initial assumptions of the researchers. However, this research 
needs to be enhanced with the study of the influences exerted domestically by the 
regulatory framework that accompanies the policy either in its’ the general form of the 
‘added value’ or specifically of the Management and Implementation Systems (MIS).  
 
To be sure, this research orientation has gained increased attention in the recent years either 
within the literature on Europeanisation and multi-level governance or the studies that 
examine administrative/ absorption and institutional capacities in particular. However, as 
far as the former are concerned they tend to focus exclusively on political aspects of 
analysis602 whilst the latter tend to attempt to isolate the impact of the EURP on 
administrative capacity. The conceptual framework and the empirical results presented in 
the thesis could add to these insights by focusing on wider aspects of state-society 
interaction such as clientelism, patronage and corruption in determining the institutional 
impact of the policy. Thus, although the political characteristics of the interaction between 
the domestic political systems and the regulatory framework that emanates from the EURP 
gain significant importance in the thesis, wider mediating aspects of the relationship 
between government and the surrounding socioeconomic environment also play an 
important explanatory role. For example, there is little doubt that clientelism and patronage, 
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as they have developed historically as ways of incorporating social actors have had 
significant impact on the final configurations of the MIS in Greece. Yet, these 
characteristics are almost explicitly dismissed by one of the more authoritative studies 
about administrative capacity that has emerged in recent years.603 Therefore, the aim of the 
thesis is to complement the results of these studies by redirecting attention in the study of 
embedded elements of interaction between state and the surrounding socioeconomic 
environments. Certainly, this conceptual framework can be deployed in the study of the 
impact of the EURP in the countries that have started receiving cohesion funding after the 
last two waves of EU enlargement. Despite some similar characteristics in the political, 
socioeconomic and administrative spheres, these countries have disparate historical 
experiences. The study of their impact in the institutional outcomes produced through the 
EURP is more pertinent than ever; hence comparative in depth research is important.   
 
Moving to the second part of the contribution to the literature that is aimed through the 
thesis, the aim is to advance the theoretical and accompanying empirical study of the Greek 
political economy through the concurrent examination of the influences exerted between 
the spheres of governmental activity and civil society. When confronting the problems that 
the Greek polity faces,604 academic commentators tend to conclude that either cultural 
change is needed or that the Greek state needs to be modernised. In the first case, 
improving an atrophied and weak civil society is proposed as the only solution for the 
improvement of the prospects of the country.605 Through that process the Greeks will 
appreciate the merits of actions that are free from the restraints of a patronising state and 
will act autonomously in order to achieve their objectives. In the second case, the 
suggestion is that the Greek state is inefficient and in urgent need of reform and the 
introduction of public sector reforms is the sole way in which the country can improve its 
competitiveness.606 Both these approaches are valid and the thesis concurs with much of 
their theorising and empirical results. However, what both of these approaches fail to 
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identify is that the two spheres are interdependent and any change in one is likely to be met 
with resistance from the other.   
 
Therefore, there is a need to appreciate the merits of conceptualising academic literature 
and also to inform public policy debates with the notion that any reforms need to take into 
account the separate concepts of state and society as well as their co-dependency. The 
extent of the embeddedness of the state in the surrounding socioeconomic environment is 
partially but not wholly dependent on the levels of social trust that exist in the country. 
Higher levels of civil society would have assisted in the formation of a better informed, 
more autonomous and self-organised society in Greece. This would have improved the 
competitiveness of the economy and would have assisted in the creation of higher rates of 
socioeconomic growth. However, such characteristics that may counteract the influences 
exerted by traditional forms of interest intermediation such as clientelism and patronage can 
not and will not arise automatically. The state has an important role to play in the creation 
of such structures through generating the necessary structural frameworks that would assist 
cooperation and bridging relationships and help the building of social trust. Hence, the 
expansions of governmental activities together with the radical reformulation of its 
operational practices are the necessary prerequisites for the creation of a more vibrant civil 
society. Simultaneously, the expansion of voluntary associations and of social groups based 
on horizontal ties between its members –trade unions, environmental groups etc- would 
offer a useful complement to the governmental activities.  
 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the two strands of literature employed throughout the 
thesis do not only aim at complementing the existing respective literatures. The 
contributions in the study of the impact that the EURP has in the recipient countries and the 
configurations of the domestic political economy of Greece produce a separate strand of the 
conceptual framework that also contributes significantly to the existing knowledge. It aims 
at overcoming the divide between the -admittedly wide- area of EU studies607 and the 
studies that come from comparative political economy.608 The former focus on the domestic 
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responses that ‘Europe’ or the ‘EU’ produce domestically whilst the latter are interested in 
institutional domestic configurations both at the level of state capacities, civil society 
organisations and economic actors. Through adopting a conceptual framework that 
concurrently examines these dynamics, the aim is to stress the importance of identifying the 
external pressures emanating from the EU and how they are internalised in the domestic 
political economy structures. Thus, a conceptual innovation is that the domestic impact of 
the EU is discussed in conjunction to the pre-existing institutional factors that determine 
economic outcomes. Certainly, the focus of the thesis has been in one specific policy 
domain- the EURP- and the Greek political economy context. Nonetheless, the combination 
of these two literatures can provide a useful orientation for research undertaken in other 
policy areas that are directly or indirectly affected by the EU and/or countries with similar 
institutional characteristics to Greece.   Having discussed the conceptual contributions that 
are aimed through the thesis, the focus now turns to the policy implications that the 
empirical material that was presented entails for Greece and other EU countries.  
 
7.4. Policy implications  
The overall theme that has emerged throughout the thesis is that in the case of Greece there 
is an apparent disjuncture between the regulations that govern the EURP and the domestic 
administrative and political practices. These have influenced the implementation of the 
programmes and specifically hindered their execution in a developmental manner. These 
issues were revealed after the conduct of extensive fieldwork in the case study country. The 
main empirical contribution of the thesis is that the fieldwork was conducted in the period 
after the establishment of the MIS in the early 2000s. The Commission’s strategy has been 
to bypass the rigid and ineffective core civil service and to create institutions with 
significant degrees of autonomy from it. The results of the thesis show that this strategy has 
not borne significant results as the previously established patterns of administrative and 
institutional interaction cancelled any positive effects intended through the MIS.  
 
It goes without saying that Greece is not the only country that faces such issues. The two 
waves of enlargement of 2004 and 2007 signalled the accession of countries with similar – 
albeit not identical – social and political structures to Greece. Certainly, even before the 
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enlargement, countries such as Portugal,609 Spain610 and certain parts of Italy611 faced 
similar problems. Nevertheless, there is limited evidence to suggest that these issues are 
seriously taken into account in the process of drawing up the EURP. The design of the 
policy is an intergovernmental affair which involves the European Council, the 
Commission and the EP in co-deciding the regulations that govern the actions funded 
through the EURP. The new financial perspective which was decided in 2005 signalled the 
reorientation of the EURP’s thematic priorities and the provision of increased funding for 
the newly accessed countries at the expense of the original Cohesion countries.612  
 
However, the EURP is guided by a policy framework that is oblivious to institutional 
conditions at the domestic level, including not only public administration practices but also 
wider issues of state-society actors’ interactions.613 The regulations governing the EURP –
as they are co-decided by the European Council, the European Parliament after receiving 
the relevant recommendations by the Commission- are still the same for every recipient 
state and the implementation is still almost exclusively the prerogative of each country. It 
can be seen that this runs the risk of failing to learn from past mistakes, since the 
administrative and political practices at the domestic level of the countries that entered the 
EU in 2004 and 2007 are likely to be in disjuncture with the EURP requirements.  
 
To be sure, it could be argued that the Commission has understood that when the IMPs 
started in the late 1980’s, more attention should have been given on domestic 
administrative, cultural and institutional conditions at the domestic level. As an 
interviewee614 employed in the DG Regio put it: 
There is little doubt that in the cases of Greece, Portugal, Southern Italy and -to a 
lesser extent Spain- a lot of money given through the structural funds was not used 
as it should have been used and seem to have been ‘lost’. This is because we were 
wrong not to have supported these countries technically and take into account issues 
of corruption, lack of organisational schemes that could support the implementation 
of the programmes and similar issues.   
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Certainly, as was mentioned in chapter 6, at the middle of the second CSF these problems 
had become apparent to the Commission which attempted to alleviate them through the 
introduction of the separate administrative network to manage the EURP in Greece. As 
another Commission employee615 put it, this was because:  
After the first two CSFs we understood that the root of the problem in Greece was 
one of governance so we were keen to promote good governance through the MIS.  
 
Therefore, the ‘steering’ role that the Commission plays during the implementation of the 
programmes is an important one that adds another dimension to the issues discussed in this 
section. In particular, although the EURP is guided by a regulatory framework that does not 
give much credence to the domestic institutional and administrative practices, this trend is 
partially compensated by the Commission’s –particularly DG Regio’s operation. As a 
Commission interviewee616 put it: 
We are trying to be very close to the national circumstances and identify the issues 
that hinder or improve the execution of the programmes. Our colleagues in other 
DGs may be adopting a more panoramic view when dealing with the member states. 
Our intention here [in DG Regio] is to go very deep at the national and sub-national 
levels and look at the practical aspects of the execution of the projects.  
 
Similarly, another Commission interviewee617 pointed out that during the implementation 
of the programmes: 
We are trying to promote networking of the governments with each other but also 
with actors from civil society and the business sector, foster contacts with 
colleagues in other member states, encourage countries to import good practices 
from other countries to their domestic administrative systems...generally we are of 
the view that it is important to promote the modernisation of the national 
administrations so as to improve the outcomes of the structural funds...hoping that 
by creating these ‘islands of modernity’ we can influence the rest of the public 
administration. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that these issues have gained prominent attention by the Commission 
is indicated by the incorporation of specific programmes of administrative reform for the 
2007-13 programming period. To be sure, there have been individual training projects for 
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public sector employees in the past CSFs for Greece–‘Politia’ and ‘Praxis’618- but the 
programming period 2007-13 includes a separate OP for ‘Administrative Reform’. This 
programme will have a horizontal nature and will involve all the implementing bodies – at 
national and sub-national levels – of the fourth programming period. It will aim at 
combating the two main aspects that contribute to the difficulties of the manner in which 
the Greek public administration operates, which have also been identified in the thesis. 
Thus, it will finance actions concerning the enhancement of civil servants’ skills whilst also 
focusing on altering the institutional framework governing the operation of the Greek civil 
service. The aim is the modernisation of the public sector, albeit not in the direction of the 
introduction of New Public Management reforms. Instead, the establishment of basic 
bureaucratic procedures, such as the recognition of job identification for each position 
advertised, is suggested. Furthermore, the introduction of basic methods of meritocratic 
recruitment and promotion is encouraged.  
 
The incorporation of this OP is undoubtedly in the right direction in attempting to reverse 
the main impediments to the successful implementation of the programmes. The experience 
gathered by the implementation of this OP could be used by the EU institutions in order to 
fund similar programmes in the new member states in future programming periods. The 
question of course remains as to whether the institutionalisation and the accompanying 
change in formal rules can lead to changes in informal rules and practices. In other words, 
even if the reform of the administrative system is the obvious way forward for the 
amelioration of the problems identified in the thesis, its effect on broader social structures 
and practices and its potential for the creation of sufficient spillovers cannot be considered 
certain. 
 
However, this activity on behalf of the Commission is not being followed by the Council 
when it comes to adopting EURP regulations that are more sensitive to domestic 
conditions.  True, the Council decided to modify the automatic decommitment rule for the 
newly accessed countries so as to allow them sufficient time to adjust their administrative 
practices. Additionally, the PHARE programme for pre-accession preparedness was 
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adopted, which stipulated the importance of institution building as the process by which to 
help candidate countries develop the structures, strategies and processes needed in order for 
them to successfully implement the programmes funded through the EURP. Nonetheless, 
the ‘n+2’ rule will start applying after 2010,619 thus signalling a return to the strict 
administrative practices –especially those relating with the auditing of the funds- that have 
contributed to the delays that became evident during the third CSF for Greece.  
 
Furthermore, the initial recognition that some of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries faced weak administrative capacities at the regional and local levels, which could 
lead to mismanagement of the funds,620does not seem to have informed the regulations that 
were finally adopted for the 2007-13 period through the European Council.  Similar issues 
can be identified with regard to the EURP regulations that deal with the enforcement of the 
principle of partnership. After four programming periods of CSF assistance, the main 
causes in the different patterns of the implementation of this principle do not seem to have 
informed the regulations adopted by the Council in consultation with the EP. The 
centralised states are more likely to ignore the contribution of the sub-national authorities. 
Conversely, states with a federal system of government will find it more natural to accept 
sub-national partners as equal stakeholders in the implementation of the policy.621 
Moreover, in countries with reduced levels of social capital, the contribution by actors 
representing civil society is more likely to be limited. In contrast, countries with established 
cultures of collaboration and consensus-building will find it easier to implement the only 
principle that entails specific consequences about the democratic systems of the recipient 
countries. Thus, it would make sense if the Council which is primarily responsible for the 
allocation of the EURP funding would distinguish between these groups of countries when 
deciding on this process. It is hardly realistic to expect countries with limited experience in 
democratic participation to successfully implement the principle of partnership. Similarly, 
countries with proven levels of reduced administrative capacity would benefit from being 
allowed more time to adjust their systems to the admittedly demanding regulatory 
framework governing the operation of the EURP.  
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However, there is little doubt that such a policy shift would imply the reinforcement of the 
processes of European integration and a significant increase in the administrative capacity 
of the Commission. As was seen above, the Commission, through its everyday operation 
attempts to compensate for these weaknesses in the regulatory framework governing the 
EURP. It does so by working closely with the member states and ‘steering’ them towards 
the direction of good governance practices that can improve the administrative and 
institutional outcomes produced through the structural funds. However, despite the 
considerable activity of the Commission in this policy area, the co-decision procedures lend 
more power to the Council in the decision making of the EURP regulations. Therefore, a 
policy turn in the directions suggested in this section would have to involve the assigning of 
more legislative powers to the Commission and the EP and/or considerable change of 
political direction at the level of the Council.   
 
Specifically, this policy turn would imply acceptance on behalf of the countries that have 
traditionally been sceptical about the policy for the need to strengthen the supranational 
mechanisms for redistribution. The EURP is not always seen as necessary, either by 
member states that do not benefit directly from cohesion funding or those that favour 
intergovernmental patterns of EU integration. Similarly, certain Commission DGs are not 
always convinced about the need for the existence of a policy that is a priori in contrast to 
their own objectives.622 The achievement of a synergy of the objectives pursued through the 
EURP with the regulations governing competition policy is still a contentious issue that has 
not been resolved with the adoption of the latest regulations on state aid.623  
 
Furthermore, taking into account the fact that the EU budget is still a predominantly 
intergovernmental affair, achieving a consensus at the Council level about the necessity for 
increases in the EU budget is the only way in which the improvements suggested above can 
be achieved. If anything, the crisis of the common currency after the financial collapse of 
2008 seems to have justified those voices624 that were warning against the adoption of a 
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common monetary policy without the concurrent adoption of EU fiscal mechanisms. The 
EURP can undoubtedly provide the blueprint for the adoption of common fiscal 
mechanisms at the EU level which would provide an institutionalised channel for the 
distribution of stabilising funding in future crises of the common currency. This can take 
place inside the discussions for the development of ‘economic governance’ that have been 
gaining increased attention at the Council level after the financial crisis of 2009-10.625 
 
If these are the implications that the thesis points towards for the EU level, at the domestic 
level of Greece the policy implications reflect the parameters taken through the conceptual 
framework adopted throughout the thesis. Therefore, there is little doubt that the country 
has been on the frontier between EU membership and traditional forms of state-society 
interaction such as clientelism and patronage for most of its contemporary history. The 
combined effect of these forces became evident in the financial crisis that erupted in 2009-
11 and was briefly discussed in chapter 3. In general, both the forces of Europeanisation 
and elements of traditional socioeconomic and political arrangements have been 
influencing the country’s polity. The impact that each of these forces has had is almost 
impossible to distinguish, and there is a need to accept that they both play complementary 
albeit at times contradictory roles in influencing political and socioeconomic outcomes. 
Traditional forms of state-society interaction that also influence administrative capacity 
exist in order to compensate for the lack of other forms of incorporation. Wide democratic 
participation based on horizontal networks of association has never existed in the country, 
largely because of the lack of industrialisation but also because of a long tradition of 
authoritarianism. Thus, to expect that the country's accession to the EU would alter these 
practices even after almost thirty years of membership is futile. This is not to say that 
anyone can doubt the importance of participating in the EU, both in political and 
socioeconomic terms. However, expecting a complete reversal of a series of national 
characteristics that have become embedded in the Greek polity because of the participation 
in the EU is not realistic. 
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Operational Programme ‘Competitiveness’, 24 June 2008.  
8) Vassileiou, Mr., former Head of the Managing Authority for the Regional 
Operational Programme of Central Greece and former Head of the Managing 
Authority for the Sectoral Operational Programme ‘Road Axes, Ports and Urban 
Development’ until 2003, 30 July 2008.  
 
Group B. Regional Operational Programme  
1) Papadopoulos Giannis, Mr., Head of Unit C of the Managing Authority of the 
Regional Operational Programme for Western Macedonia, 30 August, 2004.  
2) Mouratidis, Ilias, Mr., former Head of Unit A of the Managing Authority of the 
Regional Operational Programme for Western Macedonia, 31 August, 2004.  
3) Kokkinidis, Panayotis, Mr., Employee of Unit A of the Managing Authority of the 
Regional Operational Programme for Western Macedonia, 31 August, 2004.  
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4) Gkantoutsios Konstantinos, Mr., Head of Unit B of the Managing Authority of the 
Regional Operational Programme for Western Macedonia, 9 September 2005.  
 
Group C. Ministry of Economy  
1) Anthi Pateraki, Ms., former Head of the Department for Training and 
Implementation of the Structural Funds, Ministry for National Economy and 
Finance until 2000, 2 September 2004.  
2) Komninidis Nicos, Mr., Head of Planning and Evaluation of Regional Policy, 
Ministry for National Economy and Finance, 2 September 2004.  
3) Soussounis, Dimitrios, Mr., Head of the Single Paying Authority of the Greek 
Community Support Framework, Ministry of Economy and Finance, September 
2004.  
4) Triantafyloy Matthoula, Ms., Head of the Unit for Monitoring of Sectoral 
Operational Programmes, Managing Authority of the Community Support 
Framework, 24 September 2004.  
5) Iakovidis Dimitris, Mr., Head of the Unit for Special Service for Strategy, Planning 
and Evaluation, Managing Authority of the Community Support Framework, 25 
June 2008.  
6) Bergopoulou Mairi, Ms., Head of Cohesion Fund Monitoring Committee, Managing 
Authority of the Community Support Framework, Ministry of Economy, 30 June 
2008. 
7) Grigoriou Kostas, Mr. Head of Unit D of the Managing Authority of the 
Community Support Framework, 30 June 2008. 
8) Dimopoulou, Mairi, Ms., Head of the Coordination Service for the implementation 
of the Regional Operational Programmes, Managing Authority of the Community 
Support Framework, 17 July 2008.  
9) Tsoumanis, Mr., Head of the Coordination Service for the implementation of the 
Sectoral Operational Programmes, Managing Authority of the Community Support 
Framework, 12 August 2008.  
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Group D. Other institutions involved in the management of the CSF III 
1) Agourides Dexipos, Director General, Management Organisation Unit of the 
Community Support Framework, 6 October 2006.  
2) Koukoula Eni, Ms. Head of Unit B of the European Social Funds Actions 
Coordination and Monitoring Authority, 13 August 2008.  
 
Group E. European Commission  
1) Meadows Graham, Mr., former Director General, Directorate General Regional 
Policy, European Commission, 1 March 2005.   
2) Divaris, Evangelos, Mr., Head of Unit E3, Directorate General Agriculture, 
European Commission, 11 May 2009.    
3) Amodeo, F., Mr., employee, Directorate General Regional Policy, European 
Commission, 12 May 2009.    
4) Sofos, Athanasios, Mr. Structural Funds-Cohesion Fund Bulgaria. Formerly 
responsible for similar roles for Greece. DG Regional Policy. Between 2000-2006 
was seconded to the Greek Ministry of National Economy and Finance, 1 February 
2011.  
5) Shotton Robert, Mr. former Head of Unit for Greece between 2000-2005, DG 
Regional Policy, 1 February 2011.   
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Appendix II. World Bank indicators for Greece 
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